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Abstract 
While not essential, the link between language and national identity is nevertheless 
often a highly important and salient one, a fact illustrated by the centrality of 
linguistic concerns in many nationalist discourses throughout the world. As a result of 
this linkage, it is understandable that those seeking to create or manipulate national 
identities have habitually attempted to do so through the formulation and 
implementation of language policy and planning. This thesis develops a broad 
theoretical framework for the study of national identity and language policy. Of 
particular interest is the manner in which these two phenomena frequently interact and 
the societal consequences of that interaction. 
South Africa represents a fascinating historical and contemporary context in which to 
investigate the effect of language policy and planning on the formation of social 
identities. From the earliest stages of European colonisation to the present day, 
successive governing regimes have attempted to manipulate the various ethnic and 
national identities of the South African population to suit their own ideological 
agendas. In the post-apartheid era, much has been made of the government's official 
policy commitment to promote 'nation-building' through the institutionalisation of 
genuinely multilingual practices in public life. In reality, though, public life in 
present-day South Africa is notable for its increasingly monolingual-English 
character. This contradiction between official policy and actual linguistic practices is 
symptomatic of the hegemony of an implicit 'English-only' ideology that permeates 
most governmental and public organisations. This has led to a situation of highly 
salient language-based identity conflict between many Afrikaans speakers resentful of 
the decreasing presence of Afrikaans in public life and those loyal to the de facto 
monolingual model of nationhood promoted by the ANC. But perhaps the most 
pernicious consequence of this increasing dominance of English has been its 
entrenchment of elitist governing practices that ensure the continued socio-economic 
marginalisation of African language speakers who constitute the large majority of 
South African citizens. If language planners are to convincingly address this problem, 
it is clear that a radically alternative model of language policy and national integration 
needs to be promoted and adopted. 
VI 
1 Introduction 
The preamble to the post-apartheid South African constitution states that 'South 
Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity' and promises to 'lay the 
foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the 
will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law' and to 'improve the 
quality of life of all citizens'. This would seem to commit the South African 
government to, amongst other things, the implementation of policies aimed at 
fostering a common sense of South African national identity, at societal development 
and at reducing of levels of social inequality. However, in the period of more than a 
decade that has now elapsed since the end of apartheid, there has been widespread 
discontent with regard to the degree of progress made in connection with the 
realisation of these constitutional aspirations. The 'limits to liberation' in the post-
apartheid era has been a theme of much recent research in the fields of sociology and 
political theory (e.g. Luckham, 1998; Robins, 2oo5a). Linguists have also paid 
considerable attention to the South African situation with the realisation that many of 
the factors that have prevented, and are continuing to prevent, effective progress 
towards the achievement of these constitutional goals are linguistic in their origin. 
This study sets out to describe and analyse the interplay of linguistic factors, 
especially those relating to language policy and planning activities, with processes of 
national identity formation and expression, both in a general theoretical sense and 
then with relation to the specific South African context. A sound theoretical 
framework will obviously strengthen any understanding and consequent description 
and analysis of a particular case study. Equally, insights from the study of specific 
case studies may aid the formulation or, indeed, rejection of principles that might 
entertain some claim to universality. In this way, then, the universal and the particular 
may be harnessed to operate in a mutually beneficial manner that facilitates the 
heightened understanding of both. 
Although questions of language form the major subject matter of this study, 
considerable attention has been devoted to avoiding the sin of what has been termed 
'linguicentrism' (Spolsky, 2004:ix). That is to say that a consciously multidisciplinary 
approach, which benefits from engagement with fields of study beyond linguistics or 
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even just sociolinguistics, has been adopted. The reason for this is simply that to study 
questions of language in a societal context without reference to, or appreciation of. the 
numerous non-linguistic factors that impact upon the social life of communities is an 
unnecessarily myopic and limiting approach that will likely give skewed, or, plainly 
inaccurate, results. As Spolsky notes: 
[LJanguage policy exists within a complex set of social, political, economic, 
religious, demographic, educational and cultural factors that make up the full 
ecology of human life. While many scholars are now beginning to recognize the 
interaction of economic and political and other factors with language, it is easy 
and tempting to ignore them when we concentrate on language matters. [ ... J My 
position, then, is that language is important and that any studies of societies that 
exclude (as they too often do) language are limited, but that language and 
language policy need to be looked at in the widest context and not treated as a 
closed universe. Language is a central factor but Iinguicentrism imposes limited 
vision. (Spolsky, 2004:ix-x) 
Although it has been a valid criticism of much work previously undertaken in fields 
such as sociology and political theory that insufficient attention, if any at all, has been 
paid to matters of language, it is equally the case that much research into related 
issues such as language policy and language and identity has been overly 
'Iinguicentric' in its approach. While disciplines such as political theory have recently 
increasingly begun to engage with language issues and to benefit from insights from 
the sociology of language and sociolinguistics (Patten and Kymlicka, 2003: 1), it is 
important that this is not merely a one-way flow of knowledge. A reciprocal cross-
fertilisation of research findings from the various academic disciplines that have some 
insights to offer in connection with improving our understanding of the issues at hand 
is clearly highly desirable. A linguicentric approach to the subject of 'language policy 
and nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa' would be deficient in a number of 
ways. It would represent an attempt to describe the whole through a single part. 
Without input from other fields of research, such as social anthropology and 
sociology, this study would be quite incapable of producing any adequate general 
theorisation on the interrelated subjects of ethnicity, nationalism and national identity. 
This, in tum, would make for a deficient theoretical conceptualisation and explanation 
of language policy since, as this study goes to demonstrate, the character and content 
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of language policies are very often strongly influenced by matters of ethnic and 
national identity. In the presence of these deficiencies, then, all that would be possible 
for a linguicentric approach would be to provide a descriptive or documentative, but 
not necessarily comprehensive, case-study specific account. While such an approach 
may be appealing to those with a particular contained interest, whether professional or 
amateur, in the particular case-study context, the inherent limitations of the approach 
mean that it is likely to make a minimal contribution to any general theoretical 
debates and discussions. Therefore, in order that this study may make some worthy 
general theoretical contribution to field of the sociology/politics of language a 
multidisciplinary approach has been adopted as of necessity. 
1.1 Language policy theory and normativity 
In any study of language policy there is inevitably, and necessarily, some descriptive 
element, the function of which is twofold. Firstly, the description and presentation of 
facts pertaining to the subject in hand may simply be of interest in their own right. 
Secondly, the descriptive element serves the purpose of providing necessary empirical 
support to any attempt at analysis and explanation. After all, phenomena such as 
language policies need to be described before they can be effectively analysed. In the 
field of language policy theory, as in other disciplines, a distinction is often drawn 
between descriptive and normative approaches, often with the suggestion that any 
account that goes beyond description must necessarily be normative. This is highly 
unfortunate and symptomatic of a deeply problematic, yet seemingly unconscious or 
certainly unacknowledged, assumption that permeates a great deal of writing on 
language policy. The academic literature concerned with matters of language policy 
and planning is rich in normative theories seeking and claiming to derive a 
sociolinguistic 'ought' from a sociolinguistic 'is'. This presents a deep theoretical 
problem, a problem which is essentially one of philosophy, or more specifically, of 
meta-ethics and which might be termed the problem or, even, the error, of normativity 
(Mackie, 1977). To grasp the essence of this problem, it is necessary to understand 
exactly what normative claims amount to and, in doing so, some terminological care 
is required. Such claims are not simply seeking to establish norms of usage or of 
behaviour in the sense of subjectively determined standards or yardsticks, as do, for 
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example, prescriptivist approaches to grammar and spelling. Nonnative statements are 
actually claiming a discoverable, objective status with an inherently prescriptive and 
compulsion-inducing status for the moral and political values they promote. For 
example, for the many nonnative theorists who advocate language rights it is not 
enough to say, for instance, that 'the promotion and respecting of language rights is 
advisable if one wishes to avoid linguistic conflict'. What such theorists are 
attempting to say is, in effect, something quite different and which essentially 
amounts to the following: 'it is true and right that language rights ought to be 
respected and promoted' . 
To engage in normative discussions necessarily implies acceptance, whether 
conscious or unconscious, of the notion that there exist such things as objective moral 
and political values or standards. The reason that normativity is so widespread within 
the field of language policy theory is probably that it has historically been a central 
characteristic of much general political theory and philosophy, especially liberal 
political theory, a branch which has recently shown an increasing interest in matters 
of language policy. From Plato's 'Forms of the Good' (Mackie, 1977:59) to the 
Kantian notions of the 'categorical imperative' and the 'kingdom of ends' (Korsgaard, 
1996) to the Rawlsian conceptions of 'the good life' and 'public goods' (Rawls, 1971, 
1985; Boran, 2003), ethical and political theory has made numerous attempts to 
establish an objective theory of political morality. The language of normative ethics 
has come to feature strongly in much writing on language policy. For example, a 
review of Skutnabb-Kangas' (2000) book on linguistic human rights and linguistic 
genocide was, giving a clear indication of the tone of the book, entitled 'Linguistic 
Diversity as a Categorical Imperative' and Stroud and Heugh (2003:2) have affirmed 
their 'commitment to the moral imperative behind the linguistic human rights 
paradigm'. Elsewhere, Kymlicka and Patten's (2003) prominent volume on language 
rights also explicitly 'examines the issue of language rights from the perspective of 
normative political theory' . 
This is not the place to enter into a full-scale meta-ethical discussion on the issue of 
normative ethics but suffice it here to say that if one rejects, as this author does, the 
notion of the objectivity of moral values, it is clear that a vast amount of work within 
language policy that styles itself as, or is unconsciously or unknowingly, normative is 
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working within what Mackie (1977) terms an 'error theory'. Not only that, huge 
amounts of effort, money and time are being spent, one might even say wasted, on 
looking for things (objective values) which, ontologically speaking, are not there. This 
assertion may well prove unpalatable and unpopular to many individuals working 
within the field of language policy. One is aware that, in the eyes of many, an 
argument stripped of any moral pretensions may lose some of its persuasive force and 
attractiveness. After all, there can be little disagreement over the fact that an appeal to 
a moral truth argument often serves as a 'useful fiction' in compelling people to 
undertake a particular action which they may not otherwise perform. If one cannot 
assert the superiority of certain values which one cherishes, one may be liable to 
wonder if it is worth the effort to uphold and promote them and, admittedly, there 
may be no satisfactorily comforting answer to this concern. One might then wonder 
why the present author has been motivated to even raise the issue of normativity. The 
simple answer is that, in the name of academic rigour and honesty, it is an issue which 
requires attention and discussion. At the very least, it would seem necessary for those 
language policy theorists who operate within a normative framework to mount a 
defence or offer an explanation of their position on this issue. As of yet, though, there 
does not seem to have been even the slightest acknowledgement or suggestion that 
there might be an important theoretical issue here from those working within the 
language policy field. This is because the default position of normativity within the 
field of language policy does not appear to have had any explicit challenge or 
contestation. Consequently, many discussions of language policy, particularly those 
concerned with matters of rights and diversity, unthinkingly continue to take place 
within an extremely dubious conceptual framework based on deeply troubling 
unconscious assumptions about the ontological status of moral and political values, or 
on a seriously flawed understanding of the significance of the type of claims being 
made. 
Language policy theory does not need to posit the existence of objective moral values 
as part of its epistemological apparatus. Indeed, this insight could even be seen as a 
refreshing development by helping to undermine the many stultifying, navel-gazing 
discussions centring upon moral questions in language policy. Questions of what 
'ought to' or 'should' be done can only be answered in relation to a set of pre-
determined, subjective desires or interests, in the absence of which, such questions 
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become ontologically redundant and meaningless. Value positions related to issues of 
language, or indeed to any issues, are to be made and not discovered. 
None of this, of course, is to deride and dismiss all work on language policy from 
within normative paradigms as redundant and uninteresting. And, indeed, much 
writing on language policy that would qualify as normative is discussed and cited in 
the course of this study, particularly in chapter 3. However, no normative response to, 
or assessment of, these works is given. Instead, the normative points of view that are 
discussed are analysed in terms of their internal coherence and cogency and the 
success with which they tackle the issues they engage with. For example, in the 
discussion of the ecolinguistic arguments for preserving linguistic diversity (see 
section 3.6.2), all of which tend to be exceedingly normative, no moral case is 
advanced either way for the rightness or wrongness of linguistic diversity. Instead, 
attention is paid to issues such as the inadequate conceptions of linguistic diversity 
that many of these arguments promote, the dubious claims made regarding the 
linkages between language, knowledge and world-view and the use of misleading 
metaphors like that which compares the loss of linguistic diversity to the destruction 
of the world's biodiversity. Equally, the model of language policy and national 
integration outlined in chapter 6 also makes no claim to any objective moral status. 
Careless analysis may well lead some to interpret it as normative, given the almost 
unconscious expectation of normativity that pervades the field of language policy 
theory. However, this would be a mistake. Admittedly, this model does indeed reveal 
some of the present author's preferences for a model of language and society in post-
apartheid South Africa, which incidentally might well be shared by some individuals 
of a normative persuasion, but it does not claim to reveal any more than that. 
1.2 Methodology 
Two principal, complementary methodologies have been employed in the production 
of this study. The first involves a descriptive and analytical synthesis of primary and 
secondary source material. Primary sources include governmental policy documents, 
sociolinguistic surveys, census data and websites of relevant organisations (for 
example, that of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, see section 4.5.1). As 
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for secondary sources, one of the most abundant sources of information used in this 
thesis has been press reports. As any subscriber to the internet based Language Policy 
List (LGPolicy-List) will no doubt be aware, there has, in recent years, been an 
abundance of press material concerning language policy issues in South Africa. These 
press reports have been an invaluable source of information both in terms of keeping 
up with the latest developments on the South African scene and for contributing to a 
rather less quantitatively definable appreciation of the relevant issues and situations. 
Other secondary sources include a wide range of academic writing (journal articles, 
monographs, edited volumes etc.) on issues relevant to the subject matter of the thesis. 
The second methodological approach adopted consisted of a series of informal semi-
structured interviews with many language professionals and other academics, 
including sociologists, political theorists and historians, both within and outside of 
South Africa. This study contains no explicit description or analysis of these 
interviews themselves, rather their purpose was to allow the present author to gain a 
more profound, nuanced impression and understanding of the political and linguistic 
situation in South Africa. Needless to say, many of the ideas developed in this thesis 
owe much to the insights gleaned during the course of these interviews. 
1.3 Outline of the study 
The main emphasis of this study is to investigate the role of language policy and 
planning in the formation and consolidation of national identities, first in a general 
theoretical sense and then with specific application to the South African situation. The 
initial chapters of this study develop a broad theoretical framework for the description 
and analysis of key concepts. Chapter 2 presents a discussion of the most central 
concepts relevant to discussions of ethnic and national identities. Of particular interest 
is the issue of definition. The definition of such concepts as ethnicity, ethnic group 
and nation has long preoccupied academic theorists of ethnicity and nationalism and 
has been a source of much debate and controversy. A central element of this problem 
of definition has been the question of how, if at all, one should go about 
distinguishing the kindred concepts of ethnic group and nation. It is argued that while 
not all theorists seek to make any meaningful distinction between the two, there 
remains good reason for doing so. It is recognised that while a core ethnic element is 
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what unites the concepts of an ethnic group and a nation, they can be distinguished on 
account of the latter_'s politicisation and possession of civic elements. Consequently, a 
view of the nation as a combination of both ethnic and civic elements is advanced. 
The adoption of this view necessarily requires the rejection of the idea that individual 
nations can be neatly classified as either purely ethnic or purely civic communities, 
although it is still argued that the ethnic/civic dichotomy may retain some usefulness 
as a heuristic device in describing certain emphases of nationalist discourses. In the 
light of this insight, it is argued that many post-colonial nation-building projects are 
misguided in their attempts to promote purely civic conceptions of nationhood and 
overlook or bypass the ethnic component of national identity because it is generally 
deemed too recessive and divisive. Another issue discussed in chapter 2 is that 
regarding the supposed modernity of nations. It is noted that while many modernist 
accounts of nation formation (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Breuilly, 1993; Gellner, 1983; 
Hobsbawm, 1990) offer several important insights, particularly regarding the role of a 
standardised public culture in the development of the national community, their 
emphasis on the total modernity of contemporary nations seems somewhat overstated. 
The view of nations developed in this chapter is more in line with that of Smith (1986; 
1998; 2001), which sees nations as a fusion of pre-modern ethnic type elements with 
modern civic ones. Finally, the relationship between language and ethnic and national 
identity is considered in-depth. It is noted that while it is not possible to credibly 
assert an essential link between language and ethnic and national identities, thereby 
refuting the related theories of linguistic nationalism and linguistic determinism, 
language is frequently a highly central and salient marker of such identities. An 
attempt is then made to account for this language-identity relationship. The question 
of whether there is any significant difference in the relationship between language and 
ethnic group identity and between language and national identity is also considered. 
Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework for the study of the concepts of language 
policy and language planning. Again, considerable attention is given to the issue of 
definition. This is necessary since, as with many discussions of ethnicity and 
nationalism, discussions of language policy are often beset by uncertain or careless 
usage of terminology. Having considered some of these terminological and 
definitional issues, an understanding of language policy as a tri-partite combination of 
linguistic ideology, practices and language planning or management activities is 
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developed. Language planning, then, is not viewed as a phenomenon distinct from 
language policy but, rather, as a sub-element of language policy. Building on the link 
established between language and ethnic and national identities in chapter 2, a unified 
notion of 'language planning as identity planning' is advanced. Following on from 
this, it is then possible to regard language policies as types of identity policy. This 
insight fonns the theoretical basis for the typology of 'language-in-national identity 
policies' that is proposed in section 3.4.1. Finally, this chapter ends with an extensive, 
in-depth analytical discussion of some of the most prominent trends and issues in 
contemporary language policy theory. Issues discussed include the 'ecolinguistic' and 
'Linguistic Human Rights' arguments for maintaining and promoting linguistic 
diversity. Noting that these arguments contain no scope for reconciliation between the 
desire to promote state-led nation-building and the desire to defend linguistic 
diversity, attention is then given to some notable attempts from within the so-called 
'liberal culturalist' paradigm to make just such a reconciliation, chiefly through the 
advocacy of group-differentiated rights and, in doing so, solve the supposed 'pluralist 
dilemma'. 
The focus of the remaining chapters of this study switches to the specific South 
African situation. Developing the notion of language policy as an ideological 
discourse process, chapter 4 gives a historical overview of language policy and 
planning trends in South Africa from the earliest period of European colonisation to 
the present day. In particular, it seeks to describe and analyse the historical language 
and identity processes in South African society in the light of the concept of 'language 
policy as identity policy' developed in chapter 3. The discussion focuses on how the 
differing ideologies of the various ruling regimes, from the earliest Dutch-speaking 
settlers to the present-day post-apartheid ANC government, have influenced attempts 
to construct and manipulate social identities through the formulation and 
implementation of language policy and planning measures. An assessment of the 
relative success of these policies is also given, with the main observation being that 
the history of attempts to construct and manipulate identities through language policy 
and planning in South Africa has largely been one of coercion and failure. The latter 
part of this chapter involves an extensive description and analysis of the failure of the 
post-apartheid regime to effectively implement a policy of nation-building through the 
institutionalisation of 'equitable multilingualism' that is line with the putative 
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commitments to do so which are expressed in the language-related clauses of the 
South African constitution. This failure is attributed to the existence of a great 
discrepancy between official or overt government language policy and its covert 
policy which is revealed by the actual linguistic practices of government and other 
public organisations which tend to be highly monolingual-English. This facilitates the 
continuing strong persistence of the phenomenon of 'elite closure' (Myers-Scotton, 
1990; 1993), which has the effect of preventing that majority of South African 
citizens without an adequate command of English from participating effectively in the 
public life of the state and so also of ensuring their continued socio-economic 
marginalisation. 
Chapter 5 looks at a specific case of contemporary language/identity conflict within 
the South African context, namely that surrounding the issue of the functions and 
status of the Afrikaans language in the post-apartheid era. It is shown how the 
political supremacy of the ANC's ideological discourse in the post-apartheid years 
has greatly contributed to the declining position of Afrikaans as a public language. 
The ANC's linguistic ideology is strongly monolingual-English and fundamentally 
hostile to any public multilingual practices which depart from that ideology. 
Afrikaans is particularly stigmatised by this ideology owing to the continued 
perception of it as the 'language of apartheid' and of white dominance over the black 
population, something which threatens the model of nationhood being advanced by 
the ANC and which also, therefore, lends great emotive force to the issue. For the 
Afrikaners, the ANC's de facto hostility towards Afrikaans is experienced as a grave 
threat to the most central and hallowed element of their national identity which, again, 
has leant a highly emotive element to Afrikaner participation in, and experience of, 
the debate. The debate is also examined from a nation-building perspective. It is 
shown how the persistence of this identity conflict works contrary to the interests of 
those seeking to promote an inclusive model of national integration. The essentially 
irrational nature of the conflict lends it an intractable quality which largely negates 
any rational, planned attempts to resolve it. Effective nation-building cannot occur in 
the midst of significant social conflict. Another theme developed in this chapter is 
how the continued perception and experience of the 'Afrikaans issue' as being solely 
an identity conflict between the white Afrikaans-speaking community and those loyal 
to the ANC model of nationhood has facilitated the continued marginalisation and 
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invisibilisation of non-white speakers of Afrikaans from the debate. Consequently, 
most black and coloured Ll speakers of Afrikaans are, just like speakers of the 
African languages, prevented from contributing towards nation-building through the 
medium of their mother tongue. 
Chapter 6 seeks to develop a model of language policy that may facilitate the effective 
incorporation of all South African citizens into the national system through societal 
development and the reduction of social inequality. The central ideological and 
structural factor which is preventing meaningful progress towards the integration of 
the most marginalised members of South African society is identified as the liberal, 
capitalist nature of the current political dispensation which has allowed the extensive 
institutionalisation of authoritarian, elitist governing practices despite the widespread 
affirmation of an ideology of equality and human rights. The linguistic element of this 
authoritarianism is manifested in the increasingly exclusive use of English by 
governmental and other public organisations. These evermore monolingual practices 
are ensuring the continued banishment of the African languages and, as discussed in 
chapter 5, increasingly Afrikaans, from the public sphere. Several issues are 
discussed, and suggestions considered, pertaining to how one might effectively go 
about introducing practices which resist authoritarianism and entrench democratic 
linguistic practices in South African public life. For example, the issue of language 
activism, widely championed as a means of advancing linguistic democratisation, is 
discussed from a nation-building perspective. Also discussed is the proposal, most 
notably championed by the South African sociologist of language and political 
activist Neville Alexander (1989; 1992; 2000), to harmonise the Nguni and Sotho 
language clusters and create a single overarching standard for each. Some of the 
potentially attractive aspects of the proposal, as far as furthering national integration 
is concerned, are considered and, of course, some of the very grave difficulties. It is 
noted that the proposal has failed to get off the ground and gain widespread 
acceptance partly as a result of the lack of active support for it from the population at 
large and due to the great resistance shown to it, firstly by those with a vested interest 
in promoting those ethnolinguistic communities institutionalised through the present 
official status of their corresponding standard languages and, secondly, and somewhat 
more inexplicably, by certain scholars who have continued to cling to these numerous 
standardised languages, many of which were deliberate constructions of the apartheid 
11 
state. The proposal has also suffered as a result of misinterpretation, with many 
wrongly seeing it as a subtractive measure when it has actually been advocated as an 
additive measure. Finally, the issue of individual multilingualism is considered. From 
the perspective of national integration, the benefits of a situation of reciprocal societal 
multilingualism, that is to sayan ideal-type situation in which all South African 
citizens would be meaningfully competent in Afrikaans. English and at least one 
African language, are explained. Unfortunately. this scenario will remain an unlikely 
prospect as long as native speakers of English and Afrikaans continue to ha\e almost 
no instrumental or economic incentive to learn an African language. The question is 
then posed whether any language planning measures can realistically hope to bring 
about a change in this situation and advance the cause of national integration. 
A concluding chapter begins by summarising the main findings of the thesis. This 
final chapter then ends with some suggestions for future rescarch, highlighting hoth 
the need for further research within the specific South African context and in a more 
general theoretical context. In particular, some of the benefits of a comparative 
approach to the study of language policy and processes of identity formation and 
consolidation are outlined. One context that would potentially make a fascinating 
comparative study with the South African situation is the European Union. The 
interest in comparing these two polities stems from the fact that both ha\'c 
ideologically very similar official language policies (liberal democratic. rights-
orientated, putative commitment to promoting linguistic diversity) despite their highly 
contrasting sociological and political contexts. 
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2 Key concepts in the study of ethnic and 
national identities 
2.1 Introduction: the problem of definition 
The issue of definition has traditionally been a central feature of discussions of 
nations and nationalism (Renan, 1990; Stalin, 1973: M.Weber. 1948). Academic 
unanimity in response to the foundational question of 'what is a nation':' has been. 
and continues to be, notably lacking. Evidence of the uncertainty about what is 
precisely meant by the term nation is demonstrated by the fact that it is frequently 
(mis)used to refer to a number of different concepts. Probably the most regrettable 
and also the most puzzling (mis)employment of the term is when it is used to refer to 
a state. This is unf0l1unate and. to an extent, quite perplexing because. unlike a nation. 
a state is something that can be relatively easily conceptualised in time and space and 
defined quantitatively from without as a political-territorial entity occupying a certain 
geographical position. Yet. as Connor argues: 
Defining and conceptual ising the nation is much more difficult because the 
essence of a nation is intangible. This essence i" a psychological bond that joins a 
people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from 
all other people in the most \ital way. (Connor, 1994a:36) 
While essentially correct. the problem with Connor's remarks here is that they could 
equally be applied to ethnic groups. And indeed. it is not uncommon for the terms 
nation and ethnic group to be used interchangeably in both common and academic 
parlance. Often this may simply be the result of terminological carelessness or 
imprecision. for there are many undeniable similarities between the two concepts. 
Eriksen (2002: I I) notes. for example. that 'the term "ethnic group" has come to mean 
something like "a people'''. Indeed, the word 'ethnicity' and its various cognate terms 
havc their origin in the Greek word ethnos, meaning a people or tribe. Yet. the term 
nation is also frequently used to designate a people. The Russian word narod, for 
cxample. can mean both a people and a nation. Elsewhere, in Afri kaans. the terms 
nl/sic and \'olk are often treated synonymously (Jordaan. 2004:75) but both terms also 
carry a very strong suggestion of ethnic group identity. If the terms nation and ethnic 
group are to have any value as individual analytical concepts, and it will be argued 
that they can, it is necessary to look for characteristics which may distinguish them 
from one another instead of just focussing on the common characteristics which unite 
the two concepts. 
The following discussion considers various different approaches to. and criteria for, 
defining the nation. Particular attention is devoted to the conceptual relationship 
between the kindred terms nation and ethnic group and the question of how one might 
go about identifying both their shared and differing characteristics. Also discussed 
and critically analysed is the traditionally popular ethnic/civic dichotomy which has 
often been invoked in attempts to classify individual nations. Finally, the discussion 
turns to the relationship between language and ethnic and national identities. Of 
particular interest is the question of whether, given the similarities and differences 
noted between ethnic groups and nations, there is any significant difference in the 
relationship between language and the two types of group. Among the other questions 
considered are whether it is necessary for ethnic and national groups to have a unique 
language of their own or even whether such groups can exist without possessing a 
common means of linguistic communication. 
2.2 The ethnic/civic dichotomy 
Traditionally, the most common approach to defining the concept of a nation in 
general terms and then classifying indi vidual nations has been based on the drawing 
of a dichotomous distinction between 'ethnic' and 'civic' nationalisms (e.g. 
Schnapper, 1996). This distinction has also been conceptualised variously in terms of 
'cultural' versus 'political' nationa1isms or even 'Eastern' versus 'Western' 
nationa1isms (Kohn, 1967). These two types of nationalism tend, with respect to the 
content of their ideological conviction, to promote quite different conceptions of the 
nation. According to ethnic nationalism, membership in the nation is, theoretically, 
largely involuntary and determined by a belief in shared culture and common ethnic 
origins. Conversely, following the civic tradition, membership of the nation is 
achieved, in principle, through formal belonging to the legal community of the 
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territorial state in which members theoretically have unifonn, undifferentiated rights 
and obligations, irrespective of race, gender, age or any ethnocultural traits (Smith, 
1986: 135). According to the civic model, the bonds of nationhood, that is to say the 
sense of solidarity and community which serves as the basis of the national identity, 
are located in the existence of shared political and philosophical values. The classic 
example of this phenomenon in action is the promotion of the values of liberte, 
egalite and Jraternite (freedom, equality and brotherhood) as a central, defining 
feature of modem French republican nationalist discourse. 
The origin and persistence of the ethnic/civic dichotomy can be better appreciated if 
one considers the particular significance and function of the state in each case. In 
those cases where a pre-existing ethnic group acquires its own state, or mobilises 
itself with the aim of acquiring one, a case of ethnic nationalism is nonnally said to 
have occurred. Those states which cannot appeal to any sense of pre-existing 
ethnocultural similarity and solidarity amongst their citizenry, normally conceive of, 
and attempt to construct, a common national identity through an emphasis on 
belonging to what Anderson (1983: 15) describes as 'an imagined political 
community'. In such cases, it tends to be certain political values that are promoted as 
the essence of the national identity in question. Consequently, a case of 'civic' or 
'political' nationalism is said to have occurred. 
It is important, at this point, to clarify that to talk of ethnic or civic nationalisms is not 
the same as talking of ethnic or civic nations (Oakes and Warren, 2007: 13). 
Unfortunately, this distinction is not always appreciated. While the ethnic/civic 
distinction remains a useful device for classifying varying types and aspects of 
nationalist self-projection and aspiration, it does not follow that nations themselves 
can be so easily dichotomised according to such criteria. Although many nationalists 
would wish to believe otherwise, there is very rarely, if at all, a one-to-one 
relationship between the image and conception of the nation promoted by nationalist 
rhetoric, however sincerely believed in, and the sociological reality of the situation. 
Indeed, nationalist rhetoric tends to have a somewhat selective memory, representing 
as it does a set of aspirations, supposed destinies and mythologised pasts. Although 
different nationalist movements and other vested interests may style the nation in 
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question as a purely ethnic or civic community, nations generally show themselves, 
often unwittingly, to be composed of both ethnic and civic elements. 
2.2.1 'Ethnic' nations 
The mam problem in defining a nation purely on the basis of shared culture or 
common ethnic origin is that, in doing so, one is increasingly less able to distinguish it 
from the concept of an ethnic group. For some authors though, this is just as it should 
be, as they do not see any appreciative structural or functional differences between the 
two concepts. I.M. Lewis, for example, perceives the only difference between 
concepts such as 'tribe', 'ethnic group' and 'nation' as being one of scale, when he 
asks: 'Are these smaller segments significantly different? My answer is that they are 
not: that they are simply smaller units of the same kind' (I.M. Lewis, 1985:358). 
According to this view then, a nation should merely be regarded as an ethnic group 
writ-large. It also treats these concepts as synonymous with the concept of a 'cultural 
group' which, as shall be seen, is an ultimately inadequate approach. To return to the 
question in hand, it would appear that size is not always a satisfactory distinguishing 
criterion. To use such a method to distinguish nations from ethnic groups would 
frequently yield unsatisfactory results. Ethnic groups are not necessarily smaller than 
nations. For example, many immigrant communities in countries such as the USA or 
the United Kingdom are far larger numerically than, say, the populations of Iceland, 
Luxembourg or Estonia, yet most would unhesitatingly, and correctly, categorise the 
latter as nations and the former as ethnic groups. 
One of the most notable defenders of an ethnic approach to the definition of the nation 
is Walker Connor (1991; 1993; 1994a; 1 994b ). However, Connor's approach differs 
from that of I.M.Lewis in that he sees some benefit in making a conceptual distinction 
between 'ethnic group' and 'nation'. Yet, his criteria for making such a distinction 
present a number of difficulties. Firstly, Connor explicitly rejects the introduction of 
any political criteria in defining a nation when he talks of restricting usage of the tenn 
to 'its proper non-political meaning of a human collectivity' (Connor,1994a:36). 
Accordingly, to talk of civic or political nationalism, which links the idea to the state, 
is terminologically inaccurate and misleading since '[n]ationalism, in correct usage, 
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refers to an emotional attachment to one's people - one's ethnocultural group 
(Connor, 1993:374). Again then, we arrive at a conception of the nation which is 
largely identical to that of the ethnic group. The sole criterion that Connor proposes in 
order to make a distinction between the two concepts is that of self-awareness. 
[A] nation is a self-aware ethnic group. An ethnic group may be readily discerned 
by an anthropologist or other outside observer, but until the members are 
themselves aware of the group's uniqueness, it is merely an ethnic group and not a 
nation. While an ethnic group may, therefore be other-defined, the nation mllst be 
self-defined. (Connor, 1994a:43) 
Aside from the problem of how one determines whether a human collectivity is self-
aware or not, something which is surely a question of degree and which varies 
considerably amongst individual members of the group concerned, Connor's position 
here would seem to conflict with some important anthropological perspectives on 
ethnicity. Certainly, it conflicts with Moerman's (1965) definition of ethnicity as an 
'emic l category of ascription'. To demarcate ethnic groups solely according to other-
defined, 'objectively' ascribed criteria, such as shared cultural traits, is often shown 
up to be an inadequate approach, as boundaries of ethnicity and culture frequently do 
not coincide. Perhaps the most notable research in support of this insight is that of 
Barth (1969; 1989). Barth's approach to the delimitation of ethnic groups emphasises 
the importance of the subjectively determined boundaries which delineate one group 
from another rather than the objective cultural traits which immure them. Barth 
(1969: 14-15) writes that: 
[W]e can assume no simple one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and 
cultural similarities or differences [ ... ] [It] makes no difference how dissimilar 
members may be in their overt behaviour - if they say they are A, in contrast to 
another cognate category B, [ ... ] they declare their allegiance to the shared culture 
of A's. (Barth, 1969:14-15) 
Furthermore, there may be more objective cultural variation within a single named 
ethnic group than exists amongst several others. This is certainly true of linguistic 
variation, for example (see section 3.6.1). To refer to an objectively delineated 
I A common anthropological tenn meaning 'from the nalive point of view'. 
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cultural group as an ethnic group, as Connor does, is confusing because it suggests the 
presence of ethnicity where it may not necessarily exist. What Connor refers to as 
ethnic groups might better be called potential ethnic groups. That is to say they have a 
common cultural basis from which future sentiments of ethnic self-awareness might 
conceivably develop but which, as of yet, have not done so. Following this, it is 
therefore necessary to adopt a more subjective approach when delimiting ethnic 
groups. What is important is not actual cultural difference but perceived or believed 
difference. As Eriksen notes: 
Ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider 
themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom 
they have a minimum of regular interaction [ ... ] The first fact of ethnicity is the 
application of systematic distinctions between insiders and outsiders; between Us 
and Them. If no such principle exists there can be no ethnicity. (Eriksen, 2002: 12-
19) (Emphasis added) 
Eriksen breaks with the traditional view of ethnicity as the 'quality of an ethnic group' 
(Glazer and Moynihan, 1975: 1). Instead, he stresses that ethnicity should be seen as 
the property of the relationship between different groups. For that relationship to exist, 
communities must be aware of the existence of other groups and believe in their own 
difference from those groups, all of which must imply the existence of a certain level 
of group self-awareness. Smith (1986:22-3) draws attention to the important fact that 
ethnic groups always possess a collective name. 
Are there any unnamed ethnie (short of ruling them out by definitionaljiat)? I do 
not know of any. [ ... ] [C]ollective names are a sure sign and emblem of ethnic 
communities, by which they distinguish themselves and summarize their 
'essence' to themselves. (Smith, 1986:22-3) 
Similarly, Calhoun makes the following observation: 
We know of no people without names, no languages or cultures in which some 
manner of distinction between self and other, we and they, are not made [ ... J Self-
knowledge - always a construction no matter how much it feels like a discovery-
is never altogether separable from claims to be known in specific ways by others. 
(Calhoun, 1994: 9-) 0) 
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The point here is that collective naming is an important aspect of the subjective, self-
definition of ethnic groups. A group's acceptance and use of a name to refer to itself 
and distinguish itself from other groups again must imply a level of self-awareness. 
Outsiders may ascribe ethnic labels to groups of people either through ignorance or 
vested interest but that does not necessarily correspond to those people' sown 
inhabited sense of group identity and belonging (Blommaert, 2006:38). Quite why the 
ethnicity of an ethnic group may be externally determined and imposed upon it, 
whereas nations are free to determine their own ethnic boundaries remains unclear. 
Indeed, this represents a contradiction at the core of Connor's distinction between 
ethnic groups and nations since it defines ethnicity according to different criteria in 
each case. If the boundaries of ethnic groups may be defined according to objective, 
external criteria but the ethnicity of a nation purely according to subjective 
perception, then we are clearly not talking about the same thing in each case, a fact 
which rather undermines the validity and purpose of the whole discussion. If we 
accept that ethnicity is present at the borders of both ethnic groups and nations, it 
seems odd, not to say nonsensical, to use different definitions of ethnicity in each case 
as the basis for deriving an analytical distinction between the two concepts. 
In attempting to make such a distinction, what Connor sees as self-awareness (or lack 
thereof) is actually better conceived of in terms of political self-expression, 
mobilisation and organisation. Indeed, Connor (1994a:45) himself comes close to 
acknowledging this when he writes that the 'level of ethnic solidarity that a segment 
of the ethnic element feels when confronted with a foreign element need not be very 
important politically and comes closer to xenophobia than to nationalism' (my 
emphasis). Setting aside the fact that nations seem equally capable of, and prone to, 
bouts of xenophobia, one comes much closer to a useful criterion for distinguishing 
between ethnic groups and nations when one considers the issue of the (non-) 
politicisation of ethnicity. The problem with ruling out any political factors in 
defining the nation is that it forces one to look elsewhere for, and insist upon, 
distinguishing traits, couched in non-political terms, such as self-awareness, which 
may cause one to draw false conclusions. In this case, the result is misleading because 
it confuses and conflates group self-consciousness and political mobilisation. The two 
phenomena are not the same thing. While political mobilisation certainly implies 
group self-consciousness the reverse is not necessarily true. Many ethnic groups may 
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be incapable or unwilling to organise themselves according to the nationalist principle 
of political and ethnic congruency, yet it does not follow that such groups do not 
perceive themselves as constituting distinct social communities. Gellner underlines 
this point, noting that the group self-awareness or self-identification of nations is not 
something unprecedented or unique to them: 
Will, consent, identification, were not ever absent from the human scene [ ... J 
[T]acit self-identification has operated on behalf of all kinds of groupings, larger 
or smaller than nations, or cutting across them, or defined horizontally in other 
ways. In brief, even if will were the basis of a nation (to paraphrase an idealist 
definition of the state), it is also the basis of so much else, that we cannot possibly 
define the nation in this manner. (Gellner, 1983:54) 
Connor's criterion of 'self-awareness' essentially asserts a psychological difference 
between the concept of a nation and that of an ethnic group. However, given what we 
know about the nature and location of ethnicity, the validity of that assertion must be 
seriously questioned. Rather than looking for psychological differences, we should 
instead look for sociological differences between the two concepts. And, indeed, the 
most striking sociological difference between nations and ethnic groups is that 
concerning their respective levels of politicisation. 
A nation [ ... ] must 'be in aspiration (if not yet in fact) a political community'. It 
must aspire to self-government, to in some way control 'a chunk of the earth's 
surface'.2 In that way a nation is very different from something that is merely an 
ethnic group. (Nielsen, 1999: 122) 
This approach would seem to present a more satisfactory basis for distinguishing 
ethnic groups from nations. However, in looking to distinguish the two concepts one 
should be careful not to overlook their shared characteristics, of which ethnicity or 
ethnic character is undoubtedly the most prominent. The ignorance or denial of the 
shared characteristics of ethnic groups and nations is perhaps the greatest weakness in 
many modernist or purely 'civic' accounts of the nation as a sociological 
phenomenon. 
2 The two phrases in quotation marks are taken from Miller (1985:24-5). 
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2.2.2 'Civic' nations 
It has been argued that purely ethnic definitions of the nation, which reject any non-
ethnocultural criteria, make it difficult to distinguish it from the concept of an ethnic 
group. However, by admitting political or civic criteria into the definitional arena, one 
is much more able to make a useful distinction between the two concepts. Some 
accounts of the nation, though, have made the mistake of rejecting ethnicity altogether 
and sought to define the nation solely according to non-ethnic, political criteria. Such 
is the case with so-called 'civic' models of nationhood which equate membership of 
the nation with membership of the political community of the state. 
In his attempt to distinguish between ethnies3 and nations, Smith (200 I: 13) lists the 
shared and differing attributes of each. Those shared attributes are a proper name, 
common myths, and shared memories. In other words, it is these subjectively 
determined ethnic-type attributes which unite the two concepts. The concepts are 
similar in that they both denote inhabited, collective cultural identities. Where they 
differ is with regard to their objectively observable civic or political attributes. It is 
helpful, as Smith (2001: 14) suggests, to view the nation as a more specialised version 
of an ethnic group. The ethnic group, then, may be regarded as the more generic 
concept. The nation is the more specialised concept by virtue of the more numerous, 
specific conditions that must be fulfilled for it to be said to exist. For example, a 
nation, unlike an ethnic group, must possess or be seeking to establish a common 
public culture sustained by a standardised education system, a single economy and 
have a legal framework which (theoretically at least) enshrines common rights and 
duties for all members of the nation (Miller, 1995:27). A nation must also possess a 
territorial homeland (Krejci and Velimsky, 1981). Without possessing a territory of its 
own, it is inconceivable that a common public culture and economic system could be 
established by a national group without overlapping and impinging on that of another 
national community, something which would likely be the source of intolerable 
tension and conflict (Smith, 200 1 :31). Whereas ethnic groups may, and frequently do, 
occupy their historical homeland, they need not necessarily do so, with it often 
sufficing for them to only possess the memory of, or some other link with, some 
3 Smith uses the French tenn in the absence of a single English word to denote an ethnic group. 
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territory of (believed) origin. May (2001 :54) notes that 'the "nation" includes five 
key dimensions - psychological (consciousness of forming a group), territorial, 
historical, cultural and political'. An ethnic group may only include three or four of 
these dimensions. It includes the psychological, historical and cultural dimensions and 
mayor may not include the territorial dimension. What it does not include is the 
political dimension. It is with the incorporation of the political dimension that the 
change from ethnic group to nation takes place. 
A common mistake has been to pursue the diseased logic that because nations differ 
from ethnic groups by virtue of their civic or political attributes, they can therefore be 
defined purely according to such features. The myth of the non-ethnic, political nation 
has been a seductive and persistent one. Partly, this can again be blamed on abuse of 
terminological licence with the interutilisation of, and resultant lack of, coherent 
conceptual distinction between the terms nation, state and nation-state. The frequent 
interchangeable use of the terms nation and state has given rise to a similarly 
frequent, imprecise use of their collocation - the term nation-state. Once belonging to 
the legal community of the state becomes conflated with belonging to the nation, it is 
easy to see how most states become almost indiscriminately referred to as nation-
states. This confusion stems, to a great extent, from a reluctance amongst some 
modernist theorists to admit ethnicity as a qualifying factor for nationhood 
(Hobsbawm, 1990; Balibar, 1991). However, if one accepts that nations do indeed 
have an ethnic character, one is in a better position to unravel some of this 
terminological disarray. 
Membership in the political community represented by the state is an objective status, 
realised and easily conceptualised through the granting of formal citizenship status. 
Yet, the granting of citizenship status does not automatically carry with it 
incorporation into the ethnic community of the nation with which the state is titularly 
associated. Even many states which style themselves as nation-states, such as France, 
cannot take the ethnicity of their citizens for granted. The fact that many immigrants 
from Africa and elsewhere have acquired French passports does not necessarily mean 
that they have become French in the fully appreciated sense of the term because, as 
has been argued, belonging to a nation denotes more than mere membership in a 
political community. Rather, one may say that it denotes membership in an 
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ethnopolitical community, something which is less easily and tangibly acquired, 
requiring, as it does, acceptance intolby the ethnic community and subjective 
internalisation of that ethnic community's mythical and historical narratives. As 
Smith (1986: 136) observes, 'the newly arrived, though formal citizens, could never be 
part of the pays reel, of the solidary community of residents by birth'. Even the 
adoption of aspects of the cultural behaviour of the native ethnic community, whilst 
perhaps facilitating some level of integration into society as a whole, does not 
necessarily lead to the easy incorporation of outsiders into the ethnic community of 
the nation. 
Although certain nationalist discourses may style their associated nation according to 
purely universalistic, civic/political ideals, they inevitably reveal themselves to 
contain some ethnic content and to, perhaps unwittingly, impose some ethnic criteria 
which requires fulfilment for acceptance into the national community. This can be 
explained by what Connor (1994b:203) refers to as the 'dichotomy between the realm 
of national identity and that of reason'. This is to say that shared philosophical or 
political values do not appear to be a sufficiently potent basis for generating a 
meaningful sense of community and uniting people under the umbrella of a common 
identity. As Kymlicka notes: 
People decide who they want to share a country with by asking who they identify 
with, who they feel solidarity with. What holds Americans together, despite their 
lack of common values, is the fact that they share an identity as Americans. 
Conversely, what keeps Swedes and Norwegians apart, despite the presence of 
shared values, is the lack of a shared identity. (Kymlicka, 1995: 188) 
Instead, it is the subjective belief in shared culture, historical experience and common 
myths of descent which plays the most significant role in generating those communal 
identities which may be termed 'national'. What else, for example, can explain French 
references to 'nos ancetres les Gaulois' (our ancestors the Gauls), a claim which 
would hardly stand up to rigorous genealogical analysis and which seems utterly 
ludicrous when applied to the populations of France's overseas departments and 
territories (the so-called DOM-TOM)? Ethnic myths need not and frequently do not 
contain a great deal of historical truth and accuracy. Their purpose is not so much to 
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educate as to indoctrinate. What is important is that they are frequently perceived as 
containing truth (or elements thereof) and can therefore become sites for expression 
and possible mobilisation of identity. Those polities whose citizens have no elements 
of a pervasive, unifying identity are likely to struggle to command their allegiance, 
particularly if the state is also unable or unwilling to generate any meaningful 
instrumental attachments between itself and its citizens (see section 6.4). 
2.3 Modernity and the idea of the nation as common culture 
Dissatisfaction with the ethnic/civic models of nationhood has led some scholars to 
try to transcend the dichotomy and propose an alternative option based on the 
existence of a common public culture. Proponents of the 'cultural nation' 
acknowledge that the purely civic nation is a fiction. However, they seek to separate 
out the concepts of culture and ethnicity, thereby effectively introducing a new 
cultural/ethnic dichotomy. 
[I]t is [ ... ] a mistake to equate cultural nationalism with ethnic nationalism. Ethnic 
nationalism, as all nationalisms, is cultural, but not all cultural nationalisms are 
ethnic. Cultural nationalism defines the nation in terms of a common 
encompassing culture. (Nielsen, 1999: 125) 
The problem here is the troublesome implication that this 'common encompassing 
culture' can be easily free of any ethnic content or significance. When this common 
culture is composed of elements, such as language, which are also strongly associated 
with the culture of a particular ethnic group, it is difficult, if not often impossible, to 
engage with them without perceiving or invoking their ethnic significance. It is 
doubtful whether culture, and particularly an element as central as language, can 
simply be 'de-ethnicised' in such a way (Oakes and Warren, 2007: section 5.3). 
The equation of nationhood with culture instead of ethnic identity has been an 
assumption of much modernist thought on the nation. According to Gellner 
(1983: 135), similar cultural units which do not unite in common nation-statehood are 
in 'violation of the nationalist principle'. Modernist accounts have tended to focus on 
common culture, instead of ethnicity, as the basis for nationhood since the admission 
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of ethnicity is perceived as undermining their thesis that nations are somehow 
uniquely modem phenomena. A clear-cut distinction or historical fissure is often 
drawn between supposedly 'modem' nations and 'pre-modem' or even 
'anachronistic' ethnic groups (May, 2001 :25-28). The most notable and persuasive 
proponent of this modernist position on the origins and character of nations has been 
Gellner (e.g. 1964; 1983; 1987; 1997). Gellner argues that the pervasive level of 
public cultural homogeneity and the types of fluid, entropic social networks required 
by modem scientific-industrial society represent a historically unprecedented model 
of social organisation. And, indeed, there can be little disagreement with this view. To 
this extent then, the modernist position is eminently tenable. The problem arrives 
when one attempts to equate absolutely this modem complex of cultural conditions 
with the idea of the nation. If nations were simply just the sum of certain objectively 
delimited cultural behaviours then one would much more easily be able to assert their 
absolute modernity. However, to adopt this approach is to overlook the psychological 
dimension of nationhood. If one examines this psychological dimension, one finds a 
number of similarities and continuities with the psychological dimension of 'pre-
modem' ethnic group identities. Both ~thnic groups and nations make use of bygone 
symbols, historical myths (myths of origin, destiny, rebirth etc.) and memories as part 
of their collective psychological equipment. This is the thesis of 'ethno-symbolism' 
developed by Smith (1986) who argues that modem cultures need to possess a core of 
ethnic symbols, memories and myths, which often have their origin in pre-modem 
communities, if they are to generate sentiments of solidarity and community which 
may be termed 'national identities'. Of course, nations may invent and fabricate such 
myths and memories in the modem era, as Hobsbawm (1983) has most notably 
explicated (see also Thiesse, 1999), but to deny the possibility of inheriting any such 
memories from pre-modem (i.e pre-industrial) periods would seem to be a vastly 
overstated claim. 
This last point can be further illuminated by the case of modem national languages in 
Europe. Most contemporary European national languages are standardised, elaborated 
varieties of vernacular forms belonging to the various European dialect continua 
(S.Wright, 2004: 19). These languages are the result of conscious construction, as is 
evidenced by the fact that they are often categorised as Ausbau languages, from the 
German, meaning 'built up' or 'built away from' (Kloss, 1967b; Joseph, 1987; 
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S.Wright, 2004:48-50}. Such languages are the result of planning and selection, 
insofar as linguistic items are consciously included or excluded from them, normally 
on non-linguistic grounds. Although many European standard languages are modern 
constructs, being the products of modern nationalist movements, they are nevertheless 
still rooted in linguistic varieties spoken in the pre-modern era. 
National languages are not created out of thin air; most of them are, after all, 
based on idioms spoken by a large number of people. The national languages of 
the majority of east-central European states are based on Slavic regional dialects. 
Irish Gaelic, although admittedly spoken by relatively few people, had been used 
by monks for several centuries. Similarly, the modem Hebrew language spoken in 
Israel was not, as Hobsbawm has argued 'virtually invented' (Hobsbawm, 
1990:54); rather it was based on a language that, although largely used for 
religious purposes and not for secular ones, has never died out. (Safran, 1999:83) 
In other words, modern national languages, even though their functional expansion 
and elaborated corpuses are products of the modern nationalist era, still maintain a 
line of descent with their associated nation's pre-history. 
Again though, one must be careful to distinguish between two distinct claims -
namely between that regarding the modernity of nations and that regarding the 
modernity of nationalism. Nationalism, by which is meant the ideological doctrine 
which requires that the nation possess some measure of political self-government, 
may, indeed, be rightly regarded as a modern sociological phenomenon. Kedourie 
(1966:9), for example, observes that '[n]ationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century'. Whether nationalism can actually be said to 
have been invented by conscious human agency is debatable. Teleological, 
determinist theories, such as that of Gellner, see nations rather as a necessary, 
inevitable product of modern, industrial social conditions and not the result of the 
force of some human idea, hence Gellner's (1983:55) famous remark: 'It is 
nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round'. However, the 
significance of Kedourie's observation for this discussion is that it traces the origin of 
nationalism as a pre-eminant, political ideology to a reasonably specific (historically 
speaking) period in time and geographical location (Europe). Furthermore, we can 
agree that the existence of national identities as a mass phenomenon, pervading all 
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levels of society, is a product of the modem nationalist age. The classic illustration of 
this fact is found in E. Weber's (1979) renowned study on the modernisation of rural 
France. Weber shows how, even as late as the beginning of the twentieth century, 
many peasants in France still did not conceive of themselves as Frenchmen/women , 
continuing to identify solely with their highly localised communities. Weber 
(1979:73) cites one 19th century observer of rural French life who noted that: 'Every 
valley is still a little world that differs from the neighbouring world as Mercury does 
from Uranus. Every village is a clan, a sort of state with its own patriotism'. 
Undoubtedly, this situation was replicated throughout Europe at the time. Again 
though, one should not infer from this that the content and function of a national 
identity, once it eventually becomes fully established throughout society, is itself 
necessarily a unique product of that age. The spread of national identities in countries 
such as France might better be conceived in terms of ethnic-core expansion (both 
social and geographical) with concomitant cultural modernisation and politicisation. 
That is to say that cultural modernisation provided the conditions for elite ethnic 
identities to simultaneously expand downwards through the social class structure and 
spread outwards from a geographical centre. In this way, under modem conditions, 
that pre-existing ethnic identity is transformed into a shared mass, vertical national 
identity whilst still retaining some or much of its previous ethnic psychological 
content and function. 
In post-colonial contexts, the existence of a state-associated national identity is, on the 
whole, not (yet) a multi-class phenomenon whereas in most European countries a 
sense of common national identity permeates all levels of society. A writer such as 
Connor (1994b:21 0-226) would argue that one cannot readily talk of a national 
identity until it has become a mass phenomenon. It is partly this assertion which leads 
Smith (1998:164) to talk of 'Connor's modernism with regard to the advent of the 
nation'. Yet, should the restriction of an identity to a social elite or middle class mean 
that one cannot a priori term that identity 'national'? There would seem little good 
reason for doing so. As already mentioned in this chapter, mass membership is a 
characteristic of many nations in the modem era, but not of nations per see 
Furthermore, nation formation is a gradual process of accumulation and expansion 
and so, in reality, no sharp division can be drawn between pre-modem and modem 
eras. What one might say is that many post-colonial societies are currently at an 
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earlier stage of sociological modernisation than their European counterparts. Yet, does 
this fact invalidate the 'nationness' of those groups of individuals in post-colonial 
societies who do in fact identify with a national community represented and 
safeguarded by the state? The question of 'when is a nation?', in the sense in which 
Connor poses it, is scientifically uninteresting and somewhat unanswerable without 
the imposition of some artificially arbitrary and contrived criteria. To impose any 
such criteria would necessarily prefigure the outcome of one's analysis and 
potentially support an impartial agenda. If one wanted to show the absolute modernity 
of nations, then certainly, imposing the criterion of mass membership would aid one 
in developing a credible argument to that effect. However, to do so is to skew the 
analysis to fit a pre-determined conclusion. To avoid this, the analysis must lead us to 
the conclusion without the interference of vested interest, which requires that no 
unnecessary, contrived criteria be imposed onto the exercise. Therefore, given that the 
nation is ultimately a psychological principle, we can say that the nation, or at least 
the ethnic core of the nation, exists whenever any people entertain a genume, 
subjectively determined belief in its existence. As Eriksen has observed: 
At the identity level, nationhood is a matter of belief. The nation, that is the Volk 
imagined by nationalists, is a product of nationalist ideology; it is not the other 
way round. A nation exists from the moment a handful of influential people 
decide that it should be so, and it starts, in most cases, as an urban elite 
phenomenon. (Eriksen, 2002: 104) 
As a final word on the question of the modernity of nations, one can assert that 
nations are a blend of both modem and pre-modem elements. The modem elements 
are those civic/political characteristics which distinguish nations from ethnic groups. 
Yet, no nation can be said to exist without some ethnic core, some subjective belief 
amongst its members that they constitute a historical community represented through 
symbols, myths and memories. It is this ethnic core which prevents us from qualifying 
nations as a uniquely modem phenomenon since ethnicity also existed prior to the 
coming of the era of nationalism. New ethnic identities may indeed develop in the 
modern era, as Joireman (2003:129-145; see section 2.4) illustrates in the case of 
Eritrea, but they can only be regarded as novel in their particular, situational sense and 
not in some wider phenomenal sense. Ethnicity, then, is the common factor, the 
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historical continuity between the non-politicised ethnic identities of the pre-modem 
era, many of which still exist and flourish today, and the politicised national identities 
of the modem era. 
2.4 The routes to nationhood: politicisation of ethnicity versus 
ethnicisation of polity 
Two broad routes to nationhood can be identified. Traditional analyses of nation 
formation have often tended to classify them separately as the 'nation-to-state' route 
or the 'state-to-nation' route. The former may be seen as analogous to the idea of 
'ethnic' nationalism and the latter to that of 'civic' nationalism. While the basic 
emphasis of this distinction is correct and useful, it is also slightly unsatisfactory since 
it implies the necessary presence of a state, or rather, the necessary aspiration for 
ownership of a state for nationalism to be said to have occurred. Although nationalism 
implies some degree of politicisation and the existence of some form of polity, it need 
not necessarily be a state.4 That is, it need not necessarily be a state in the common 
understanding of the term. For example, in common understanding, provincial 
government structures are not generally conceived of as states. However, in Quebec, 
for instance, official reference is often made to I' etat du Quebec with regard to the 
governance that comes with provincial powers (Leigh Oakes: personal 
communication). Equally, an argument could be made for the state-like character of 
the European Union, as it acquires ever more influence over the lives of European 
citizens. Might it be in the future that the current member states of the EU come to be 
regarded as provincial sub-divisions of a wider EU state or 'super-state'? This is a 
relatively minor point in the context of this study but it does go to illustrate the way in 
which the meaning and usage of such politically significant terms is not immutable, 
insofar as the specificity of the concept to which they refer is liable to fluctuate and 
may be subject to contestation by vested interests. However, for the remainder of this 
discussion the term 'state' will be employed according to its most widespread 
contemporary understanding. 
4 See, for example. McRoberts (2001) on Catalan nation-building. 
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In order to avoid the necessary equation of nationalism with the concept of the state, 
instead of thinking in terms of 'agitation or aspiration for a state' it is preferable to 
think in more general terms of 'politicisation' and instead of the more specific notion 
of a 'state', one should employ the more generic concept of a 'polity'. As Sharp 
(1997:67) notes: 'The international courtesy that describes all states as "nation-states" 
hides the fact that they do not have a monopoly on nation-building'. In fact, if all 
states were indeed nation-states then the concept of nation-building would be 
redundant. It is precisely the widespread absence of nation-states (Beer and Jacob, 
1985: 1) that makes nation-building projects such common phenomena. Part of the 
ideology of nation-building is to assert the existence of a nation that is coterminous 
and inseparable from the state but assertion alone does not bring the nation-state, as a 
discernible sociological form, into existence. 
The first route to nationhood is consequently better formulated as the 'politicisation of 
ethnicity'. This occurs when an ethnic community begins to organise itself with the 
intention of securing some measure of self-government, sometimes with the intention 
of acquiring its own state or sometimes aspiring no further than gaining a more 
limited degree of self-government within a wider state structure. Nationalist demands 
for group self-determination do not always extend as far as to constitute demands for 
fully independent statehood. For example, Welsh demands for representation within 
the United Kingdom seem to have been largely satisfied by the introduction of some 
degree of devolved government and by measures aimed at the protection and 
promotion of the Welsh language (Jenkins, 1991). As May (2001:79) notes: 'The 
history of Welsh nationalism [ ... ] clearly demonstrates that there are means other than 
state recognition by which national distinctiveness can be attained and maintained'. 
The absence of their own state does not make groups such as the Welsh any less 
national than those groups that do possess a state. The presence or absence of a state 
does not significantly impact upon the fundamental nature of the psychological bonds 
of national identity. 
The second route to nationhood occurs through what may be termed the 'ethnicisation 
of a polity'. In such cases, a polity, typically a state although not necessarily, in the 
absence of any appropriately correspondent ethnic/national identity, seeks to create 
one amongst its diverse citizenry. This process has become known as 'nation-
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building' (Eriksen, 1990; MacLaughlin, 200 1; Weinstock, 2004; S. Wright, 2oooa; 
2004). Kolst~ (2000) describes_ nation-building as 'an architectural metaphor which 
[ ... ] implies the existence of consciously acting agents such as architects, engineers 
and carpenters, and the like'. The conscious will of nation-builders is reflected in the 
formulation and implementation of things such as education and language policies 
and the choice and promotion of national symbols, all of which aim at social 
engineering. This leads us to another characteristic of nation-building policies, namely 
that they are invariably top-down endeavours. That is to say that they have tended to 
consist of the state or other polity imposing measures, such as the introduction of 
particular languages or educational curricula, upon its popUlation with little or no 
consultation and often a good degree of coercion (Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997: 196). 
Geldenhuys (2000) observes that '[t]he very notion of nation-building suggests that 
something is amiss: the "nation" in question either does not exist and needs to be built 
anew, or suffers from serious defects and should be repaired'. In most African cases, 
it is generally a case of building the nation anew. Owing to the somewhat arbitrary 
nature of their genesis, the frontiers of most African states are generally incongruent 
with ethnic boundaries and contain a multitude of diverse ethnic groups and, 
therefore, tend not to have a naturally corresponding national unit (Fardon and 
Furniss, 1994). Consequently, African (and other post-colonial) nation-building has 
frequently been a question of creating a common national identity amongst disparate 
groups from scratch. When used in the European context, the term 'nation-building' 
tends not to carry so much the suggestion of the nation having been built anew. 
Rather, it invariably suggests the dominance and (attempted) incorporation of 
peripheral (socially and geographically) ethnic groups by a single core ethnic group. 
This is certainly the case in countries such as France, Spain and Britain where a single 
core ethnoculture was imposed and promoted (with varying degrees of success and 
resistance) to the detriment of the various regional ethnocultures in each country. In 
these cases, the political dominance of the core ethnic group meant that the ethnic 
character of the state-associated national unit could be taken somewhat for granted. In 
most post-colonial African states, the ethnic foundations of nation-building are not so 
easily determined. The often extreme ethnic diversity found within most African 
states means that the selection and promotion of a pre-existing ethnoculture (or 
elements thereof) as the basis of the state-associated national identity is likely to 
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prove a highly controversial and divisive measure. Post-colonial nation-building 
projects have often been blighted by the fact that there is. little pre-existing ethnic 
material which may serve as an acceptable basis for the creation of anew, shared 
national identity. Given the serious difficulties involved in trying to engineer a sense 
of national identity in such ethnically diverse and frequently deeply divided societies, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the ethnic element of nation-building is often 
overlooked or seen as inappropriate. Consequently, nation-building discourses in 
countries such as South Africa tend to promote a highly political or civic conception 
of national identity which is to be clearly distinguished from group identities based on 
ethnocultural loyalties. The idea of the state-bounded political nation has been 
advanced as a means of overcoming potentially divisive ethnic attachments. 
The political nation refers to a group of people - which can include the whole 
population, but not necessarily - who are bound together by a loyalty to the state, 
its institutions and symbols and to the population as a whole. This emotional 
union, or patriotism, takes precedence over group loyalties (for example, towards 
linguistic, cultural or' religious communities) [ ... ] With the government as the 
agent of nation-building, ethnic identity is under-emphasized and even 
suppressed, while a new national identity and loyalty is consciously cultivated. 
(Geldenhuys, 20(0)5 
The influence of the ethnic/civic contrast when conceptual ising nationhood appears to 
be strong. Web9 (2002a: 141), for example, chooses to use the term nation to refer to 
'the people of a territory united under a single government, country, state' as opposed 
to its 'other meaning' of a 'stable, historically developed community of people with a 
territory, economic life, distinctive culture and language in common'. Elsewhere, 
Elaigwu (1992:429) writes that '[n]ation-building [ ... ] is the widespread acceptance 
of the processes of state-building; it is the creation of a political community that gives 
fuller meaning to the life of the state'. Webb's preferred definition of nation (in the 
South African context, at least) leads one to ask 'what is it that actually unites the 
people of a territory under a single government, country, state?' Presumably, the 
implication is that, in the absence of a historical sense of community, distinctive 
culture and common language, people are expected to unify around a set of common 
5 This translation and. indeed. aU other subsequent translations from non-English language sources are 
my own, unless otherwise indicated. 
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political values. Nation-building, then, is styled in this case as the creation of a 
political identity that can be neatly distinguished from any ethnocultural identities that 
citizens may have. 
Implicit in this view of nation-building is the idea of multiple identities. In the 
modern state, whether in Europe or Africa, citizens have more than one identity, 
some of these identities being cultural and the others political. In the same way as 
a citizen of Belgium can have a Aemish identity, be a Belgian and also a 
European, so citizens of African states can be Buthelezi's, Zulu's [sic] as well as 
South African. (Webb, 2002a: 143) 
Some further comment is needed on this notion of 'multiple identities'. Smith 
(1998:201) distinguishes the notion of 'multiple identities' from what he refers to as 
the 'onion character' of ethnic identities, whereby an individual may have several 
ethnic identities that may be visually conceptualised in terms of concentric circles, 
with each smaller circle being encompassed by the larger. For Smith, the term 
'multiple identities' implies the existence of social identities of a fundamentally 
different sort. It implies the co-existence, although not necessarily in harmony, of 
national or ethnic identities alongside identities centring upon such things as class, 
gender or other 'lifestyle' identities such as religion or sexuality. Smith would regard 
Webb's example above, whereby a South African identity encompasses a Zulu 
identity which encompasses a Buthelezi identity, etc. (as an additional thought, one 
might also conceivably insert an additional circle into that example, namely a circle of 
black identity between the South African and Zulu circles), as an example of 
concentric ethnic identities and not of multiplie identities. Now, it is not known 
whether Webb has used the term 'multiple identities' in the strict sense that Smith 
demands. After all, there is no fundamental illogicality in Webb's use of the term. 
There is no real reason why the term 'multiple identities' may not refer to a 
multiplicity of ethnic/national identities. However, the fact that Webb has made a 
distinction between 'political' and 'cultural' identities in this context indicates that he, 
unlike Smith, does indeed view the 'state' identities he refers to (Belgian and South 
African) as being of a fundamentally different sort, i.e. political and non-ethnic, from 
the sub-state ethnic identities (Aemish and Zulu). 
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This distinction between the political and the cultural nation is somewhat reminiscent 
of Connor's (1994b) distinction between ethnonationalism and patriotism. although 
Connor would divorce totally the concept of a nation from that of patriotism. For 
Connor, loyalty to the political-territorial state must not be confused with loyalty to 
one's ethnocultural group, the former being a case of patriotism rather than 
nationalism. According to this view, then, to refer to attempts to create a state-
bounded political identity as 'nation-building' is a misnomer - 'Contrary to its 
nomenclature, the "nation-building" school has in fact been dedicated to building 
viable states' (Connor, 1994a:40). Can this confusion be explained merely as the 
consequence of terminological inaccuracy? Certainly, in popular understanding, the 
terms nationalism and patriotism are frequently perceived as being synonymous. 
Dictionaries also often seem less sure of any absolute conceptual distinction between 
the two terms. The explanation of terminological inaccuracy would perhaps be 
possible if one could indeed draw and maintain such a razor sharp distinction between 
political and ethnocultural identities. However, the empirical data would not seem to 
support such a conclusion. In many cases, the line between patriotism and nationalism 
cannot always be so neatly demarcated. For example, Smith (2001 :16) notes that: 
[T]he English have always found it impossible to distinguish their own English 
ethno-nationalism from a British patriotism, which they conceive of equally as 
their 'own'. [ ... ] [I]t reflects the way in which British patriotism was felt in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to be a 'natural extension' of English ethnic 
nationalism and how a British nation came to be viewed by the English and not a 
few Scots (North Britons), as a coming together of the various nations inhabiting 
a united kingdom. If we recall the frequency of nationalism without nations, does 
it invalidate the idea, and the historicity, of a British nationalism (as opposed to a 
British patriotism, in Connor's sense), if ultimately an integrated British nation 
failed to materialize? (Smith, 2001: 16) 
In other words, can we confidently assert that sentiments of Britishness are activated 
only by a loyalty to the British state and its institutions and are devoid of any sense of 
historical communality, memory and solidarity that might bind the English, Welsh, 
Scottish and Ulstermen together, particularly when faced with foreign, i.e. non-
British, elements, and which therefore might be described as ethnic? One must 
naturally be aware of overstatement but it would seem misleading to pretend that, 
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despite the existence and persistence of some significant historical internal divisions 
and hostilities, many British citizens are not also bound in some (albeit perhaps fairly 
loose) way by a perception of shared cultural attributes and a sense of common 
historical experience. 
The distinction between nationalism and patriotism is even less clear in the French 
case to the extent that it almost fades into irrelevance. How does one separate a 
French patriot from a French nationalist? As Smith (200 1: 16) again asks: 'How can 
we in practice separate the French nation from France, the national state, when so 
many of the key symbols of French nationalism are political?' The point here is that, 
in the French case, the political and the ethnic are so irredeemably intertwined as to be 
almost inseparable. One might counter by arguing that in African and other post-
colonial contexts where the state does not have any naturally associated ethnic 
identity there is no need to endow it with one. However, the question that needs to be 
entertained by those engaging in nation-building projects in such contexts is whether 
widespread loyalty to, and identification with, the state can be cultivated amongst its 
citizens purely on the basis of political values and in the absence of any unifying 
ethnic-type sentiments. Whilst constitutional or institutional patriotism (Habermas, 
1996; Ingram, 1996) is certainly highly desirable and important as far as securing the 
legitimacy of the state is concerned, it is doubtful whether it alone is a sufficiently 
substantial force for the long-term maintenance of a viable social order. Smith 
(1986: 17) highlights this point when he writes that 'in order to forge a "nation" today, 
it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to 
constitute a serious impediment to "nation-building'''. This is in line with the 
understanding of the concept of the nation, established in this chapter, as a community 
displaying both ethnic and political characteristics. Therefore, if nation builders are to 
do as their name suggests, it seems incumbent upon them to seek both an ethnic and a 
political basis for nationhood. Seeking an ethnic basis is no easy task, of course. 
Attempting to inculcate the population of a country such as South Africa, for 
example, with a perceived sense of common history, descent and shared culture may 
appear to many as a hopeless endeavour given the extent of the ethnic diversity and 
the deep inter-communal historical divisions and suspicions that exist. One must 
remember, however, that most post-colonial African states are relatively recent 
constructions in comparison with many of their European counterparts which have 
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had centuries in which to create ethnic myths and forge a sense of shared historical 
experience amongst their previously diverse and disunited populations (Thiesse, 
1999). 
Most African states have been judged failures on the basis of less than half a century 
of nation-building efforts. Yet, this should not lead us to dismiss the possibility of 
states forging some new ethnic identity amongst their citizens. Joireman's (2003) 
discussion of Eritrea provides evidence of the emergence of a new ethnic identity in 
the post-colonial period. Joireman (2003: 129) writes that the Italian colonisation of 
Eritrea 'left a people with a unique historical experience that was the basis for a 
separate ethnic identity and "ultimately" a nationalist movement of great force'. This 
Eritrean identity was further crystallised and politicised in the subsequent war of 
independence with Ethiopia. This war facilitated the styling of the Ethiopians as the 
common foe, as the 'Other' in contrast to which Eritrean national identity was to be 
constituted. The important point here is that Eritrean nationalists did not concentrate 
on promoting a purely civic/political conception of the Eritrean nation in order to 
recruit ide<Hogical loyalties. Joireman highlights how they embarked upon a 
conscious campaign of national myth making. 
The EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Force] engaged the arts in the creation of 
a national myth - the myth of a shared history among diverse ethnic groups with 
different livelihoods and different historical experiences. The use of drama, 
music, visual art and poetry allowed the EPLF to reach and educate an Eritrean 
population that spoke many languages and included many people who could not 
read or write. The EPLF was incredibly effective in creating a national myth. By 
the time of independence, Eritrea was a country of Eritreans with a shared 
identity. (Joireman, 2003:] 35) 
The Eritrean case highlights the importance of not neglecting the ethnic dimension of 
nation-building, as it is invariably this aspect which lends a nationalist movement its 
great ability to inspire deep emotional solidarity and attachment. Now, this is not to 
say that all post-colonial states are likely to be as successful as Eritrea in fostering a 
new, united sense of ethnic identity amongst their populations, nor is it to imply any 
normative compulsion that they should attempt to do so. What is being said is that if 
top-down nation-builders wish to effectively create a state-associated national 
36 
identity, some attention must be paid to the creation of some ethnic content. The 
serious difficulty of this task does not, in any way, negate its necessity as far as 
nation-building is concerned. It is necessary because an appeal to certain political 
values and institutions is highly unlikely to prove an adequate means of uniting 
diverse and frequently conflict-ridden societies. At the same time, there also appears 
to be an inevitable degree of antagonism between the ethnic and civic dimensions of 
nationhood. 
[AJsserting the principle of citizenship would not be in itself sufficient to create a 
community of citizens. Sovereignty and citizenship are fictions. You cannot rally 
individuals to such abstract ideas. [ ... J The democratic nation, even though it is 
founded on the notion of citizenship, cannot but maintain the ethnic dimensions of 
collective life. There is an essential tension between, on the one hand, the 
formally rational and abstract ideal of citizenship, of a political and legal nature, 
and on the other hand the necessity in every society to create a social link that is 
necessarily 'ethnic' or 'community-orientated,' that is direct and emotional 
between the citizens. (Schnapper, 1996:23] -2) 
Appeals to rationality in the name of citizenship are always likely to come second to 
the emotional force of appeals to sub-state ethnic identity if the two ever come into 
conflict (Connor, 1994b: 196-209). Consequently, the state-promoted national identity 
must acquire some emotional power of its own if nation-building is to have any hope 
of success. Schnapper (1996:232) goes on to describe the notion of a 'community of 
citizens' as a paradox. Nation-building requires that people become more than 'fellow 
citizens', rather it requires that the citizenry becomes a historically situated, self-
aware community. For this to happen, it is necessary that citizens come to develop 
sentiments reflecting some degree of ethnic solidarity. As inconceivable as it may 
sound, given the levels of inter-ethnic conflict and the negative connotations 
associated with the very concept of ethnicity, the building of a new national identity 
in a country such as South Africa requires the creation of what is essentially a new 
South African ethnic identity, much as occurred in Eritrea, which may complement 
the political dimensions of nationhood such as adherence to, and advocacy of, the 
values expressed in the country's constitution. Quite what the basis and contents of 
that new ethnic identity might be is not evident a priori and can only be determined 
through popular acceptance or rejection of particular elements. Given the frequent 
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centrality of language to ethnicity, it would be remiss of nation builders not to pay 
serious attention to the possibilities that language may offer in attempts to create and 
consolidate the national community. The role of language in the specific South 
African nation-building context is discussed from various perspectives in chapters 4,5 
and 6. However, let us now tum to the matter of the relationship between language 
and national identity in more general, theoretical terms. 
2.5 The relationship between language and ethnic and national 
identities 
The fact that questions of language have frequently been the site of nationalist 
movements and struggles on every continent of the earth, from the Basques in Spain 
(Conversi, 1997) to the Tamils in Sri Lanka (Jeyaratnam-Wilson, 2(00) and the 
Afrikaners in South Africa (see chapter 5), suggests an intimate relationship between 
language and national identity. Having discerned the existence of some form of 
linkage between the two, the task becomes one of identifying the precise nature of 
that relationship. This task is complicated by the fact that in pursuing this relationship, 
it soon becomes obvious that one cannot readily make universal generalisations from 
the analysis of specific cases. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful whether a universal, a 
priori predictive model of language and national identity could be constructed. One of 
the questions which has most preoccupied theorists of language and nation is whether 
language is a determining feature of national identity. This question spawns a number 
of other questions such as 'does loss of language equal loss of identity?' and 'can a 
nation exist in the absence of a common language?' In this section, an attempt will be 
made to answer some of these questions. First, though, in line with our understanding 
of the nation as a kindred, though more specialised, version of the ethnic group, we 
would do well to begin by reflecting on the relationship between language and ethnic 
identity. 
2.5.1 Language and ethnic identity 
Earlier in this chapter, an understanding was reached that ethnic groups are 
constituted through a process of subjective self-differentiation. Ethnicity, it was 
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argued, occurs at the boundaries which delimit one group from another. These 
boundaries are usually constituted by the subjective belief in (elements of) cultural 
difference. The particular cultural elements that are erected as group boundaries may 
vary from case to case. Language, as a highly salient cultural form, may therefore 
readily serve a boundary function. And, indeed, linguistic boundaries often coincide 
with ethnic ones. However, in some cases they do not, and when this is so, some other 
diacritical element must take the place of language. 
[L]anguage may be a salient marker of ethnic identity in one instance but not in 
another. While a specific language may well be identified as a significant cultural 
marker of a particular ethnic group, there is no inevitable correspondence between 
language and ethnicity. In effect, linguistic differences do not always correspond 
to ethnic ones - membership of an ethnic group does not necessarily entail 
association with a particular language, either for individual members or for the 
group itself. Likewise, more than one ethnic group can share the same language 
while continuing without difficulty to maintain their own distinct ethnic (national) 
identities. (May, 200 I : 129) 
At the most fundamental level, there would appear little more to say about the 
relationship between language and ethnicity. Sometimes language will serve as a 
marker of ethnic identity, sometimes it will not. In the same way, religious differences 
will sometimes serve as ethnic boundaries and sometimes they will not. The same can 
also be said for certain physical characteristics such as skin colour. This conclusion 
obviously denies any essential link between any particular cultural element and ethnic 
identity. What is important is that some cultural element is erected as a boundary 
marker. None of this is to imply that the selection of cultural elements as ethnic 
boundaries is some kind of aleatoric happening. The ethnic salience of certain cultural 
forms is obviously dependent on the particular communities and socio-historical 
contexts in question (Giles and Coupland, 1991 :99). However, although one must 
deny any absolute, essential language-ethnic identity link, one can readily observe, 
and ask why it should be, that language seems to be the most frequently invoked 
marker of ethnic identity. 
The reason that language is so often a central feature of ethnicity is a consequence of 
its simultaneous capacity to both include and exclude (Heller, 1987). Knowledge of a 
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particular linguistic variety enables one to communicate with those who also speak 
that variety or quite similar varieties. Conversely, lack of that knowledge seriously 
constrains one's ability to do so. The ability to communicate may allow the bonds of 
identification and, hence, a sense of community to develop between fellow speakers 
of a language (S. Wright, 2oooa). In this light, Anderson (1983:133) notes language's 
'capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect particular 
solidarities' (emphasis in original). We may say, then, that language is a frequent 
facilitator of ethnic group (self-)identification. Yet, the examples of ethnic groups 
which have neither a unique language of their own, nor a language which all members 
speak but may share with members of other ethnic groups, preclude us from invoking 
any universal principles regarding the nature of the relationship between language and 
ethnicity. For instance, one thinks of diaspora immigrant groups, such as the Jews, 
whose common ethnic identity remains intact in spite of the fact that most have 
assimilated to the majority language group of the different societies that they inhabit. 
For example, it is highly unlikely that a functionally monolingual-English American 
Jew would be able to communicate effectively with most fellow Jews from 
somewhere such as Ukraine or Russia. However, even in the Jewish case, one should 
not overlook the symbolic importance of the Hebrew language, which was used 
regularly, and still is, even before its modern revival in Israel (Fishman, 1991 :289-
291) for ceremonial purposes by Jewish communities throughout the world. Hebrew 
may therefore be seen as serving as a central symbolic expression of Jewish ethnicity, 
suggesting that even in the absence of a common means of vernacular 
communication, there still exists a significant relationship between language and 
ethnicity in this case. Similar claims have also been made regarding the relationship 
between the Irish language and Irish ethnic/national identity (Oakes, 2001 :3), 
although the difference with the Jewish example is that the Irish do also possess a 
common means of everyday communication, namely the various linguistic varieties 
which go under the name of Irish English. The unmistakable distinctiveness of Irish 
English means that it is also able to serve as a potent marker of Irish identity, 
suggesting that a single identity may be represented by, and enacted through, more 
I 
than just one single linguistic variety. 
The empirical reality that language either mayor may not be a central feature of 
ethnic identity would seem to deal a fatal blow to the related theories of 'linguistic 
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nationalism' and 'linguistic determinism' (in its absolute version) which have been 
the subject of much discussion amongst contemporary and historical theorists. The 
theory of linguistic nationalism is best associated with the German 'Romantic' writers 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, most notably Herder. von 
Humboldt and Fichte. These writers conceived of the nation as an organic, perennial, 
divinely inspired entity whose essence or Volksgeist was located principally in 
language. For von Humboldt, a nation's language was 'its spirit and its spirit is its 
language' (Cowan, 1963:277). Fichte (1968: 184) confidently asserted that 'it is 
beyond doubt that, wherever a separate language can be found, there a separate nation 
exists'. This, of course, raises the question of how one goes about defining a separate 
language - a question of very little conceptual value or relevance to the science of 
linguistics (see section 3.6.2.3) - and is itself illustrative of the unscientific approach 
of such writers, hence the label 'Romantic' that is commonly attached to them. Given 
the supposed absolute centrality of language to national identity, Fichte's assertion of 
the superiority of the German language naturally entailed the assertion of the 
superiority of the German nation. This superiority supposedly derived from the fact 
that, according to Fichte: 'the German speaks a language which has been alive ever 
since it first issued from the force of nature, whereas the other Teutonic races speak a 
language which has movement on the surface but is dead at the root' (Fichte, 
1968:58-59). For Fichte, languages such as French and English which contain high 
numbers of borrowed, foreign words and constructions were viewed as composite, 
derived and therefore corrupt languages which made spontaneous, sensuous speech 
and thought impossible. German, on the other hand, is supposedly an uncontaminated 
'original' language which 'does not exert an influence on life; it is itself the life of 
him who thinks in this fashion' (cited in Kedourie, 1966:67). 
Furthermore, from this supposed critical centrality of language to national identity, 
the Romantic writers claimed to be able to derive normative prescriptions, as 
Kedourie (1966:68) notes of their thought: 'A group speaking the same language is 
known as a nation, and a nation ought to constitute a state. [ ... ] [A] group of people 
speaking a certain language may claim the right to preserve its language'. Obviously, 
applying the rigour of scientific analysis to these ideas makes them appear as 
ontologically unsound pieces of pseudo-religious, deeply prejudiced, mystical 
yearning. Of course, there was a clear partisan agenda behind much of the Gennan 
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Romantic nationalist writing. In large part, it was a reaction against the so-called Age 
of Reason and Enlightenment philosophy associated with the French Revolution and 
the modem French state. Kedourie (1966:60) also attributes it to the jealousy of 
German intellectuals who resented their lowly position in German society while the 
French intellectual and cultural tradition was revered by the privileged classes 
throughout Europe. This animosity towards the French often manifested itself in quite 
choleric terms. Herder (188 I: 128-30), for example, in his poem An die Deutschen (To 
the Germans), in reference to the French language, famously exhorted the German 
people to 'Spew out the ugly slime of the Seine, Speak German, 0 You German!,.6 
The difference between the classic French Republican view on the relationship 
between language and national identity and that of the German Romantics is perhaps 
best illustrated by Ernest Renan's oft-cited remark that: 'Language may invite us to 
unite, but it does not compel us to do so' (Renan, 1990: I 6). In contrast to the German 
Romantic position, the French position views national identity as a matter of 
voluntary participation and affirmation, as a kind of 'daily plebiscite' (Renan. 
1990: 19) and not as a matter of involuntary, objective blood ties. 
Beyond the renowned trio of Herder, Fichte and von Humboldt, similarly unscientific, 
empirically unverifiable views were also expressed by German writers such as 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) who observed that '[e]very nationality is 
destined through its peculiar organisation and its place in the world to represent a 
certain side of the divine image' (cited in Kedourie, 1960:58). The central feature of a 
nation's 'peculiar organisation', that is the element that endows it with its individual 
national character, was held to be its particular language. In other words, it is 
supposedly this particular language which determines the ontological form and 
content of each ethnoculture. Consequently, the idea of a Yolk without a language of 
its own is treated as a logical absurdity or Unding (literally 'non-thing') to use the 
German term (Barnard, 1965:57). Such views have been largely, and correctly, 
repudiated by modem(ist) theorists of nationalism who have rejected the idea of 
nations as 'bounded cultural objects' (Handler, 1988:27). However, many 
linguistically focused nationalist movements have been, and continue to be, founded 
on beliefs similar to those of the Romantic theorists (Fishman, 1996). Edwards 
6 The translation of the original Gennan is taken from Kedourie ( ) 966:59). 
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(1994: 129) lists numerous nationalist slogans which encapsulate a belief in an 
absolute link between language and national identity. For example, the Manx slogan 
'Gyn chengey, gyn cheer' translates as 'no language, no country' and the Gaelic 
'Sluagh gun chanain, sluagh gun anam' as 'a people without its language is a people 
without its soul'. As shall be seen later in this study (specifically sections 4.3, 4.4 and 
chapter 5), Afrikaner nationalists in South Africa have also made similar claims 
regarding the relationship between the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner ethnic 
identity. It would seem then, that the empirical findings of scientific sociological 
analysis frequently bear little resemblance to, or have minimal influence upon, the 
intoxicating, affective discourses associated with ethnonationalist movements. 
2.5.2 Language and national identity 
Having reflected upon the nature of the relationship between language and ethnic 
identity, one is now in a position to ask the question whether there is any significant 
difference between that relationship and the relationship between language and 
national identity. Does the change from ethnic group to nation bring about any 
fundamental functional or symbolic changes with regard to the role of language in 
group identity? 
We can agree that ethnic groups mayor may not share a common language and that 
that common language mayor may not be unique to that group. As a general 
principle, the same can also be said of nations. However, some caution is needed 
when making an assertion that two or more nations or ethnic groups share a 'common 
language', as it may falsely suggest that language is an unimportant feature of the 
respective identities in question. The fact that, for example, Australians, New 
Zealanders, the English and the Scottish speak (for the most part) mutually intelligible 
linguistic varieties, all of which are endowed with the label 'English', in no way 
dilutes their respective senses of individual nationhood. Indeed, even in those cases 
where separate nations or ethnic groups are perceived as speaking the same language, 
an admittedly unscientific assertion, one can still often point to a strong relationship 
between language and ethnicity. In such instances, the link between language and 
ethnicity is expressed in the form of local speech styles and other linguistic 
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peculiarities. These local peculiarities may take numerous forms including accent, 
forms of greeting and address and the use of particular lexical or morphological items. 
Certainly, most nations within the English-speaking world have an easily identifiable, 
distinctive national accent which, to most native English speakers at least, serves as 
just as potent a marker of the national origin of the speaker in question as do so-called 
'foreign' languages, i.e. not varieties of English. Native English speakers are, on the 
whole, just as able to identify an Australian as they are, say, an Italian from hearing 
their native speech performances. The same may also be said of, amongst many 
others, the Spanish and Mexicans, the Germans, Swiss and Austrians, the French and 
Quebecois and the Dutch and Flemish. 
[E]thnic verbal markers are usually a very direct and overt expression of social 
differentiation in interethnic interaction [ ... ] Language characteristics are often 
necessary to distinguish group memberships - for example, an American from a 
Canadian, perhaps Catholics from Protestants in Northern Ireland, an Australian 
from a New Zealander, and between many ethnic minorities in the United States. 
(Giles and Coupland, 1991 :98) 
Of course, many nations do indeed have a language that may be regarded as uniquely 
their own. Examples would include isolate language groups such as the Hungarians, 
Basques, Japanese and Koreans. In such cases, it is not surprising to find that 
language is an extremely strong ethnic marker since, owing to their uniqueness, these 
languages are an unmistakable indicator of group belonging. 
A question which has provoked considerably more debate is whether a national 
identity can exist in the absence of a common language or, to put it more accurately, 
in the absence of a commonly intelligible linguistic variety. Stalin (1973: 19) was in 
little doubt about the matter: 'a common language is one of the characteristic features 
of a nation'. However, such a universal assertion is not fully supported by the 
empirical evidence. While there is an extremely high incidence of nations with a 
common language, there are also exceptions to this pattern. Although rare, it is 
possible for nationality to transcend language. Switzerland is the most commonly 
cited example in this regard. As Anderson observes: 
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[N]ations can now be imagined without linguistic commonality [ ... J [T]he 
appearance of Swiss nationalism on the eve of the communications revolution of 
the 20
th 
century made it possible and practical to 'represent' the imagined 
community in ways that did not require linguistic uniformity. (Anderson, 
1983: 127) 
In the Swiss case, the lack of a unifying means of internal communication between 
the various linguistic communities still does not mean that Swissness cannot be 
expressed linguistically. The highly distinctive varieties of Swiss German 
(Schwyzertiitsch), which often depart hugely from standard German (Hochdeutsch) 
and which speakers of German from other German-speaking countries often have 
enormous difficulty in understanding, serve as extremely salient markers of Swiss 
identity, at least within in the German-speaking world (Russ, 1994:76-99). 
Beyond the Swiss example, however, listing nations without a common, inclusive 
everyday means of linguistic communication becomes more difficult. It might be 
argued that many post-colonial countries in Africa and elsewhere, whose populations 
display great linguistic diversity and who do not share any common language, provide 
additional examples of nationhood which transcends language. However, one must be 
careful in making such an assumption. This is because, in such contexts, the nation is 
basically synonymous with that thin social stratum which constitutes the ruling elite 
(see section 4.5 on 'elite closure'). The great majority of many post-colonial 
populations remain outside the national system and consequently have not come to 
identify with it and internalise the values of its nationalist discourse and so cannot be 
said to belong to the state-associated national group. The ruling elites' sense of 
national identity is facilitated by the fact that they frequently do possess a common 
language, very often, although not exclusively, the language of the ex-colonial power. 
At this stage, the reader may wonder why the relationship between language and 
ethnic identity and that between language and national identity have been treated 
separately given the strong ethnic content of national identity. The reason for this is 
simply that, as far as national identity is concerned, language fulfils more than just an 
ethnic function and it is in this regard that the modernist perspective is perhaps at its 
most iIluminating. It was discussed earlier in this chapter that one of the 
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characteristics that distinguishes nations from ethnic groups is the former's possession 
of a common public culture. The maintenance of a public culture relies on what 
Gellner (1983) terms 'context-free' communicative exchanges between individual 
citizens and between the citizenry as a whole and the public authorities. The efficacy 
of such exchanges is obviously heightened if there is a common language that is 
spoken and understood throughout the national community. It is clearly more efficient 
for the state to communicate with its citizens through the medium of one language 
rather than several, provided that all citizens understand that language sufficiently 
well. Consequently, most states have regarded the spread of a common national 
language as a central component of their nation-building policies and have 
implemented policy and planning measures accordingly (see section 3.4). The 
invocation of a central relationship between language and national identity is not, 
then, just purely a feature of so-called 'ethnic' nationalisms. Language has also 
frequently occupied a central place in what would be commonly be classified as civic 
nationalist discourses. The classic example here, of course, is France (Oakes, 200 I). 
In traditional post-revolutionary French nationalist discourse, the French language has 
not been styled as the property of anyone ethnic group but rather as the property of 
all French citizens (i.e. members of the supposed civic nation). This position has 
meant that the recognition of minority languages has been impossible within such an 
ideological framework (see section 3.4.3). To recognise, say, the Basque language as 
the language of the Basque ethnic group would contradict the promotion of French as 
a supposedly de-ethnicised medium of civic communication. An alternative 
recognition of the Basque language (or Breton, Occitan etc.) as being the property of 
the civic French nation would neither be credible nor desirable according to 
traditional French nationalist discourse. Therefore, official French language policy 
has tended to proceed largely as if such minority languages do not exist, as illustrated 
by France's refusal to ratify the European Charter for Regional and Minority 
Languages (Judge, 2007:140-144; S. Wright, 2000b). 
A further example of a CIVIC nationalist discourse which has placed extreme 
importance on the issue of language comes from the USA and the so-called 'Official 
English' movement or the 'English-Only' movement as some have chosen to name it 
(May, 2001 :204). A central focus of this movement has been to campaign against all 
forms of public bi- or multilingualism and, in particular, against publicly funded 
46 
bilingual education programmes and to strengthen English-language requirements for 
immigrants (Adams and Brink, 1990; Tarver, 1994)._ Among the most common 
reasons advanced for the 'English-Only' position are that a linguistically fractured 
population is a threat to social harmony and unity, that learning English is the only 
means of allowing immigrants to participate in the democratic process and that 
bilingual schooling is harmful for a child's educational development (Marshall, 1986; 
Marshall and Gonzalez, 1990). May (2001 :204-224), amongst many others, has 
shown the clear ethnic agenda lurking behind the civic veneer of this movement and 
has convincingly challenged the validity of many of the claims made on behalf of it 
but the ultimate empirical validity of these claims does not alter their significance as 
far as the image of the language/national identity link they promote is concerned. 
Just as, in reality, all nations contain both ethnic and civic elements, the promotion of 
a particular linguistic variety for supposedly civic purposes cannot be shorn of all 
ethnic content or significance. In addition to serving instrumental or integrative ends, 
the spread of a common national language also serves an important complementary 
ideological function which may have the effect of further reinforcing the 
language/ethnicity linkage. The common language is frequently abstracted as a 
symbol of nationhood in nationalist discourse and often becomes the object of strong 
emotional attachment (this phenomenon is discussed in relation to Afrikaans 10 
chapter 5 and the instrumentaUsentimental distinction is considered in depth 10 
chapter 6). It is this sentimental dimension of sharing a common language that can 
enable a sense of solidarity and mutual identification to develop which is a necessary 
basis for the establishment of a national community. Therefore, we can say, as far as 
nation-building is concerned, that from a context-unspecific, theoretical point of view, 
language has the potential to serve a dual ethnic/civic function which is crucial to the 
development of a national identity. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with several key issues pertaining to discussions of ethnic 
groups, ethnicity, nations and nationalism and the relationship of language to these 
kindred phenomena. In connection with the issue of definition, an issue which has 
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long beset academic discussions of ethnicity and nationalism, it was argued that while 
the concepts of an ethnic group and a nation are in many respects highly similar. the 
two should not be treated synonymously since there remains good reason for drawing 
a distinction between them. However, the basis for this distinction should not. as some 
prominent authors have suggested, be a psychological one, nor should it be one of 
scale. Rather, it -should be an objective sociological distinction related to respective 
levels of politicisation and organisation. A unified understanding of the nation as a 
form of 'politicised ethnic identity' was reached. The commonly invoked distinction 
between 'ethnic' and 'civic' nations, while a useful device for classifying certain 
emphases of nationalist movements, was shown to be a misleading method of 
describing the sociological reality of individual nations, which inevitably reflect a 
combination of both ethnic and civic elements. Let it be emphasised that this is not to 
reject outright the ethniclcivic dichotomy, as some commentators have done 
(Bourque, 200]; Seymour et al. 1996; Taylor, 2001; Venne, 2001), but merely to 
qualify the extent of its value as an analytical device. As one commentator has noted: 
Binary oppositions are an analytical procedure, but their usefulness does not 
guarantee that reality can thus be divided. We must be suspicious vis-a-vis anyone 
asserting there are two kinds of people, two kinds of reality or process. (M. 
Douglas, cited by Schnapper, 1996:229) 
Another issue addressed in the preceding discussion was that concernmg the 
modernity of nations. It was demonstrated that while some modernist theories of 
nations and nationalism make many incisive observations about some of the most 
striking, novel features of modem nations, the claim that nations are entirely modem 
phenomena utterly distinct from any cultural and identity communities of the pre-
modern (i.e. pre-capitalist-industrial) era is overstated. Modem nations reflect a 
combination of modem and pre-modem elements and probably the most significant 
continuity between the modem and pre-modem eras is the ethnic character of national 
communities. Overlooking the necessary ethnic component of national identity has 
been a mistake of many post-colonial 'nation-building' endeavours which have tended 
to promote highly civic conceptions of nationhood in the absence of an appropriate 
existing ethnic basis for the aspired-to national community. Successful nation-
building cannot simply jettison the ethnic component in favour of a purely political 
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image of the nation since evidence overwhelmingl y suggests that the existence of 
shared political values and practices is not, by itself, a sufficiently powerful generator 
of the sentiments of fellowship and solidarity which are necessary for the founding of 
a national community. This is where language can become of great importance for 
nation builders. Because of its frequently strong linkage to ethnicity, language must 
be considered as a strong potential candidate to fonn the necessary ethnic component 
of the nation which the nation builders are attempting to construct. Of course, in many 
multilingual, multiethnic settings the selection and promotion of a single national 
language is likely to cause conflict and alienate some linguistically non-represented 
groups from the state-associated national community (see chapter 5) and this is an 
issue which nation builders must consider when deciding which national integration 
policies to adopt. 
The relationship between language and ethnic and national identity was also 
discussed. One of the most fundamental observations to be made in this regard 
amounts to the rejection of any universalist assertions of an essential relationship 
between language and ethnic and national identity. This involves, amongst other 
things, the repudiation of determinist theories of linguistic nationalism. Language may 
often be a central, defining feature of ethnic and national identities thanks to its strong 
ability to act as a highly salient delimiter of cultural boundaries and its resultant 
capacity to generate inter-personal solidarities. However, language may not be such a 
central feature of identity if the group in question possesses some other equally 
distinctive, socially meaningful distinguishing characteristic. Although not every 
ethnic group or national group may possess a common means of everyday 
communication, it is still neverthless difficult to list ethnic or national groups for 
whom language is utterly unimportant and whose language practices do not in some 
way reflect their group identities. For example, Krejci and Velfmsky note the 
following of the 73 European ethnic groups or nationalities that they surveyed: 
Forty-seven ethnic groups can be identified by their exclusive use of their own 
literary language. Thirteen ethnic groups are in a sense bi-lingual: they speak both 
their own special language and language which they share with another ethnic 
group. Of these. in eight cases the native language is more or less a literary one. 
whereas in the remaining five cases it had remained at the level of a dialect. In 
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another 13 cases both the spoken and literary language of the respective group is 
the same as that of kindred people in another, usually neighbouring state. (Krejci 
and Velfmsky, 1981 :220) 
These final 13 cases that Krejci and Velfmsky refer to include nationalities such as the 
Flemish and Scottish. While it is true that these two groups do indeed share a common 
literary language with neighbouring national groups, the assertion that they share the 
same spoken language is potentially misleading, for in both cases there are distinctive 
spoken features (predominantly accent and vocabulary) which act as highly salient 
ethnic/national markers (see section 2.5.2). In the case of the Flemish, their spoken 
varieties are even known by a different label (vlaams) from those spoken in the 
Netherlands (nederlands). Ethnic or national distinctiveness cannot only be expressed 
through the possession of a unique literary/standard language. Therefore, if one 
considers elements such as vernacular varieties and accent, in Europe at least, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to list ethnic or national groups who are utterly 
identical linguistically. Again though, no universal rule can be invoked to predict the 
content of the language-identity relationship in specific contexts. The only universal, 
context-unspecific assertion that one can readily make with regards to the language-
ethnic/national relationship is that of uncertainty although, of course, this uncertainty 
is tempered to an extent by observable patterns. 
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3 Language policy, language planning and 
national identity: theoretical perspectives 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a broad theoretical approach to the study of the phenomena of 
language policy and language planning. Firstly, and of necessity, the murky issue of 
definition is addressed. Definitions and conceptions of language policy tend to vary 
considerably in scope and precision. Consequently. an attempt is made to work 
towards a valid comprehensive and inclusive definition of language policy. In doing 
so, language planning is established as being a specific component of language policy 
and the various types of language planning activity that may be undertaken are 
discussed. The focus of the chapter then shifts onto the link between language policy 
and planning activities and ethnic/national identities. In view of the link between 
language and ethnic/national identities, the notion of language policy and planning as 
a form of identity policy and planning is proposed. This notion forms the basis of the 
typology of language-in-national-identity policies that follows. The chapter ends with 
a discussion of some contemporary academic thought in the field of language policy 
theory. Of particular interest are the various discernible scholarly attitudes towards 
nationalist motivations in language policy and planning. many of which seem to have 
undergone quite a radical change in the last few decades as concerns for linguistic 
diversity and minority rights have come to the fore. The main question under 
consideration in this regard is whether nationalist/nation-building interests can be 
reconciled with a desire to promote linguistic diversity and/or minority group rights. 
3.2 What is language policy and planning? 
Employed in its narrowest sense, the term 'language policy" usually refers to the 
formulation of laws. regulations and official positions regarding language usage and 
the allocation of linguistic resources by some government or other political 
organisation. However, for a broader, more nuanced appreciation of the nature of 
language policy, it is necessary to go beyond reference to just official or go\ernmental 
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positions on language and instead, consider the range of linguistic variables which 
comprise the language policy (or policies) of a particular social group or speech 
community.7 Spolsky identifies three different components that determine the 
character of a speech community's language policy: 
A useful first step is to distinguish between the three components of the language 
policy of a speech community: its language practices - the habitual pattern of 
selecting among the varieties that make up its linguistic repertoire; its language 
beliefs and ideology - the beliefs about language and language use; and any kind 
of language intervention, planning or management. (Spolsky, 2004:5) 
This approach to defining language policy allows us to view all collectively acting 
groups as having a language policy. Indeed, even individual persons may be said to 
have their own language policy. After all, each person has a repertoire of linguistic 
practices and has beliefs, however unconscious or poorly articulated, about language 
and its usage and some individuals may, and frequently do, consciously seek to affect 
the linguistic behaviour of others. These first two components (language practices and 
beliefs/ideology) make up what Schiffman (1996) terms a speech community's 
linguistic culture. Accordingly, we may view language policy as a combination of 
linguistic culture and language planning. The terms language policy and language 
planning though, are unfortunately often used interchangeably with little or no 
conceptual distinction drawn between the two. What, in fact, turns out to be language 
planning is frequently referred to as language policy. This is not especially 
problematic if, as Schiffman (1996:3) notes, language planning is to be the principal 
expression of the language policy in question. However, in many cases, to refer to 
language planning as language policy is to use a totum pro parte term. For general 
purposes, it is more helpful to regard language planning or language management as 
an element or subdivision of a wider language policy. Kaplan and Baldauf define 
language planning as 
a body of ideas, laws and regulations (language policy), change rules, beliefs, and 
practices intended to achieve a planned change (or to stop change from 
7 A distinction is commonly drawn between 'linguistic communities' and 'speech communities' 
(Silverstein, 1998). According to Blommaert (2006:243): '[T]he former are groups professing 
adherence to the normatively constructed, ideologically articulated "standard language" ("we speak 
English") and the latter are groups characterized by the actual use of specific speech forms'. 
52 
happening) in the language use in one or more communities. To put it differently. 
langu~ge planning involves deliberate, although not always overt, future oriented 
change in systems of language code and/or speaking in a societal context. (Kaplan 
and Baldauf, 1997:3) 
One might argue, for example, that attempts to prevent or reverse linguistic change 
cannot really be described as future-oriented but the above definition captures the 
essential trait of language planning, namely that it involves deliberate intervention in 
a linguistic corpus (corpus planning) or in the sociolinguistic environment (status and 
acquisition planning). Language planning may therefore be viewed as a sometimes 
absent, conscious, action-orientated dimension of language policy. The absence of 
conspicuous, concrete language planning measures within a speech community does 
not, though, imply the absence of a language policy. One may have language policy 
without language planning but no society is without a language policy (Eastman. 
1983:6). This does not necessarily mean, however, that a community's language 
policy is easily locatable or readily observable. Several factors may contribute to the 
obscuration of language policies. Firstly, in those cases where there is no official 
language policy and questions of language are not particularly salient or high profile, 
language policy may only exist implicitly. Such implicit policies can only be 
ascertained by observation of the linguistic practices of the community in question. 
Locating language policy is also often rendered problematical by the existence of 
what may be termed an unharmonised language policy situation, which may be 
defined as the existence of some discrepancy or, indeed, outright contradiction 
between the de jure and de facto language policies that operate within a polity. 
Examples abound in which overt, official language policies are undermined and often 
rendered essentially meaningless by the existence of covert policies. Post-apartheid 
South Africa, for example, represents a clear case of an unharmonised language 
policy situation (see section 4.5). Spolsky (2004:222) asks the question 'Will the real 
language policy stand up?' This appeal may seem a reasonable one in the light of the 
conflicting language policies that frequently operate within speech communities. 
However, by retaining the distinction between de jure and de facto language policies, 
one can spare oneself the task of agonising over the question of what constitutes the 
'real' language policy of the society in question. This view allows one to see most 
language-related behaviour as the consequence of some language policy, albeit often 
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unconscious or covert. The most important question to be answered is: which of the 
language policies in operation tells us more about the relationship between a speech 
community and the repertoire of linguistic varieties that exist within it? 
The answer to the above question is, undoubtedly, that language practices (i.e. de 
facto policy) are, on the whole, far more revealing than official policies, as they may 
be viewed as a representation of what might be termed 'ideology in action' (Jaffe, 
1999). Where official policies are not consistent with language practices and beliefs, 
empirical observation would overwhelmingly seem to suggest that they are likely to 
have negligible effect (at least in the manner intended by the policy) on the linguistic 
environment of the society in question. Such policies are likely to meet with one of 
two responses. Firstly, they may be ignored or not enforced and therefore rendered 
largely decorative. Secondly, the attempted enforcement of such policies may 
generate resistance and refusal to co-operate amongst their target populations. 
However, even in cases where the language policy situation is not unharmonised and 
official policy and planning broadly reflect the prevalent beliefs and practices, one 
should be wary of crediting the policy with having engineered the prevailing 
sociolinguistic situation. 
Another problem with some approaches to questions of language policy, language 
planning, language loyalty, and other sociolinguistic issues, is that that some 
researchers seem to interpret reasons for various developments as outcomes of 
policy when it is clear that they are elements underlying the policy. That is, 
conclusions are drawn about supposedly causal relationships between language 
and policy that seem [ ... ] totally turned around. (Schiffman, 1996:3) 
All this would seem to point to the relative ineffectiveness of official language policy 
and planning in attempting to bring about non-evolutionary, engineered changes in the 
sociolinguistic environment. Nevertheless, language planning activities continue to be 
keenly engaged in by polities throughout the world. Why do so many states persist 
with language planning measures which do not coincide with, or complement, 
linguistic ideologies and practices at the grass roots level, given the extremely modest 
success rate of such endeavours? Several explanations may be offered in answer to 
this question. The simplest, and perhaps most cynical, explanation is that many 
language planners, especially those who are not trained sociolinguists or sociologists 
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of language and are largely unaware of any historical or theoretical precedents in 
language planning, unquestioningly continue to believe that language is something 
which may be easily planned and managed (Robin and Jernudd, 1971). In this regard, 
Fishman (1994:97-8) makes the pertinent observation that 'very little language 
planning practice has actually been informed by language planning theory'. At the 
most basic level, attempts at language planning may simply originate in a 
fundamental human instinct to problem-solve and engineer the social environment to 
suit particular ideological and practical needs. However difficult a problem may be to 
overcome, certain individuals (in this case, language planners) seem compelled to at 
least try and undertake the task of doing so. Pessimism is generally regarded 
unfavourably, whatever the extent of the task in question. At the individual level and 
perhaps even more so at the societal level, to sit back and do nothing in the face of a 
problem seems rarely to be a satisfactory course of (non)-action. Where states and 
other governmental agencies are concerned, to be seen not to be even trying to solve 
language-related (and other) problems is likely to lead to politically damaging 
accusations of negligence. Where genuine political will and/or competence to 
undertake language planning is lacking, some forms of weak, largely unimplemented, 
token planning measures may still exist in order to fend off allegations of remissness. 
Attempts at language planning, then, may be the consequence of political ideology or 
political pragmatism or, indeed, a combination of both. However, neither of these 
motivating factors is a necessary guarantee of successful language planning outcomes. 
Language planning activities have traditionally been divided into three types, namely 
status planning, corpus planning and acquisition planning (Cooper, 1989; Haugen, 
1968; Paulston and Heidemann, 2006:293). Status planning refers to the deliberate, 
authoritative allocation of particular language varieties to certain functional domains 
at the societal level (Hornberger, 2006:29; S.Wright, 2004:43-47). Examples of status 
planning might include the formulation and enaction of legislation which allows or, 
indeed, demands some form of official or institutional use of a particular named 
linguistic variety. Corpus planning is concerned with managing or changing the 
internal properties of language itself (Haugen, 1983). Cooper (1989:31) defines it as 
'the creation of new forms, the modification of old ones, or the selection from 
alternative forms in a spoken or written code'. Corpus planning activities may 
include, for example, spelling reform, the development of new lexical items or 
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resistance to the use of foreign loanwords. Status and corpus planning have been 
referred to as 'two sides of the same (language planning) coin' (Fishman, 2006:315). 
the implication being that neither activity generally happens in isolation from the 
other. Indeed, status and corpus planning are often co-occurring, complimentary 
processes. There is little use in a linguistic variety being promoted and sanctioned for 
use in particular status domains unless it is equipped with an appropriate corpus 
which may allow it to be employed effectively. Equally, the extended development of 
a corpus for a linguistic variety that is unlikely to acquire any further status domains 
seems a largely redundant exercise. However, as Fishman (2006:316) observes, due to 
the much greater difficulty of status planning, particularly in highly unequal, 
multilingual 'development settings', corpus planning frequently precedes status 
planning as it may often be a less (though not always) politically provocative 
endeavour. The third type of language planning - acquisition planning - is concerned 
with the question of who uses which particular language varieties. It involves 
activities aimed at facilitating the spread of language varieties throughout particular 
communities or parts of such communities. Acquisition planning may involve the 
systematic learning of a foreign or second language or it may involve efforts aimed at 
the reacquisition of a historically associated language. Language maintenance 
endeavours should also be mentioned as a type of anti-deacquisition planning. In 
contrast to acquisition planning, it should be noted that its antithesis, namely non-
acquisition planning, might also form part of a polity's language policy. Apartheid-
era language planning in South Africa represents a classic example of non-acquisition 
planning, designed as it was to prevent the majority black population acquiring any 
useful competence in English and Afrikaans, the two official languages of state 
administration (see section 4.4). 
Although we may recognise status, corpus and acquisition planning as quantitatively 
distinct activities operating within a broader notion of language planning, each type of 
activity can nevertheless be shown to reflect a concern, whether conscious or 
unconscious, for matters of identity. Consequently, one is in a position to advance the 
concept of 'language planning as identity planning'. 
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3.3 Language planning as identity planning 
Even language planning which, on the surface, may appear to have a purely pragmatic 
or instrumental rationale generally reveals itself to have some affective identity-
related agenda. For example, the principal motivation for the Icelandic Language 
Council's petitioning of Microsoft to produce an Icelandic language version of 
Windows is unlikely to have been the fact that most Icelanders are unable to use the 
English (or even Danish) version. Instead, it is the symbolic importance of having an 
Icelandic version that seems to be the strongest underlying rationale in this case 
(Spolsky, 2004:62). So, it can be seen that what on the surface may seem like a piece 
of purely pragmatic status planning (i.e. acquiring a new domain of use for Icelandic) 
is inextricably caught up with questions of identity and ethnolinguistic self-esteem. 
Instrumental reasoning often fails to account for certain status planning decisions. 
What else, for example, other than power of affective. sentimental factors can 
adequately explain the continued status of Irish as the 'first official language' of 
Ireland? 
Equally, instrumentalist accounts are frequently incapable of locating fully the 
motivation behind particular corpus planning initiatives. A good example is the 
decision of the Norwegian government in the 1950s to change the way of saying all 
two-digit numbers over 20 (Jahr, 1998). Previously, Norwegians had always said such 
numbers in the same way as speakers of Dutch, Afrikaans, German and Danish by 
counting the units before the tens. However, it was decided in 1951 that Norwegians 
should follow the English and Swedish habit of counting the tens before the units. The 
reason given for this change was that this method was supposedly both more logical 
and more 'international'. It is difficult to believe that the alleged illogicality of the 
previous counting system impeded in any significant way the ability of Norwegians to 
conduct their lives, just as it does not do so today for speakers of Dutch, Afrikaans, 
German and Danish. Instead, as Jahr (1998:265) observes, this piece of Ausbau 
corpus planning was essentially an attempt to further distance the Norwegian 
language from Danish (the Danes being the most significant 'Other' in opposition to 
which Norwegian identity has historically been constituted) and align itself with 
English, the language of greatest international prestige - a clear identity-related 
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initiative. Attempts to influence identity are also clearly evident in much language 
acquisition planning. Acquisition planning has been an important feature of many 
nation-building projects as states (and some sub-state polities), especially in Europe. 
have viewed the acquisition of a single, 'national' language by a previously 
heterogeneous population as a necessary condition for the creation and consolidation 
of a common national identity. Acquisition of a language allows for (at least some 
degree of) participation in its associated culture(s), something which may, although 
not necessarily, have implications for the identities of the individuals and 
communities concerned (see section 2.5.1). 
Given the potential pertinence of all three types of language planning to matters of 
identity, one is able to propose a unified notion of language planning as identity 
planning. In fact, use of the term identity planning seems, somewhat surprisingly, to 
have made only highly infrequent appearances within the sociology of language 
literature (e.g. Freeman, 1994; Pool, 1979). This can perhaps be partly attributed to a 
previous scholarly tendency to concentrate on economic and other instrumental 
motivations for language policy and planning. Yet, this still seems a curious oversight 
given what we know about the relationship between language and identity (see section 
2.5). Identity and culture are intimately connected and language, as perhaps the most 
immediate and salient expression of culture, is therefore also inextricably linked to 
identity (Fishman, 1989:66-94). In simple terms, language affects identity and vice-
versa, although the strength of the correlation between the two variables may vary 
significantly from case to case (May, 200 I: 129). It should be noted, however, that 
asserting the existence of a link between language and identity is not to make the 
claim that language loss necessarily equals loss of identity (Sachdev and Bourhis, 
1990). The language-identity link may be upheld without suggesting that the 
relationship is in any way primordial (see section 2.5.1). The countless immigrant 
communities, for example, that have maintained a linkage with their identities of 
ancestral origin despite experiencing complete loss of their traditionally associated 
mother tongues effectively disproves any essential relationship between a particular 
language and an identity. When, over time, a community switches to another language 
it does not inevitably eradicate all linkage with its historical ancestry. However, 
neither does this mean that the identity of the community in question will necessarily 
remain unaltered. Language shift represents a change in a community's cultural 
58 
content, so it should not be surprising that some concomitant changes in the content of 
its identity may also occur. 
[A] different language in the ethnoculturally encumbered interactions is indicative 
of a differently realized and implemented ethnocultural identity, a differently 
enacted and expressed ethnoculturally contrastive context, even if the same ethnic 
label is still utilized due to the elements of continuity that may remain even after 
language shift occurs. (Fishman, 1989:401) 
The question of whether language shift is a phenomenon to be regretted and resisted is 
another matter entirely and essentially involves a perspectival value-judgement 
regarding the relationship between language and ethnocultural identity and language 
and knowledge (see sections 3.6.2.1 and 3.6.2.2). Language shift involves both loss 
and gain. In cases of language shift, some elements of identity and inherited 
knowledge are well likely to be lost, yet some new elements of identity may also be 
gained in the form of the newly acquired language and all the cultural material that 
comes with it. For example, the way some immigrant communities which have 
experienced language shift claim hyphenated identities (e.g. Italian-American, Indian-
British) demonstrates this. The value of the losses and gains that occur in instances of 
language shift are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine empirically, 
despite the attempts of numerous normative accounts to do so. However, there still 
does not appear to be a universally accepted mainstream theory of response to 
situations of language shift amongst normative theorists within the academic 
discipline of the sociology of language. 
In the light of the interrelationship between language and identity, Pool (1979:5-6), 
somewhat laboriously, makes the following conclusions regarding the relationship 
between language planning and identity: 
(I) Since language affects identity, an increase in language planning means that 
planners are having an increasing effect on identity. In other words, identity 
planning (whether deliberate or not) is increasing. 
(2) Since good planning takes account of side effects. language planners should 
study the effects of planned linguistic change on identity. 
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(3) Since identity affects language, language planners should study identity 
planning as a means of accomplishing their goals. 
(4) Since language affects identity, those wanting to influence identity should 
consider language planning as a means. 
(5) Those wishing to foil the efforts of language planners should consider using 
identity, and those wishing to foil the efforts of identity planners should 
consider using language, to accomplish their aims. (Pool, 1979:5-6) 
The question of whether one undertakes language planning to change identity or vice-
versa is somewhat circular and serves only to confuse. Is not identity planning that 
strives to affect language just language planning? To plan language is to plan identity 
or, at least, an (often central) element of identity. Identity planning need not just be 
about language of course and so may concern itself with other elements. For example, 
during the apartheid era in South Africa, racial categorisation (in combination with, 
and complementary to, language planning) was an important component of the 
governing regime's identity planning project (see section 4.4). One should therefore 
view language planning as a type of identity planning. Indeed, it is perhaps the most 
common, or at least most salient, type of identity planning. However, the mere fact 
that language planning exists does not necessarily mean that language lends itself 
particularly well to such activity. Pool's assertion above that 'an increase in language 
planning means that planners are having an increasing effect on identity' does not 
necessarily follow. An increase in ineffective language planning wil1 not have an 
increasing effect on identity and history should caution us against taking an overtly 
optimistic view of the potential of language planning to successful1y accomplish its 
language and identity goals. For example, instances of successfully planned reversal 
of language shift (RLS) are far outweighed by the number of failed RLS attempts 
(Fishman, 1991). Given that language and identity are closely linked and that changes 
in one will likely lead to changes in the other, the question that presents itself is 'to 
what extent can identity become the object of deliberate, effective manipulation 
through planned intervention in the linguistic environment?' This question is 
especially relevant in the context of 'nation-building'. The fact that so many people 
and agencies have engaged, and continue to engage, in nation-building activities 
would suggest that the belief that language and identity can be readily planned is 
widespread. However, one should again be wary of overestimating the capacity of 
language planning by explaining changes in identity as being outcomes of language 
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planning activities, when they are in fact non-deliberate, unconscious developments. 
One must attempt to distinguish between planned and unplanned language change. 
Although they confusingly refer several times to 'unplanned language planning' - one 
can have unplanned language policy but to talk of unplanned language planning is a 
contradiction in terms whatever way one looks at it - Kaplan and Balduaf (1997:299) 
highlight the importance for language planners of identifying and distinguishing 
between planned and unplanned language change. 
[T]here is much in the way of unplanned language policy and planning occurring 
in societies, and this often goes unnoticed and therefore unrecorded by language 
planners. This has an impact on language change and the ability of language 
planners and bureaucrats to implement language change. Unplanned language 
change is a 'problem' for language planners because it alters the language eco-
system making it more difficult to develop accurate and effective language 
planning strategies; yet as it occurs as a 'natural' part of the system. it needs 
somehow to be taken into account. (Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997:299) 
It is necessary to be able to identify the unplanned elements in processes of identity 
formation and change if one wishes to make any meaningful judgements regarding the 
success or failure of particular language planning measures. It can equip one with the 
ability to see through dishonest or false claims of language planning success where 
unplanned linguistic changes happen to coincide with the aims of language planners 
(see quotation of S. Wright, section 3.4.3). As far as language planners themselves are 
concerned, taking cognisance of unplanned linguistic changes is an important step in 
formulating an appropriate language planning agenda which sets realistically 
achievable goals, 
3.4 Language policy and national identity 
If we can talk of language planning as a type of identity planning, it follows that we 
can view language policies as types of identity policy and when they operate at the 
level of nations and states we may then talk of language-in-national identity policies. 
Language policies which operate at a state-wide level can be broadly divided into two 
categories: those which promote a monolingual conception of national identity and 
those which advocate a multilingual or pluralist model of national unity. Of course, 
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the significance of the policy adopted by a state, whether monolingual or multilingual. 
depends greatly on the ethnolinguistic complexity and diversity of its population. Ever 
since the rise of modem nationalism in the 19th century, most states have tended to 
adopt what may be termed monolingual national identity policies. The idea of 'one 
language, one nation' has tended to prevail over that of the multilingual national 
culture, even in some of the most multilingual and multiethnic states. Linguistic 
uniformity has frequently been viewed as a precondition for the creation and 
consolidation of national unity. Even language policies that may be described as 
multilingual may still promote a monolingual understanding of the relationship 
between language and national identity (see section 4.4 on apartheid language policy). 
Examples of language policies that promote a truly multilingual understanding of 
national identity seem to be relatively few (Stewart, 1968). The following section 
considers the various types of state within which language policies reflecting either 
monolingual or multilingual conceptions of national identity may occur. 
3.4.1 Types of language-in-national identity policy 
Spolsky (2004:58) attempts to correlate language policies with the ethnic complexity 
of the state. In doing so, he identifies three types of state: 
The first type is made up of countries that are ethnolinguistically homogenous. 
Such countries, like Japan or China or the United States may contain linguistic 
minorities, but these are perceived to be small and insignificant and are 
geographically or socially marginalized. 
The second type consists of dyadic (or triadic) countries, which include two or 
three ethnolinguistic groups relatively equal in numbers or power. Prototypical 
examples are Switzerland, Belgium, Fiji and Canada. 
The third group consists of mosaic societies, multiethnic states like Nigeria and 
India and Papua New Guinea which contain a large number of ethnic groups. 
More than half the countries of the world [ ... J have five or more substantial ethnic 
communities. (Spolsky, 2004:58) 
Although Spolsky's classification makes no explicit mention of national identity, it 
provides a useful foundation upon which to develop a typology of language-in-
national identity policies that operate at the state level. Not all states, however, can be 
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said to conduct such policies. In certain cases, particularly in areas of sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is even a moot point as to whether one can credibly claim the existence of 
the state. Although there may be international recognition of certain states, many 
governments have very little or no control over significant proportions of their states' 
putative territories. As Blommaert (2006:240) observes, in many instances core 'state' 
functions such as the provision of education and medical services (if they are 
provided at all) are performed by agencies and organisations other than the state such 
as the UNHCR or international NGOs. Therefore, any language policy that may be in 
operation in such instances cannot credibly be attributed to, or derive any authority 
from, the non-functioning state. Building upon Spolsky's classification and with some 
refinements and additions, we can identify the various types of state within which 
different forms of language-in-national identity policy may operate. These states are 
the pure monolingual/monoethnic state, the monolingual state-nation with small 
and/or highly marginalised minorities, the dyadic or triadic multinational state and the 
post-colonial polyethnic state. 
3.4.2 The pure monolinguallmonoethnic state 
The monolingual/monoethnic state may be defined as one containing a single, 
homogenous ethnolinguistic group and no indigenous ethnolinguistic minorities, 
however small. Few states can credibly claim to contain no indigenous linguistic 
minorities. Of the exceptions, Iceland is commonly cited as the clearest example of a 
completely monolingual and monoethnic state (Vik~r 2000). Icelandic is apparently 
spoken as a first language by 100 percent of the population and is spoken between 
Icelanders in all domains of life. Consequently, the linguistic character of Icelandic 
national identity can be taken for granted and is fully inclusive of the whole Icelandic 
population. It represents a monolingual identity solution to a monolingual 
sociolinguistic situation. The possibility of a multilingual national identity is 
unavailable because there exists no domestic multilingualism. As Spolsky (2004:62) 
observes: 'Iceland is a nation-state that is monolingual in practice, ideology and 
language management.' A consequence of this absolute domestic monolingualism is 
that language management activities are usually of a corpus planning type since status 
planning measures are a reaction to a competitive multilingual environment. In 
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Iceland, language planning has long been preoccupied with matters of punsm 
(Thomas, 1991), which has involved concerted efforts to resist the use of foreign loan 
words in Icelandic and to promote supposedly authentic, often archaic Icelandic terms 
instead (Halldorsson, 1979). However, as the example of Icelandic and Microsoft 
discussed earlier demonstrates, it IS likely that with the increasing effects of 
globalisation and the penetration of English into many higher level domains. 
especially new, hi-tech ones, in non-native English speaking countries, language 
status planning will become an issue of increasing importance, or indeed necessity, 
for even the most domestically monolingual of states. 
Other countries that could possibly be included in this category are South Korea and 
North Korea, for whom Ethnologue lists a single language (Korean).8 The Republic of 
Ireland is an interesting, possibly unique, example of a bilingual monoethnic state. It 
contains two linguistic communities (Irish and English speakers) but a single 
indigenous ethnic/national community. 
3.4.3 The monolingual state-nation with small and/or highly 
marginalised minorities 
Another type of state is the monolingual state-nation with small and/or highly 
marginalised indigenous minority groups. This state may be defined as one that is 
monolingual (and monoethnic) in ideology and in language management but 
multilingual in practice. In these countries, only one language is associated with the 
state-promoted national identity despite the existence of several minority 
ethnolinguistic groups. Such is the influence and widespread acceptance of the notion 
of 'one language, one nation' that language policies in these states frequently depict 
minority languages and domestic multilingualism as an obstacle to national unity. As 
such, they represent (attempted) monolingual solutions to multilingual situations. 
Consequently, an important element of such language policies has involved the 
delegitimisation or even outright denial of the existence of any minority languages 
and the converse validation of the language that is held to represent the state-bounded 
8 http://www.ethnologue.com 
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national identity. The delegitimisation of the non-national minority languages may 
take several forms, some more overt and coercive than others. The case of Turkey 
represents a particularly extreme example of a state attempting to assert the 'one 
language, one nation' ideal in the face of a manifestly multilingual reality (Kirisci and 
Winrow, 1997). Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak (1995) document how the Kurdish-
speaking minority was rendered invisible and illegal by the policies of the modem 
Turkish state. The following constitutional provisions clearly demonstrate the 
monolingual, monoethnic model of nationhood promoted and, indeed, fanatically 
insisted upon by the Turkish state: 
The state of Turkey is in its state territory and state citizens an indivisible whole. 
Its language is Turkish. (Constitution, Article 3). 
Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk. 
(Constitution, Article 66, Paragraph I). 
No language other than Turkish may be taught as a native language to citizens of 
Turkey in instructional and educational institutions. (Constitution, Article 4219) 
The following laws were not annulled until 1991: 
The mother tongue of Turkish citizens is Turkish. (Law 293213) 
It is prohibited to disclose, publish or broadcast ideas and opinions in languages 
other than those which are the primary official languages of states recognized by 
the Turkish State. (Law 293212) 
It is forbidden to claim that there exist minorities in Turkey. It is forbidden to 
protect or develop non-Turkish cultures and languages. (Section 81 of Law 
No.2820 on Political Parties) (cited in Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak, 1995:355-6) 
The patently false assertion that Turkish is the mother tongue of all Turkish citizens is 
clearly an aspiration of state policy (or wishful thinking, perhaps) rather than an 
expression of considered, unbiased sociolinguistic research. To an extent, these 
ludicrous claims are unsurprising since the indivisible, monolingual model of nation 
subscribed to by the Turkish state does not contain any ideological space for allowing 
even an admission of the existence of sub-state minority cultural expressions of any 
type. 
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A state with a broadly comparable national identity policy to Turkey is France. Post-
revolutionary French language policy and planning has traditionally adopted a 
steadfastly monolingual approach in dealing with the multilingual, multiethnic reality 
of its population (Ager, 1999; Oakes, 2001). The notion of 'La France: une et 
indivisible' is one of the founding myths of the modem French state and its doctrine 
has been strictly adhered to in the formulation and enactment of state language policy. 
Again, the promotion of this indivisible, monolingual conception of nationhood in the 
midst of a multilingual environment has meant that an important emphasis of French 
language policy and planning has been to portray domestic multilingualism as 
problematic and politically divisive. The French state's failure to ratify the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languges is indicative of its reluctance to give any 
form of recognition to domestic minority ethnolinguistic groups (S. Wright, 1999). 
Indeed, in 1996, this Charter was declared unconstitutional by the French Council of 
State (May, 2001 : 162). Linguistic varieties other than standard French have also often 
been depicted as backward, inferior and even unworthy of being called languages, 
instead often being referred to derogatorily as patois (Ager, 1990:26). This type of 
-
national identity policy has been described as propagating an 'ideology of contempt' 
towards minority languages (Grillo, 1989: 173). Indeed, such has been the 
pervasiveness of this ideology in France that: 
it has [ ... ] entrenched deep into the French national psyche a view that the 
promotion, and even simply the maintenance, of minority languages (and 
cultures) are fundamentally at odds with the principles and objectives of the 
French state. As a result, there have been remarkably few exceptions to this 
assimilationist imperative in French language and education policy. (May, 
200]:160) 
Not all ideologically monolingual states are able to adopt such an extreme position as 
France and Turkey. Even France and Turkey have recently begun to come under 
greater international (and internal) pressure to recognise minority languages to some 
degree (See May, 2001:162; Oakes, 2001; Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak, 1995:358; S. 
Wright, 2000b). Many states are compelled, by reasons of political expediency, to 
acknowledge some degree of domestic multilingualism. An example of such a state 
would be Austria which has recognised several regional languages including Slovene, 
Hungarian, Slovak, Czech and Croatian despite the fact that these languages are 
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spoken by only around 2% of the country's total population. However, in such cases, 
this recognition tends to fall well short of promoting any minority language to the 
status of 'national' language, avoiding any suggestion of there being any linguistic 
equality between the minority language(s) and the main language of the state. 
Consequently, only one language continues to be associated with the state bounded 
national identity. The recognition of some kind of multilingualism does not 
necessarily entail deviation from a monolingual conception of ethnic or national 
identity but it does allow for the possibility of plural identities, something not 
permitted by the French and Turkish models of nationhood. However, plural identities 
tend only to be tolerated where they are strictly sub-national in character and do not 
seriously threaten the unity of the state and the essential character of its associated 
national identity. The type of assimilationist nation-building discussed above is 
deeply hegemonic in that it requires minority ethnolinguistic groups to accept the 
political and cultural values and characteristics of the dominant, state-owning ethnic 
group. In France, this type of hegemony has, notwithstanding some small degree of 
peripheral resistance, taken hold with considerable force. The pressing question here, 
then, is 'to what extent has language planning instigated and maintained such 
hegemonic processes'? 
Having identified the national identity policies discussed above as being of a similar 
type, it is important to consider what criteria one should use in order to measure their 
degree of success. When one talks of the success or failure of a policy, one is usually 
referring to the degree of effectiveness with which planning measures taken on behalf 
of the policy have been implemented. Admittedly, French minority languages have 
suffered a severe decline in the past two centuries (Heran, 1993). However, they have 
not disappeared and many minority language movements continue to struggle 
vigorously for recognition in the face of an unyielding state. In its ultimate goal then, 
i.e. of achieving state-wide monolingual linguistic unifonnity through the eradication 
of minority languages, French (and Turkish) policy must be regarded as having failed, 
giving credence to the view that language planning is very often an ineffective 
enterprise: 
How effective has French language policy been? Considering that it has been 
fighting the regional varieties since before the Revolution. it is a wonder that they 
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still survive at all. Two hundred years of active language management should 
sure!y have been enough to destroy them completely. This is further evidence of 
the powerlessness of language management. (Spolsky, 2004:74) 
Short of genocide or mass deportation history suggests that ethnolinguistic groups 
cannot simply be planned out of existence. Furthermore, in most cases it is by no 
means certain that even the decline and attrition experienced by minority 
ethnolinguistic groups in the face of this type of monolingual national identity policy 
is, at origin, the consequence of consciously pursued, top-down language 
management decisions. By asserting the influence of language planning measures in 
such circumstances, one risks underestimating the importance of economic and 
demographic changes, which are beyond the control of language planning, in 
producing changes in the sociolinguistic environment. For some, the extent to which 
national languages and identities spread during the age of nationalism may seem like 
a triumph of top-down language and identity acquisition planning. However. to adopt 
this view is to miss an important feature of the nation-building era, as S. Wright 
observes: 
[L]anguage learning on an ideological basis was achieved in nation building [ ... J 
because top-down and bottom-up movements coincided: the spread of the national 
language was central to nation building; acquisition of the language was useful for 
individual success and social mobility. (S. Wright, 2004: 169-70) 
This is in line with the view of nation formation outlined by Gellner (1983) who 
argues that the spread of state-bounded national cultures was a necessary consequence 
of the prevailing economic and sociological conditions of the time (see section 2.3) 
According to this position, language planning merely has the role of a facilitator in the 
spread of the national language, rather than being the actual motor of sociolinguistic 
change itself. Language planning can only really be successful insofar as it is in 
harmony with the socio-economic Zeitgeist, that being when the desirability of the 
measures attempting to be implemented is widely accepted by the target population. 
Consequently, the notion of language management is perhaps more appropriate than 
that of language planning, as it gives a more modest, realistic assessment of the extent 
to which consciously acting agents can affect the linguistic behaviour of whole 
communities (Spolsky, 2004:8). 
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3.4.4 The dyadic or triadic multinational state 
In the dyadic or triadic multinational state, the promotion of a monolingual state-
bounded national identity is generally not a politically feasible option. The presence 
of two or three ethnolinguistic groups of similar size and/or power is likely to mean 
that giving a single linguistic variety the status of 'national language' or, indeed, the 
existence of any form of salient linguistic inequity will generate resistance amongst 
those groups whose languages are not adequately represented. Language conflict is 
often a highly visible characteristic of the political life of such states. Therefore, it is 
generally expedient for the state to recognise and promote several languages in order 
to negate secessionist tendencies and maintain its structural unity. The promotion of a 
monolingual national identity may also be rendered impossible on practical grounds 
by the simple fact that the population in question may not share a common language. 
This type of multinational state may encounter a number of problems in attempting to 
foster a pervasive state-nationalism. For it to succeed, it is necessary that loyalty to 
the state does not conflict significantly with loyalty to any of the state's constituent 
national groups. The perception of some form of state-promoted inequality between 
the different groups that inhabit multinational states is frequently a cause of conflict. 
Where such conflict remains largely unresolved, expressions of sub-state 
ethnonational identities are often likely to be considerably more salient and politically 
mobilising than any expressions of identification with the state. Identity conflicts, 
whether about language or some other issue, present a serious obstacle to the 
development of a shared identity (see chapter 5 on identity conflict surrounding 
Afrikaans). Consequently, the major thrust of language planning in such societies 
tends to be concerned with the avoidance or resolution of inter-ethnic linguistic 
conflict. 
Language policies in dyadic or triadic states may reveal a quite complex set of 
linguistic arrangements in order to reduce the potential for linguistic conflict. 
However, one common feature is that there is usually some partitioning of the 
linguistic space (Spolsky, 2004:161). This may be done either according to the 
'personality principle' whereby the distribution of language rights is dependant upon 
the (ethno )linguistic status of the individual citizen or according to the 'territoriality 
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principle' whereby such rights are distributed geographically (Reaume, 2(03). In each 
case, the state-bounded national identity may, in theory, be enacted by any of the 
official languages of the state. Finland is a good example of a state which has sought 
to diffuse a historical tendency towards language conflict through the application of 
the personality principle (Gambier, 1986; McRae, 1997). 
Switzerland represents the classic example of a state which has, by and large. 
successfully applied the territoriality principle in order to avoid language conflict. The 
federal division of Switzerland into mainly monolingual, self-legislating cantons has 
greatly depoliticised the country's language question. Because of these political 
arrangements, a common, supralinguistic Swiss nationalism has been able to flourish. 
despite the fact that there remains quite a low level of interaction between Swiss 
citizens from the four main language groups (Diirmiiller, 1997). This suggests that a 
multilingual model of nation does not necessarily mean that all members of the nation 
should themselves be multilingual. Clearly, there will always be the need for some 
multilingual individuals to act as brokering agents in such societies but mass 
multlingualism9, while clearly helpful, would not appear to be an absolute 
requirement for the formation of a national identity. However, Switzerland does have 
some credible claims to uniqueness and it is doubtful whether certain features of the 
Swiss case may be readily applicable to other states (see section 4.5). 
The ethnolinguistic composition of multinational states means that their populations 
are generally more resistant to state-led projects of identity construction, especially 
when sub-state groups are large enough and have sufficient institutional development 
to be said to constitute their own 'societal culture' (Kymlicka, 1995). The 
disintegration of the former-Yugoslavia and the USSR are illustrative of this. 
Belgium, a state with a roughly comparable ethnolinguistic composition to 
Switzerland, is an example of a country in which the historical inability to resolve 
language conflict has inhibited the growth of a state-led nationalism. The 
federalisation of Belgium only occurred in 1992 after centuries of language conflict 
between the Dutch and French-speaking populations. The legacy of this conflict is 
that separate Flemish and Francophone identities are much stronger and inspire far 
9 A distinction is often made between societal multilingualism and individual pluralingualism. 
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more loyalty than the notion of a unified Belgian nation does. Deprez (2000:26-27) 
attributes this to the fact that the political solution to the language question means that 
Belgians no longer interact with each other: 
Belgians do not have a common language any more. [ ... ] Education and media 
have been completely split up. Even in Brussels two exclusively monolingual 
networks - schools (at all levels!), cultural centres, theatres, and the like have 
been developed in spite of the city's bilingual administrative status. The result is 
Flemings and Francophones no longer know each other. They do not read each 
other's newspapers, do not watch each other's television channels, no longer 
know each other's authors, do not visit each other's theatres, etc. [ ... ] there is 
hardly a Belgian nation left. (Deprez, 2000:26-27) 
The Belgian case would seem to suggest that conflict prevention alone is not a 
sufficient condition for the formation of an overarching state-bounded national 
identity. The resolution of linguistic conflicts may often only satisfactorily be 
achieved through some form of devolution or federalisation. A possible consequence 
of this weakening of centralised state power is that it lessens the degree to which 
many people recognise the state-associated culture as being the primary locus of their 
identity. The resurgence of regional national identities following decentralisation in 
multinational states such as Spain and the UK might be regarded as evidence of this 
(May, 2001: chapter 7). 
It must be remembered that states do not generally give up power unnecessarily or of 
their own volition. The promotion of multilingual national identities in dyadic or 
triadic states stems less from an ideological commitment to, or appreciation of, 
multilingualism per se than from the pragmatic necessity to compromise by 
accommodating competing ethnolinguistic demands. Sub-state national groups that 
demand multilingualism and linguistic representation at the state level often have 
highly assimilationist policies towards their own immigrant popUlations, reinforcing 
the monolingual nature of their particular regionally dominant culture and identity. 
Such is the case in Belgian Flanders, for example. where 
the general attitude towards language in society is strictly homogeneistic and 
monolingual. Immigrants. for instance. are continuously blamed for not or badly 
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knowing Dutch, and part of their inferior socio-economic status is explained by 
their failure to learn or speak Dutch. [ ... J The government also expressed its 
intention [ ... J to promote the use of Dutch outside the public and business sphere, 
because this would be the best way to realize the 'integration' of ethnic 
minorities. 'Integration' has a strong assimilationist ring to it, and though exotic 
cuisine, foreign music and dances can be tolerated as expressions of 
multiculturalism, societal bi- or multilingualism as a result of the integration of 
migrants is seen as definitely undesirable. (Blommaert, 1996:242-3) 
This demonstrates that the assimilationist impulse is still frequently very much 
present in multinational states. However, because of the fine inter-ethnic balancing of 
power that is required to maintain social peace and the unity of the state, the state 
cannot normally get away with policies, whether implicit or explicit, which promote 
the assimilation of one native national group into another. Immigrant popUlations, on 
the other hand, are mostly much smaller, less politically organised and lacking any 
territorial base, meaning that there is considerably less pressure on the state to grant 
them any extensive cultural/linguistic recognition. Immigrant languages are generally 
not viewed as valid media for the expression of national identity and there is normally 
the expectation that immigrants must assimilate linguistically into the host society, at 
least in public life. 
All national identities are fundamentally linguistically selective. Even the most 
pluralistic do not allow for unfettered multilingualism. The linguistic scope of most 
multilingual national identities normally only extends to include several named, 
territorially based languages. It is this need for selection and therefore exclusion of 
linguistic varieties, which lies at the heart of the tension between multilingualism and 
the nation-building process. An important question to consider is 'how much 
multilingualism can a single national identity tolerate?', a question which leads us 
neatly on to a discussion of the next type of state in our typology, namely the post-
colonial polyethnic state. 
3.4.5 The post-colonial polyetbnic state 
A more extreme example of the problems faced by dyadic/triadic states in their 
attempts to construct a unifying national identity is to be found in the polyethnic post-
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colonial state. This type of state is characterised by a very high level of 
ethnolinguistic diversity. Spolsky (2004: 173) defines it as a state which contains at 
least twelve ethnolinguistic groups, although some may actually contain several 
hundred. Spolsky's choice of twelve ethnolinguistic groups as a qualifying criterion 
does admittedly strike one as an unnecessarily arbitrary imposition, but this is a minor 
point. The most linguistically diverse state is generally held to be Papua New Guinea 
which, according to Ethno[ogue lO, has 820 named languages in use. However, as is 
discussed in section 3.6.1, counting language names is not actually a scientifically 
rigorous method of measuring linguistic diversity. Therefore, some caution is 
advisable when making or agreeing with such claims. Many of the world's most 
linguistically heterogeneous states were at one time part of the colonial empire of one 
of the European imperial powers - Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Italy. The boundaries of such states were often highly arbitrarily drawn 
up, reflecting competing colonial spheres of influence instead of any indigenous 
ethnolinguistic frontiers. Consequently, many ethnic groups find themselves living 
alongside other groups with whom they historically have no elements of shared 
culture or sense of identity. Indeed, they may often find themselves inhabiting the 
same state as groups with which they have a history of conflict and violence. 
Such high ethnolinguistic diversity and conflict potential obviously makes any 
attempt to engender state-wide unity and a sense of common identity and purpose a 
daunting task. Yet such states are inevitably compelled by the logic of their situation 
to undertake such efforts in order to prevent their own disintegration. Also, to use 
European patterns of national identity development as the standard by which to judge 
the efforts of post-colonial nation-building endeavours is to overlook a significant 
difference in time-scale. It took several centuries until the vast majority of Europeans 
were integrated into their respective national state systems (Thiesse, 1999). In most 
cases, post-colonial nation-building did not begin until at least the 196Os. The fevered 
sense of urgency behind many post-colonial nation-building efforts may lead one to 
hastily formulate overly negative judgements regarding their efficacy. However, an 
appreciation of historical precedents which suggest that national identities are not 
generally created and spread over such short periods of time can allow one to make 
10 http://www.ethnologue.com 
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more realistic assessments with regards to what constitutes reasonable progress and 
success in post-colonial nation-building contexts. 
As far as nation-building is concerned, the problem faced by polyethnic states is not 
fundamentally different from that experienced by dyadic/triadic states. The task is 
still to forge a shared, unifying national identity between diverse ethnolinguistic 
groups. However, the difficulties encountered in doing so tend to be exacerbated by 
several factors in polyethnic societies. Firstly, the extreme ethnic diversity means that 
there are many more potential loci for inter-ethnic conflict. The frequently conflicting 
demands of many groups, rather than of just two or three communities, may need to 
be satisfied in order to maintain social peace. Yet social peace alone, achieved either 
through some recognition of diversity, is unlikely to be sufficient to generate and 
maintain a shared national identity. 
In most polyethnic states, some degree of supra-ethnic symbolism is required - if 
only to avoid riots and unrest. To depict the nation as identical with a 'mosaic of 
ethnic groups' could, at the same time, threaten to undermine the project of 
nation-building since it focuses on differences instead of similarities. (Eriksen, 
2002:] ]6) 
The basis of a national identity cannot be located in the recognition of difference. 
National sentiment resides in a belief in commonality. Where language cannot be the 
basis for this commonality, some equally distinctive marker of identity must take its 
place (see section 2.5.1). Often however, there may be no shared characteristic 
between the various ethnic groups that inhabit such states which may readily serve as 
an appropriate basis for a shared nationality. In such cases, the state is faced with the 
improbable prospect of creating an identity ex nihilo. Secondly, most polyethnic 
countries are in the developing world where participation in the civil life of the state 
and the proportion of the population receiving anything more than the most basic 
level of education tends to be much lower. The spread of literacy is further hampered 
by the fact that many languages have no standardised written form and remain purely 
oral vernaculars. Also, limited social and geographical mobility, itself a consequence 
of inadequate education and other causes of societal underdevelopment, mean that 
contacts between individuals from diverse ethnolinguistic groups remain relatively 
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quite limited. Consequently, identities often remain highly localised as most people 
draw little meaning from wider social networks such as those associated with the state 
and its institutions (see section 4.5.2). 
Polyethnic states may actually adopt either monolingual or multilingual nation-
building policies. A good example of a multilingual, 'mosaic' policy is India's 'three-
language formula' whereby a local language, Hindi and English would all be used at 
secondary school level (Khubchandani, 1997). The crucial element of the policy is 
that it seeks to promote languages of wider communication at three different levels _ 
regional, national and international. Therefore, as Schiffman (1996: 172) notes, this 
policy represents a compromise between unlimited multilingualism and a 
monolingual policy. Again though, it is highly selective with regard to the 
multilingualism that it endorses. The idea that multilingual policies are merely 
negotiated compromises, rather than the consequence of any deeply felt ideological 
commitment, is supported by the fact that many post-colonial multiethnic states adopt 
highly monolingual policies. Two main factors allow states to pursue monolingual 
policies in such linguistically diverse societies. The first is to do with power relations. 
In many post-colonial contexts there are great socio-economic inequalities and a 
highly unequal distribution of political power. As a result, ruling elites are less 
compelled to seek to satisfy the demands of minority groups. They are often able to 
get away with promoting monolingualism because their hold on power is not greatly 
inconvenienced by doing so. The second factor that may enable states to pursue 
monolingual policies is the linguistic inheritance of the colonial era. Many post-
colonial states have undertaken nation-building projects by promoting the ex-colonial 
language as the language of national unity, for example Botswana (see section 4.5.3). 
This has been facilitated by the widely held, but mistaken, belief that the ex-colonial 
language has an ethnically and politically neutral quality. The idea that the conflict-
laden potential of selecting certain indigenous languages to serve as national 
languages can be neatly side-stepped by opting for monolingual ism in the ex-colonial 
language has been evident in many post-colonial states' language policies, be they 
overt or covert. However, although such policies may have reduced conflict in some 
cases, their facilitation of 'elite closure' has meant that they have been markedly less 
successful when it comes to inclusive nation-building (see section 4.5.3). 
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In some other post-colonial circumstances, a supra-ethnic, indigenous lingua franca 
has been promoted as the. language of state administration, education and as the sole 
carrier of national identity. Examples include the promotion of Bahasa Indonesia in 
Indonesia and Swahili in Tanzania (S.Wright, 2004: chapter 4; De Swaan, 200 I: 
chapters 5 and 6). Again though, it remains difficult to make any firm judgement 
regarding the success of these policies. Seemingly contradictory tendencies can be 
noted. Although it seems to have had some reasonable success in spreading Bahasa 
Indonesia (S.Wright, 2004:88), Indonesia has also experienced quite severe inter-
ethnic violence and some highly active anti-state separatist movements. Blommaert 
(2006:248) comes to equally ambivalent conclusions with regard to the success of 
Tanzanian language planning, which appears to represent a case of successful 
language acquisition planning but without the desired attendant identity 
con seq uences. 
Thirty years of concentrated efforts toward the goal set forth in the I 960s resulted 
in the generalized spread of Swahili. Sociolinguistically, Swahili and its varieties 
have become the identifying code of public activities throughout Tanzania. The 
campaign in that sense was exceptionally successful. But what did not happen was 
the ideological homogenization of the country. While Swahilization was 
manifestly a success, the monoglot ideal in which language, political ideology, 
and identity would be coterminous was a failure. (Blommaert, 2006:248). 
Whether one regards a certain activity as success or failure depends largely upon 
one's expectations. Language policies that fervently seek to bring about the rapid 
ideological and cultural homogenisation of highly plural societies are rather inviting 
one to label them as failures when this inevitably fails to occur. It is not in the nature 
of states and other governmental organisations to display any diffidence either with 
regard to their achievements or to their future ambitions. Therefore, language policy 
and planning conducted upon their behalf is often likely to suffer from a degree of 
overestimation and overambition. 
The preceding discussion has shown that most states have, at some stage in their 
modern history and with varying degrees of success, attempted to use language policy 
and planning as a tool to facilitate nation-building and, indeed, many continue to do 
so today. This has generally meant the pursuit of policies which aim to move towards 
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cultural and linguistic homogenisation and which only tolerate divergence from the 
national standard in cases where it is politically expedient to do so. In an earlier 
period when academic discourse was strongly influenced by modernist thinking and 
broadly aligned with the prevailing nationalist spirit of the age, the desirability of 
language policy and planning activities pursued on behalf of nationalist movements 
were generally seen as self-evident and consequently, such endeavours were viewed 
somewhat uncritically. However, the last few decades have witnessed something of a 
paradigmatic shift within the field of language policy and planning theory (S.Wright, 
2004:96). The influence of postmodernist thought, coupled with the failure of 
modernism to fulfil its prophecy of instrumentally motivated homogenisation and the 
consequent local and global power inequalities generated by that failure, has led many 
to contest the legitimacy of the assumptions and motivations behind nationalist 
language policy and planning. Where linguistic homogenisation was once the 
normatively acceptable motivation for language planning, many contemporary 
language policy and planning theorists are increasingly unanimous in their advocacy 
of language policies which prioritise the protection linguistic diversity. The following 
section shall consider some of the theoretical tensions that have arisen as a result of 
the paradigmatic shift away from nationalistlmodernist approaches to language policy 
and planning towards post-nationalistlpost-modern methods of engaging with the 
discipline. 
3.5 Nation-building and contemporary trends in language 
policy theory 
It has been observed that the urge to nation-build seems to be characteristic of most 
liberal democracies (Patten and Kymlicka, 2003:37; Costa 2003). Historically, most 
ethnolinguistically heterogeneous states have placed a premium on establishing a 
common sense of national identity and patriotism amongst their diverse populations. 
However, some insights from contemporary political and sociolinguistic theory are 
increasingly unanimous in their recognition of certain models of nation-building as 
being both counter-productive and morally objectionable. Nation-building policies, of 
which language policies naturally form an important part, have become the object 
much normative agonising amongst certain academic theorists. In particular, those 
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nation-building policies which, whether implicitly or explicitly, promote a reduction 
in linguistic diversity through assimilation into a single common linguistic and 
cultural formation have been the target of severe criticism (Reaume, 2000; Weinstock, 
2003:253). Some authors, such as Degenaar (1994), have even explicitly rejected the 
desirability of the concept of nation-building altogether. Monolingual, assimilationist 
language policies that promote a single majority language to the detriment of minority 
languages have been condemned from a number of discernible normative standpoints 
within sociolinguistics and political theory. The most commonly heard and most 
unqualified criticism has come from what may be termed the 'diversity argument' 
associated with the 'ecolinguistics' school (see Fill and Miihlhausler, 200 1) and, also, 
with the 'Linguistic Human Rights' (LHRs) movement (Phillipson and Skutnabb-
Kangas, 1994; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000; Kontra et ai, 1999) with which it is closely 
aligned philosophically. 'Preserve linguistic diversity above all else' has become the 
cri de guerre for many politically engaged contemporary sociolinguists. Concerns for 
national unity have become increasingly viewed as illegitimate and irrelevant in the 
face of the increasing diminishment of the world's linguistic diversity. 
Other authors, however, have sought to find some middle ground between the 
nationalist/modernist and post-nationalist/post-modern positions and establish models 
of nation-building which can be reconciled with, and, indeed, facilitated by, policies 
which tolerate and even promote (at least a certain level of) ethnolinguistic diversity 
(see Kymlicka, 1995; Patten and Kymlicka, 2003). The discussion that follows 
provides an analysis and critique of some of the most prominent and commonly 
rehearsed academic arguments surrounding matters of national identity and nation-
building from the rapidly growing literature concerned with questions of language 
rights and linguistic diversity. In particular, some prominent normative arguments in 
favour of language policies which have the promotion of linguistic diversity and/or 
language rights as their ultimate goal will be considered and their cogency assessed. 
Finally, an attempt will be made to answer the question of whether a desire to 
promote a common national identity can be theoretically reconciled with language 
policies that seek to maintain and legitimise cultural and linguistic diversity. 
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3.6 Language policy and linguistic diversity 
How are we to determine the validity of objections to assimilationist patterns of 
national (and global) integration based upon the assertion that linguistic diversity is 
good per se and something which must be protected ahead of any other concerns? 
Also, to what extent can the aim of simply 'maintaining linguistic diversity' serve as a 
theoretically coherent ideological basis for the formulation of a language policy which 
aims to contribute to nation-building? These questions will be considered in the 
discussion that follows. However, before assessing the various arguments in favour of 
maintaining linguistic diversity, it is important to first reflect upon what we actually 
mean by linguistic diversity and, in particular, how we choose to measure it. 
3.6.1 Measuring linguistic diversity 
Many discussions concerned with the threat to linguistic diversity begin in what has 
now become a very familiar manner, reporting that a large number of the world's 
6,000 or so languages are faced with relatively imminent endangerment or extinction. 
For example, Krauss (1992:7) claims that 'the coming century will see either the 
death or the doom of 90% of mankind's languages'. This approximate figure is 
arrived at by counting language names. To the non-specialist, counting the number of 
languages may seem the most obvious way of measuring the extent of linguistic 
diversity. However, such a method of measurement soon reveals itself to be 
problematic. Defining the concept of 'a language', as opposed to 'language' itself, is a 
notoriously unscientific affair and one generally motivated by non-linguistic, political 
factors (Pennycook, 2006). The concept is also inappropriate for measuring linguistic 
diversity because it equates linguistic diversity with the number of named languages 
rather than with the sum total of linguistic variation or the diversity of human 
linguistic behaviour. Consider the case of the language situation in the former 
Yugoslavia. Does the fracturing of the language formerly known as Serbo-Croat into 
three separate languages, namely Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian, mean that there has 
been a three-fold increase in the linguistic diversity of the linguistic area in question? 
The same question could equally apply to the almost identical linguistic varieties now, 
for nationalist reasons, known separately as Romanian and Moldovan but which were 
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previously just labelled 'Romanian' (Dyer, 1999; Dumbrava, 2004). The answer to 
this question is 'surely not'. A further problem with addressing linguistic diversity by 
dealing in units of named languages is that this procedure tends to overlook intra-
language diversity in favour of concentrating on inter-language diversity (Blommaert, 
200 I : 135). A single language name may refer to a far greater degree of linguistic 
variation than several other named languages. For example, a greater divergence of 
linguistic behaviour is covered by the language names 'German' or 'Chinese' than is 
covered by the two language names 'Bulgarian' and 'Macedonian' or 'Czech' and 
'Slovak' etc. It is consequently of far greater use to think in terms of 'linguistic 
variation', than of the indistinct concept of 'a language' in helping one to understand 
the nature of linguistic diversity. The term 'linguistic variation' may therefore be 
viewed as partially synonymous with the diversity linguistic of items, by which is 
meant any type of syntactic, morphological, phonological or terminological feature. 
The extent of the linguistic variation contained within a given geographical area is not 
necessarily a reliable indicator of the number of different languages that people may 
perceive to exist there. Consequently, a more sophisticated approach than merely just 
counting language names is required in order to arrive at a scientifically meaningful 
appreciation of the notion of linguistic diversity. 
Nettle and Romaine (2000) discuss two methods of quantifying what they term 
'divergence between languages'. Again, though, their phrasing still indicates that they 
are positing the existence of discrete languages as part of their theoretical apparatus. 
Given the problems, discussed above, associated with defining 'a language' or 
'languages', a more accurate term to use would be the 'extent of linguistic variation'. 
One possible way of measuring linguistic diversity, discussed by Nettle and Romaine, 
is to use the method of genetic classification (Nettle and Romaine, 2000:34-35). This 
method deals with historical relationships between linguistic varieties and attempts to 
group them together into language families or 'stocks' that share a common 
provenance (Nichols, 1999:24-5). A stock may then be further subdivided into phyla 
or branches. For example, Germanic, Celtic and Baltic are some of the composite 
phyla of the Indo-European language stock. Some language stocks may only consist 
of one branch and are known as isolates. Examples include Basque, Korean and 
Japanese, all of which appear to share no confirmable historical origin with any other 
linguistic variety. This approach would appear to offer a more satisfactory way of 
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measuring linguistic diversity since the concept of a language stock is a more 
scientifically rigorous concept than that of 'a language' because it can be deduced 
from a purely linguistic analysis. Counting the number of language stocks in a given 
area would seem to reflect a more nuanced understanding of the nature of linguistic 
diversity. The level of diversity within a particular language stock could then be 
ascertained by counting the number of phyla of which it is made up. In this regard, 
Nichols (1999:232) introduces the concept of 'genetic density' as a measure of 
genetic linguistic diversity, which she calculates by dividing the area of a given 
geographical region (in million square miles) by the number of stocks contained 
within it. However, even this method of measuring linguistic diversity is not without 
some difficulties. Proving or disproving historical linguistic relationships can be a 
difficult and controversial endeavour and the requisite evidence may simply not be 
available for meaningful judgements to be made either way. 
The other technique proposed for measuring linguistic diversity is that of typological 
classification which 'group[s] languages together on the basis of contemporary 
structural similarity, such as a common word order, or the same number and type of 
vowel sounds' (Nettle and Romaine, 2000:34). For example, according to this 
technique, two historically quite unrelated linguistic varieties, which may 
coincidentally both happen to have a SVO (Subject-Verb-Object) word order may be 
classified together. The problem with this approach is that it does not seem obvious 
which aspect(s) of linguistic structure one should prioritise when attempting to 
construct a typological classification. For example, should morphological 
considerations come ahead of phonetic ones, or vice-versa and, if so, why? 
While the genetic and typological classification methods may be two potential ways 
of measuring the diversity of linguistic forms, they do not provide a means of 
measuring the diversity of meanings. As Pennycook (2004:226) asks: 'is it 
glossodiversity we should be concerned with, or semiodiversity: diversity of forms as 
well as meanings, or just diversity of meanings?' Semantic diversity is not necessarily 
predicated upon structural diversity. Different semantic contents may be encoded in 
identical linguistic forms or, conversely, the same meaning may be expressed through 
the use of different linguistic forms. This point highlights the fact that a bi-
dimensional appreciation of the term 'linguistic diversity' is possible. Furthermore, 
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such an insight is necessary in order to better understand and assess those arguments 
put forward which seek to espouse the benefits and rectitude of linguistic diversity, 
many of which seem to be unkowingly working with an inadequate conceptualisation 
of the thing they claim to hold most dear. It is to these arguments that we now tum. 
3.6.2 Arguments for maintaining linguistic diversity 
Having considered briefly the highly intricate question of what is meant by linguistic 
diversity and how one might go about measuring it, one can now tum to the equally 
complex question of why many linguists place normative value upon such diversity 
and actively seek to preserve it. After all, the view that linguistic diversity is 
beneficial and desirable is not one that has traditionally found favourable expression 
in Western thought. Quite the contrary is true. One thinks of the fictional biblical 
story of the Tower of Babel, for example, in which a multitude of languages was 
imposed upon the descendants of Noah as a divine punishment for their 
presumptuousness. More recently, the philosophy of the so-called 'Enlightenment' 
thinkers supported assimilationist nation-state ideologies in order to destroy the 
proliferation of supposedly backward, superstitious, irrational, pre-modem cultures. 
Movements supporting the universal adoption of artificial languages such as 
Esperanto or Volapiik, which achieved a widespread following from the latter half of 
the 19th century onwards, also revealed an inherent hostility towards linguistic 
diversity (Miihlhausler, 2001: 159). Emphasising strongly the instrumental, 
communicative functions of language, such strands of thought supported the notion of 
'the fewer languages, the better'. However, many contemporary sociolinguists have 
come to adopt an entirely contrary standpoint and have sought to advance a moral 
case for the protection of the world's languages. Four broad, often mutually 
reinforcing, strands of arguments can be located within this self-styled moral case for 
the maintenance of linguistic diversity. These may be called the public goods, the 
world-view, the biodiversity and the rights arguments. 
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3.6.2.1 Linguistic diversity as a public good 
The concept of public goods is a useful analytical frame of reference in attempting to 
understand and classify some of the most commonly proposed arguments advocating 
the protection of linguistic diversity. Precisely how one defines a public good has 
been the subject of much conjecture within political philosophy and definitions vary 
widely (Cullity, 1995). However, Boran (2003: 194) identifies three essential features 
that must supposedly be present in order to qualify something as a public good. 
[A] good that has at least the following features can qualify as a public good: (I) 
jointness (in supply and consumption): if a good is available for one person, it is 
available for others; its consumption by one does not diminish the consumption 
by others; (2) non-excludability: if a good benefits anyone, no one else can be 
prevented from doing so; and (3) indivisibility: the good cannot be divided into 
private goods. Examples are clean air, an unspoiled environment or street lights. 
(Boran, 2004: 194) 
To employ a public good argument is to make an undifferentiated appeal to an interest 
supposedly shared by all members of society, an interest from which one can then 
allegedly derive moral behavioural prescriptions. The assertion of linguistic diversity 
as a public good rests on two main arguments, which we may call the aesthetic and 
scientific arguments (Boran, 2003). The aesthetic argument holds that the existence of 
a diversity of languages is an asset that enriches human experience by expanding the 
range of cultural resources available to us. According to this view, pleasure is derived 
from the simple fact of linguistic diversity per se, in a similar way to how one might 
possibly rejoice at the existence of different architectural or musical styles. To what 
extent though, can one derive political duties and obligations from this preference for 
linguistic diversity? If one were to successfully employ a public goods argument in 
this instance, it would seem necessary to demonstrate that any deviation from, or 
disinclination towards, this aesthetic appreciation of linguistic diversity is both 
unlikely, unreasonable and, hence, wrong, in some cosmic sense. Yet to assert such a 
view potentially sits uncomfortably, particularly for those writing from within a 
liberal tradition and even more so for those who reject the ontological validity of the 
very notion of normative philosophical statements. A liberal instinct would seem to 
suggest that the appreciation of the aesthetic qualities of linguistic diversity is 
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something about which people may reasonably differ. It is not inconceivable that 
certain individuals gain more pleasure- from linguistic uniformity. After all, as was 
mentioned above, there is a tradition within Western thought that regards linguistic 
uniformity as preferable to diversity. Although many linguists may lament the fact. 
linguistic diversity is unlikely to feature highly on most individuals' list of things that 
make life worth living. Consequently, some individuals may display little or no 
preference on the matter. The aesthetic argument on its own makes only a very weak 
case for the maintenance of endangered languages and some might argue that it makes 
no case at all. It risks reformulating what is essentially a predilection on the part of 
some individuals for a particular linguistic environment into a universal human 
aesthetic requirement. 
This argument for the aesthetic benefits of linguistic diversity is also complicated, 
somewhat ironically, by the fact that many human beings, particularly Westerners, are 
currently being exposed to and experiencing more linguistic diversity than has ever 
previously been the case, at a time when worldwide linguistic diversity is decreasi~g 
at a faster rate than ever. Grin (2003: 179) highlights this when he distinguishes 
between objective and subjective diversity. 
Many components of objective linguistic diversity [ ... J are obviously under threat. 
This threat is evidenced not only by the demise of small languages (with the 
passing away of their last remaining speakers), but also by the worldwide spread 
of specific cultural contents in forms of entertainment, types of consumer goods, 
and socio-political models of society [ ... J At the same time, perceived or 
subjective diversity is an increasingly prevalent feature of modem societies. 
Several trends coincide in this evolution, in particular the reassertion of long-
suppressed manifestations of ethnic identity (including language) after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall; large-scale migration flows, with a much more varied range of 
combinations of country of origin and country of destination; the deepening and 
broadening of supra-national organizations such as the European Union; and the 
advance of what is usually referred to as 'globalization', and attendant processes 
such as the intensification of international trade. (Grin, 2003: 179-80) 
This distinction between objective and subjective diversity agam shows that the 
conceptualisation of linguistic diversity is not a critically unproblematic endeavour. 
The innate tension that exists between the subjective experience and the objective 
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reality of linguistic diversity is one that does appear to be fully countenanced in much 
of the ecolinguistic discourse. Let us consider the fonn of a world with fully 
maximised levels of linguistic diversity. In theory at least, it would consist of 
countless, small isolated groups of people that had no contact with each other. In other 
words, subjective linguistic diversity would be approaching zero. To actively 
experience linguistic diversity and the benefits thereof, increasing inter-societal and 
inter-linguistic contacts need to occur. When these contacts occur between 
communities of unequal power the threat of language shift often looms large. To 
experience the aesthetic pleasures of linguistic diversity is not necessarily 
commensurate with the protection or maintenance of that diversity. Some trade-off 
between objective and subjective diversity would therefore seem to be necessary. One 
might counter this by arguing that cultural and linguistic contacts can occur without 
any necessary detriment to any party involved. Is it not possible to enjoy the aesthetic 
benefits of linguistic diversity without simultaneously endangering it? Is such a fonn 
of 'linguistic eco-tourism' conceivable? Historical and contemporary patterns of 
language shift occurring as a result of contact between Western-style, modem 
industrial cultures and pre-modern indigenous cultures would seem to present 
extremely discouraging evidence. 
Another argument that conceives of linguistic diversity as a public good emphasises 
the scientific and epistemological value of having a multiplicity of linguistic varieties. 
Many authors writing within the ecolinguistics paradigm highlight the fact that many 
of the world's most endangered languages are vast repositories of knowledge and 
information, particularly with regards to the naming and classification of items in the 
natural world (Nettle and Romaine, 2000: chapter 2). Much of this knowledge is 
apparently undocumented and/or unknown to Western society. According to the 
ecolinguistic standpoint, the loss of these languages would represent an irretrievable 
loss of knowledge that would weaken the adaptational strength of our species. 
However, it should be noted how this scientific argument is often highly Western-
centric. The Western world has undoubtedly profited from its discovery of worldwide 
cultural and linguistic diversity and the knowledge derived from it. Capitalist 
economies have found new resources to plunder and new markets and labour forces to 
exploit. Knowledge from indigenous languages has been imported chiefly to serve the 
needs of Western societies in the form of pharmaceuticals etc. The high levels of 
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ethnolinguistic diversity found in colonial settings was greatly beneficial to the 
Western colonial powers insofar as it facilitated their implementation of divide and 
rule strategies to consolidate their dominance over the indigenous colonised 
populations. The West's experience of (particularly indigenous) cultural and linguistic 
diversity has been mainly profitable. But can we claim the reverse? It is certainly a 
moot point. For example, have indigenous cultures' subjective experiences of cultural 
and linguistic diversity, in the form of contact with Western societies, been 
beneficial? Such contact has exposed many of these indigenous cultures to disease 
and gross acts of violence and oppression and has led to their degradation and in 
many cases, disappearance. Also, the importation of Western knowledge in the form 
of, say, systems of government, religion and education, has often proved 
inappropriate. The point being made here is simply that linguistic and other forms of 
cultural diversity may be experienced positively or negatively. Indeed, it may be 
experienced both positively and negatively simultaneously. Western societies are 
generally keen to benefit, aesthetically and materially, from the linguistic and cultural 
diversity found in indigenous communities far from home, but they have traditionally 
been far less tolerant of domestic diversity. 
The fact that linguistic diversity may be experienced either positively or negatively 
undermines the claim that it constitutes a public good because this violates the 
principle of non-excludability (see above). While some societies may benefit from 
exposure to, and interaction with linguistic diversity and its other associated cultural 
products, some other societies may suffer from it. The pure fact of linguistic diversity 
is neither good nor bad and no objective value can be placed upon it. It is how such 
diversity is harnessed and appropriated for particular ends that determines the 
subjective value one can place upon it in particular circumstances. 
3.6.2.2 Language and world-view 
Ecolinguistic arguments do not just concern themselves with the threat to practical, 
scientific knowledge caused by the endangerment of linguistic diversity, they also 
emphasise the potential loss of philosophical knowledge and existential 
interpretations of the world. The relationship between language and world-view has 
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long been a subject of debate within sociolinguistic theory. Fishman (1991 :20) 
describes what he terms the 'indexical relationship' between a language and its related 
ethnoculture, emphasising how each language has been fine-tuned over time to 
communicate certain attitudes and beliefs. 
That language which has traditionally been linked with a given ethnoculture is, at 
any time during which that linkage is still intact, best able to name the artefacts 
and to formulate or express the interests, values and world-views of that culture. 
Since the two, the language and the ethnoculture (if we pennit ourselves to 
separate them for a moment) have 'grown up together' over an extensive period of 
time, they are better attuned to each other, at any time when the linkage between 
them is generally intact, than is any other language to that culture at that time. 
(Fishman, 1991 :20) 
There can be little disagreement with Fishman's assertion here. However, some 
ecolinguists, pursuing a kind of pseudo-logical extension to this argument, go on to 
assume an essential relationship between language and knowledge (e.g. Skutnabb-
Kangas, 2000:259). Invoking a strong, deterministic version of the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis (Whorf, 1956; Kay and Kempton, 1984), they claim a strong, nay absolute, 
link between a language and a particular Weltanschauung or world-view. 
Most perceptions of the world and parts of the world are brought into being and 
sustained by languages. Speakers of different languages, therefore, do not 
perceive the same world. Instead, different languages emphasize and filter various 
aspects of a multi-faceted reality in a vast number of ways. [ ... J [EJach language 
may be seen as a provisional interpretation of a world so complex that the only 
hope for understanding it is to approach it from as many different perspectives as 
possible. If we regard each language as the result of a long history of human 
endeavour to gain knowledge of the world, we may begin to see why linguistic 
diversity is an invaluable resource rather than an obstacle to progress. 
(Muhlhausler, 2001: 160) 
Kibbee (2003:50) notes that the adoption of a strong Whorfian position has led many 
ecolinguists to attribute negative characteristics to dominant international languages. 
For example, while indigenous languages supposedly detennine a greater respect and 
appreciation among their speakers for the natural world, Western languages such as 
English, with their emphasis on human causativity and lack of structural distinction 
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between real and imaginary nouns, are held to be inherently inadequate for the 
espousal of ecologicaVenvironmental discourse (Goatly, 1996; Miihlhausler, 2001; 
Schleppegrell, 1997). Only by maintaining other languages, which are able to 
formulate alternative visions of the way in which human beings may interact with the 
natural world, will we be able to avoid environmental disaster, so the ecolinguistic 
argument goes. English is allegedly perfectly suited to expressing the values of 
industrial pollution, consumerism, global capitalism and imperialism or 
'McDonaldization' as some authors choose to name it (Phillipson, 2003:72; Heller, 
2003; Gorter, 2006:4)11. One can accept the indexical relationship between a language 
and its associated ethnoculture described by Fishman above, since this position does 
not deny the possibility, and indeed, the reality of translated cultures. However, the 
ultra-determinist perspective offered by the ecolinguists does just this. Yet, the 
argument that language loss necessarily entails the loss of knowledge seems vastly 
overstated. To deny the possibility of importing knowledge from one language to 
another is simply not empirically sustainable. Of this argument for protecting 
linguistic diversity, S.Wright (2004:221) notes that it 
would only be the case if the strong Whorfian claim that translation is ultimately 
impossible were true. However, translation is possible. The very fact that 
Miihlhausler and Chawla can point out that Westerners ignore important aspects 
of the environment, and that new ways of expressing our experience might change 
how we behave towards it, exemplifies Sapir's claim that elaboration and 
adaptability are always possible. Speakers of SAE [Standard Average European 
languages] could gain insights from peoples whose languages make the need to 
respect the environment more explicit. If a certain language does not have the 
lexis for a particular subject, it can be borrowed or invented. If it does not have a 
particular structure, it can be developed. If there is a particular way of reasoning 
or conceiving a topic in a language, it can be copied. If precise ways of talking 
about the ecosystem make speakers more aware of diversity and of damage and 
encourage them to be active stewards of biological and ecological diversity, then 
these can be copied and learnt. (S.Wright, 2004:221) 
II The tenn 'McDonaldization', which was origina]]y used in the title of a book by Ritzer (1993), is 
often used by Phillipson and others similarly philosophica]]y aligned without inverted commas, 
suggesting an assumption on the part of the author that the tenn is a universa]]y accepted one. This is 
not the case. The present author echoes the sentiment expressed by Kibbee (2003:53) that to employ 
such a tenn without any discernible sense of humour or dramatic exaggeration is to unnecessarily 
stereotype American cultural influence around the world as consisting merely of this 'symbol of 
mediocrity. • 
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To adopt the strong Whorfian position would actually amount to absolving Western 
states of responsibility for their poor environmental records, something which may be 
likely to inhibit the initiation of political and social action to rectify them. If their 
languages make them unable to conceptualise the world in a manner that prevents 
them from causing ecological damage, then how can one readily criticise them? Such 
an argument may also be turned against speakers of threatened indigenous languages. 
If Western languages are deemed incapable of allowing their speakers to think 
ecologically, one may equally accuse indigenous languages of being unsuitable for 
use in modem applications. The consequences of such thinking can be disastrous. For 
example, speakers of African languages in South Africa have long suffered from an 
extreme lack of linguistic self-esteem, believing their languages to be incapable of 
expressing modem technical and scientific thought (see section 4.5.1 for a detailed 
discussion of this). This has led to the stigmatisation of these languages as 
inappropriate for anything other than use in informal, private functions, which has 
contributed to the extreme socio-economic and political marginalisation of many of 
their speakers. Consequently, it can be seen that to practise this extreme version of 
linguistic determinism is to play a dangerous game, as it supports a highly dubious 
type of discourse, which may be manipulated to serve undesirable political ends and 
actually work against the interests of speakers of marginalised languages, interests 
which ecolinguists so fervently claim to represent. 
3.6.2.3 Misleading metaphors: linguistic diversity and biodiversity 
When Nettle and Romaine (2000:50) note that 'languages, like species, are highly 
adapted to their environments and [ ... ] all extinctions have as their cause 
environmental change', they invoke a metaphor popular in much of the literature 
surrounding language loss and preservation. This metaphor relies on drawing 
equivalences between linguistic diversity and biodiversity. Inferring more widely 
from the premise that biological diversity is desirable per se and also necessary for 
biological sustainability, similar claims are often made regarding linguistic diversity. 
According to Crystal (2000:33), the need to maintain linguistic diversity 'stands 
squarely on the shoulders' of arguments to maintain biodiversity. Some authors have 
also pointed out correlations between linguistic and biological patterns of diversity, 
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noting that linguistic diversity is greatest in areas of high biodiversity and even 
coining the term 'biolinguistic diversity' in order to highlight the linkl2 (Nettle and 
Romaine, 2ooo:43). Consequently, any loss of linguistic diversity is metaphorically 
equated with a loss of biodiversity. 
The extent of the usefulness of this biological metaphor to describe language loss is 
doubtful, however, as it posits a number of quite uncomfortable assumptions about the 
very nature of language itself. Firstly, let it be stated that it is not the intention here to 
question the desirability and necessity of biological diversity for biological viability. 
Neither is it the intention in any way to argue that linguistic diversity is necessarily 
undesirable. It is the validity of the biological metaphor that is being questioned and 
which, ultimately, must be rejected. For one to accept the validity of the metaphor. 
one would have to accept the analogy between languages or speakers of languages 
and biological species. While species are the natural unit of biological investigation, 
linguistic theory does not need to posit the existence of separate, discrete languages 
(Harris, 1990:45; Pennycook, 2004: 234). The language/species equivalence falls 
down on numerous counts. When languages come into contact, they can influence 
each other's content or even develop into a new linguistic variety. Individuals can 
acquire new languages and even forget old ones in some cases. Biological species 
cannot interbreed in such a manner. Kibbee (2oo3:52) observes that 'in an ecological 
conception of languages, all lexical, phonological, morphological or syntactic 
borrowings are attacks against a language, an artificial deformation'. This view is 
highly reminiscent of the position, discussed in the previous chapter, of the German 
Romantic writers who viewed all foreign linguistic influences as sources of 
degradation, corruption and inauthenticity (see section 2.5.1). However, such 
borrowings, while often resisted by some 'purists' for reasons of identity and 
symbolism (see section 3.3), do not necessarily degrade the communicative functions 
of languages. Indeed, they may even be sources of enrichment. The biological 
metaphor may also be employed to undermine efforts to reverse or prevent language 
loss, as it overlooks the critical importance of social forces, implying that inherent 
characteristics somehow determine the vitality of a particular linguistic variety. 
12 Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) has, incredibly, even suggested that this correlation might be indicative of a 
causal relationship between linguistic and biodiversity. 
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Unlike natural species, languages have no genes and thus carry no mechanism for 
natural selection. Their prospects for survival are determined not by intrinsic 
traits, or capacity for adaptation, but by social forces alone. (Crawford, 1998: 155) 
Languages do not have an inevitable, pre-programmed life cycle in the way that 
biological species do. Languages may grow and decline any number of times 
depending on the social, economic and political forces acting upon them. Reliance on 
the biological metaphor tends to obscure this fact and may indeed give rise to the 
suggestion that language decline or expansion is some kind of 'natural' process (May, 
2001 :2-3). This can then potentially be used against arguments advocating language 
maintenance/preservation through the importation of a discourse espousing a kind of 
linguistic Darwinism. The vitality of a language is a reflection of the vitality of the 
community that uses it, something determined by wider, non-linguistic, socio-
economic and political variables. Metaphors are generally employed to improve our 
understanding of a concept or process. However, this 'biolinguistic' metaphor 
singularly fails to do this because it projects a view of language which falls down 
after little more than the most cursory scrutiny. The attractiveness of the metaphor is, 
to a limited extent, understandable, since it does serve to highlight the extent to which 
linguistic diversity is threatened in the current era. Yet, serious critical engagement 
shows the metaphor to be irredeemably flawed and requires that alternative models be 
developed in order to represent the reality of linguistic diversity and any factors which 
may cause it to decrease or, indeed, increase. 
3.6.2.4 Linguistic diversity and 'Linguistic Human Rights' 
A theory of universal language rights has been proposed as both a means of, and 
reason for, maintaining linguistic diversity. This argument has been the basic tenet of 
the 'Linguistic Human Rights' (LHR) paradigm which is most widely associated with 
the work of Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson. 
The perpetuation of linguistic diversity can [ ... ] be seen as recognition that all 
individuals and groups have basic human rights. and as a necessity for the 
survival of the planet. in a similar way to biodiversity. (Skutnabb-Kangas and 
Phillipson, 1995:84) 
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Taking the fundamental desirability of linguistic diversity as a starting point and 
asserting its maintenance and promotion as the ultimate normative goal of language 
policy and planning, this paradigm presupposes a generally unproblematic, clear-cut 
relationship between linguistic diversity and linguistic justice. 
Fundamentally, the ideology of rights and the ideology of diversity are not at 
variance with one another. [ ... ] [A] defence of linguistic diversity will generally 
coincide with a defence of human rights. (Grin, 2003: 187) 
Biological and environmental metaphors and equivalences are also frequently drawn 
in support of this argument for language rights. Majoritarian language policies which 
do not officially recognise all minority languages and which promote linguistic 
convergence, i.e. a reduction in linguistic diversity, are criticised for violating 
supposedly universal language rights. 
Linguistic rights should be considered basic human rights. Linguistic majorities, 
speakers of a dominant language, usually enjoy all those linguistic human rights 
which can be seen as fundamental, regardless of how they are defined. Most 
linguistic minorities in the world do not enjoy these rights. It is only a few 
hundred of the world's 6-7,000 languages that have any kind of official status, and 
it is only speakers of official languages who enjoy all linguistic human rights. 
(Phillipson, et 01, 1995:2) 
Criticism of such language policies is often couched in extreme terms. Policies that 
deny these so-called LHRs to minority language communities have been accused of 
propagating 'linguicide' or 'linguistic genocide' (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 
1995; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000; 2006). The languages of powerful socio-political 
communities which pressurise minority language speakers into abandoning their 
native languages have been labelled 'killer languages' (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2001). The 
use of such emotionally loaded terms is not restricted solely to contexts in which a 
language or several languages are in danger of imminent disappearance but is used to 
refer to all instances of monolingual, assimilationist language policies (Phillipson, 
2003:161). A fundamental assertion of the diversitylLHR argument is that any 
pressures for linguistic consolidation are necessarily unjust and immoral and the 
consequence of some abuse of power by a majority (ethno)linguistic community. 
Such an assertion carries within it the implication that all macro-level sociolinguistic 
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dynamics can be reduced to the consequences of human agency. It is upon this central 
claim that Phillipson (1992), for example, builds his much discussed thesis of 
'linguistic imperialism.' Phillipson sees globalisation as a process of neo-imperialism 
mediated chiefly through the English language which maintains the political and 
economic hegemony of the USA and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain. While this 
thesis is of some use in exposing global political power relations, it has been the 
subject of considerable and, one might add, justifiable criticism and scepticism, 
chiefly for its claim that the position of English can be explained as the result of 
consciously implemented language planning measures by bodies such as the British 
Council and various US organisations (S. Wright, 2004: 167; Brutt-Griffler, 2002; 
Canagarajah, 1999). It was mentioned earlier in this chapter how prevailing 
sociolinguistic trends are often falsely deemed to be outcomes of language policies 
when they are actually underlying elements of policies. This insight suggests that the 
effect of conscious agency on linguistic behaviour may often be inadvertently 
exaggerated. Whilst one should not underestimate or deny the power inequalities that 
frequently underlie instances of language decline and desuetude, one should be 
careful not to underestimate the influence of wider structural forces over which 
consciously acting agents have little or no control. 
Let us return to the claim of proponents of LHRs that a defence of linguistic diversity 
necessarily corresponds with a defence of (linguistic) human rights. This is a matter 
which requires further critical reflection. Must we regard all forces that militate in 
favour of a reduction of linguistic diversity as unjust, insidious and malign? Certainly, 
the tendency of many states to undertake coercive, lacobinist nation-building projects 
may be regarded as instances of linguistic diversity being eroded under deeply 
oppressive conditions. However, as Levy (2003) argues, there are certain pressures 
towards a reduction in linguistic diversity which originate spontaneously, cannot be 
attributed to malicious human agency and may even be highly desirable. The spread 
of literacy within modem states is one such pressure. 
Even independent of any injustices in the world. there are real pressures toward 
linguistic homogenisation in a modern world made up of modem states. These 
pressures are intensified by the spread of mass literacy and printing [ ... ] In 
laments for the lost world of casual polyglottism. or enthusiastic reports of that 
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world's persistence in parts of Africa or Asia, one fails to see that it is much 
harder to be literate in several languages than it is to be conversant in them. Once 
'knowing a language' comes to include the ability to read and write in it, each 
language (including the native language) requires a much greater investment of 
time, energy and education to acquire. This of course does not force anyone into 
monolingualism. But it does put downward pressure on how many languages any 
one person is likely to know. Moreover, any downward pressure on the number of 
languages any person is likely to know also places downward pressure on the 
number of languages that can sustainably be spoken in any given region. (Levy, 
2003:231) 
The point made by Levy here is an important one. Even the most ardent advocates of 
the supposed moral case for maintaining linguistic diversity surely would not oppose 
the acquisition and spread of literacy in previously illiterate societies. In non-modem, 
non-literate societies an exclusively oral multilingual competence is sufficient for 
both people's identity and communicative requirements. However, under modem 
conditions, people's communicative requirements expand considerably to include 
literate competence. Purely oral ability in a language, while it may often be sufficient 
for some affective identity purposes, does not permit one to participate in the full 
range of cultural options available in modem societies. Literacy, however, is not 
something that can be casually or incidentally acquired. Additional time and resources 
have to be allocated in order to achieve full or, at least, a meaningful level of literate 
linguistic competence. Consequently, when faced with the choice of which languages 
to acquire literacy in, communities will inevitably undertake some form of cost-
benefit analysis and prioritisation of languages, which, in the long term, could well 
lead to the marginalisation and eventual disuse of some spoken varieties. Even a 
language which has a tradition of literacy may become threatened if its user-base 
withers to the point where the opportunity costs of continuing to use it become too 
high. It seems, therefore, that some degree of diversity needs to be traded-off in order 
for widespread, societal literacy to become established. As for language rights then, 
those rights which permit and facilitate the acquisition and spread of literacy do not 
necessarily work in favour of maintaining former levels of linguistic diversity. 
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Linguistic convergence may also occur as the unforeseen and unintended consequence 
of other, otherwise desirable, human activities such as the building of transport 
infrastructure networks (roads, railways, increased air travel etc.) and the spread of 
broadcast media, all of which allow for increased nationwide (and global) 
communication exchanges. Yet, one does not tend to hear defenders of linguistic 
diversity decrying or opposing these activities on moral, or any other grounds, 
something which the logic of their position would seem to require. None of the 
foregoing is to deny the fact that a defence of linguistic rights will most likely 
correspond broadly with a defence of a certain degree of linguistic diversity. After all. 
the increasing interest in questions of language rights has been largely stimulated by 
dissatisfaction with lacobinist policies of national integration and the subtractive 
language learning associated with the role of English in the context of globalisation. 
However, the argument here is that the emphasis of the diversity argument is 
misplaced. If one believes that the primary function of language rights should be to 
combat linguistically mediated oppression and marginalisation, as advocates of LHRs 
claim - Skutnabb-Kangas' and Phillipson's (1994) edited volume on LHRs was, after 
all, subtitled 'Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination' - one needs to look beyond a 
concern for linguistic diversity, which, as we have seen, may be experienced 
positively and negatively. As Patten and Kymlicka (2003:50) observe, 'the key issue 
is not whether the language dies but whether language change, including language 
death, takes place in a context of oppression and injustice.' 
Contrary to the claims of advocates of LHRs, arguments about language rights and 
linguistic diversity do not necessarily amount to the same thing. A reduction in 
linguistic diversity is not synonymous with linguistic exploitation, abuse or 
imperialism, unless one sees the diversity itself, rather than people, as the object of 
abuse, a view which would lead one to the absurd position of demanding rights for an 
abstract concept. Let it be stated once again that what is being advocated here is not 
that diversity is somehow bad, or necessarily needs to be treated as problematic, but, 
merely, that if one has the aim of defending the interests of minority or endangered 
language speakers, in some cases other considerations and concerns have more 
pressing claims to supersede it. For instance, it is conceivable that a programme of 
rights formulated with the intention of language preservation may work contrary to 
the interests of speakers of threatened languages. A policy preoccupied with 
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preservation is unlikely to give due attention to the needs and desires of such speakers 
to acquire majority languages of greater instrumental value. Far from protecting the 
rights of minority language speakers, the diversity argument may actually impose 
unwanted duties upon them. 
Let us say that the aesthetic or educational value of diversity does justify 
imposing certain costs on people in the majority culture. Why then does the value 
of diversity not also justify a duty on the members of the minority to maintain 
their traditional culture? If the benefits of cultural diversity to the larger society 
can justify restricting individual liberties or opportunities, why does it matter 
whether these restrictions are imposed on people inside or outside the group? [ ... J 
It is difficult to see how the diversity argument can make this distinction. Because 
it appeals to the interests of the larger society, it cannot explain why minorities 
should be able to decide for themselves whether or how to maintain their culture. 
(Kymlicka, 1995: 122-3) 
The notion of linguistic justice promoted by proponents of linguistic human rights is 
purely outcome-based. The argument may be summarised as follows: linguistic 
convergence is bad and undesirable, therefore anything which contributes towards a 
reduction in linguistic diversity is necessarily unjust and must be condemned and 
resisted. Yet, as was discussed above, to pursue such logic may lead to the 
undesirable and unjustified condemnation of such things as the spread of literacy, 
infrastructure networks and broadcast media. Furthermore, forms of linguistic 
diversity may be promoted through oppressive, repellent methods, apartheid South 
Africa being a notable example (see chapter 4). Clearly, from a liberal perspective, the 
ends do not always justify the means in matters of language policy and planning. The 
universality of the linguistic human rights paradigm, proclaimed as its great strength 
by its advocates, is actually its greatest weakness. It leads to an in-built inflexibility 
which makes it incapable of positing anything more than a set of quite minimal 
tolerance or negative-freedom type rights because it cannot deal with the theoretical 
and practical complexity engendered by the fact that different groups will tend to have 
linguistic demands and needs that vary considerably in nature and scope, according to 
the particular historical and socio-political context(s) in question. However, if one 
adopts a procedural notion of linguistic justice, by judging means instead of 
outcomes, one is better able to assess the legitimacy of language policies on an 
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individual basis. By employing a procedural approach one can avoid the automatic. 
binary caricaturisation of language policies as 'bad' or 'good' depending on whether 
they lead to linguistic convergence or promote linguistic diversity. It can allow us to 
identify and separate those factors which contribute towards linguistic convergence 
that are indeed oppressive from those which cannot be attributed to malicious design 
and which may even be desirable. The diversity argument and the LHR argument 
(which is essentially a form of the diversity argument expressed in legalistic terms) 
are unable to make this distinction because of the obsessive prioritisation of (a poorly 
formulated conception of) diversity. Consequently, the concept of nation-building, 
which by definition implies some degree of convergence (ideological and cultural), 
cannot be accommodated within the diversityILHR framework. 
3.7 The pluralist dilemma: Reconciling nation-building and linguistic 
diversity? 
It is clear that state-led, top-down nation-building cannot be reconciled with a 
universal theory of language rights which has the maintenance and promotion of 
linguistic diversity as its principle normative motivation. However, as we have seen, 
the diversity and LHR arguments also provide a theoretically inadequate and often 
incoherent critique of nation-building language policies. Patten and Kymlicka 
(2003:38) make the relevant observation that 'it would be a mistake to simply dismiss 
nation-building on the grounds that it is "insensitive to difference"'. After all, the 
linguistic ideology of the nation-state does have some potentially attractive elements, 
in addition to its more pernicious ones. With regard to the possession of a common 
language, there are obviously some significant benefits to be had for both majority 
and minority groups (Kelman, 1972: 194-7). For example, theorists of 'deliberative 
democracy' have stressed the important role of a common language in allowing 
minority voices to be heard publicly and so make a meaningful contribution to 
opinion-forming in the wider society (Dryzek, 1990; Young, 2000: chapter 1). The 
importance of the sense of shared citizenship and common solidarity that can be 
facilitated by the existence of a common language has long been emphasised by 
liberal political theorists (Kymlicka, 1995: chapter 9). Given the many potential 
benefits of having a common language, a liberal position would likely claim that any 
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theoretically satisfactory objection to assimilationist nation-building policies needs to 
be based on something other than a desire to protect and promote linguistic diversity. 
since a predilection for diversity cannot be anything more than a preference for a 
particular linguistic model of society. This preference for linguistic diversity cannot 
lay realistic claims to any objective moral, categorical imperativeness. nor, indeed. 
can any linguistic model of society (see section 1.1), despite the passionate arguments 
of ecolinguists. 
One of the most favourably received attempts to undertake the task of formulating a 
non diversity-based counter argument to coercive, assimilationist language policies is 
to be found in the work associated with the liberal culturalist paradigm and, in 
particular, in the work which builds upon the theory of 'group-differentiated rights' 
developed by authors such as Kymlicka (e.g.l989; 1995) and Young (e.g.1989; 1990). 
This approach asserts that individual languages (and other cultural behaviours) are not 
inherently valuable per se but, rather, that they are worthy of respect and protection 
only insofar as individual speakers of those languages deem them valuable and 
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meaningful, whether for affective or instrumental reasons, or both. Unlike the 
diversity argument, this approach has the advantage of not imposing any duty upon 
groups to maintain their associated language and culture. It merely states that they 
should be free to do so if they wish. Accommodating the reasonable demands of 
minority groups for cultural recognition and protection has required some degree of 
departure from 'traditional' liberalism. It is claimed that the universal, 
undifferentiated notion of individual rights and duties promoted by classic, orthodox 
liberal theory frequently gives unsatisfactory and unjust results when applied to 
questions of language rights, as it invariably leads to a situation of majoritarian 
ethnolinguistic hegemony (often cloaked in the rhetoric of a universal civism) and the 
political and economic subordination and possible disintegration of smaller, less 
powerful groups (May, 2001). The liberal culturalist position does not reject the most 
fundamental tenet of liberalism though, namely the prioritisation of the protection of 
the freedom of the individual. Instead, it seeks to marry this traditional liberal concern 
for the individual with the legitimate claims of groups to political representation and 
protection. Indeed, liberal culturalists argue that individual freedom is actually highly 
dependent on membership in a societal culture since that group culture supposedly 
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affords the individual an option-laden context within which to pursue his or her 
particular conception of the 'good life' (Kymlicka, 1995: 75-106). 
In a multicultural, multiethnic society of unequal inter-group power relations a 
universal, undifferentiated notion of citizenship fails to provide minority groups with 
adequate political and legal resources with which to protect themselves from the 
cultural formation of the dominant majority group. However, making a binary 
distinction between majority and minority rights is too simplistic because several 
types of minority group can be identified and they may often differ significantly in 
terms of their social organisation and in the degree to which they are marginalised 
within the state. For example, when it comes to questions of language rights, authors 
such as Kymlicka (1995) and May (2001; 2006) claim that we should make a 
distinction between minority indigenous ethnolinguistic groups and immigrant 
minority groups, as both the type and extent of the language rights which each 
demands are likely to differ considerably. This stems from the quite different 
requirements that these groups can reasonably be expected to have concerning their 
relationship with the state. Indigenous minority groups may often go so far as to 
demand some degree of, or even total, self-governance. Very often their incorporation 
into the wider state was involuntary and the result of some imperialist domination and 
so they may reject as illegitimate the right of the state to exercise power over them. 
As for immigrant groups, their ambitions generally revolve around gaining acceptance 
into the mainstream society, although this does not mean they are prepared to 
renounce all forms of behaviour and expression associated with their cultures of 
origin. Kymlicka (1995) uses this distinction between indigenous and immigrant 
minorities, which has been the target of some criticism (e.g. Pooge, 2003), as the basis 
for his theory which advocates the distribution of group-differentiated rights. He 
proposes that native minorities which constitute a full 'societal culture' should be 
entitled to 'self-government rights' which permit and facilitate the devolution of 
power to them, whilst immigrant minorities should benefit from integrative 
'polyethnic rights' which 'are intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities 
express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the 
economic and political institutions of the dominant society' (Kymlicka, 1995:31). 
Kymlicka also proposes a third category of rights, namely 'special representation 
rights' which are intended for the protection of non-ethnic minority social groups such 
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as women, homosexuals or the disabled. This third category can also have an impact 
on language policy debates although they tend to centre on questions concerning the 
use of appropriate, 'politically-correct' terminology. 
So where does the granting of different categories of rights to majority groups, 
indigenous minorities and immigrant minorities leave state-led nation-building? The 
existence of a situation of differentiated citizenship seriously undermines the ability 
of the state to pursue assimilationist policies which promote a homogenous view of 
society. It also seriously questions the legitimacy of such policies (earens, 2000). 
Nevertheless, all states seem compelled to search for some source of unity amongst 
their diverse populations, no matter how tenuous or fallacious it may appear, in order 
to avoid inter-group conflict and to negate secessionist tendencies. Indeed, it is 
difficult to deny some of the benefits and attractions of social unity. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that it is a prudent or desirable idea to attempt to explicitly 
engineer it in situations where it has not developed spontaneously. This conflict 
between the promotion of a single state-bounded identity and the granting of group-
differentiated rights has become known as the 'pluralist dilemma'. Bullivant (1981: x) 
defines it as 'the problem of reconciling the diverse political claims of constituent 
groups and individuals in a pluralist society with the claims of the nation-state as a 
whole'. For proponents of the diversity and linguistic human rights arguments, no 
such dilemma exists because they are concerned with sources of diversity, not sources 
of unity and so therefore, any claims made on behalf of an aspiring nation-state are 
automatically viewed as illegitimate. However, liberal culturalists do not reject all 
aspects of the nation-state ideology out of hand. As Laitin and Reich, (2003:89) note: 
'The liberal culturalist approach attempts to capture the nationalist perspective but 
contain it within liberal principles' . For many in the liberal tradition, an 
ethnolinguistically homogenous society bound together by a sense of common civic 
duty and purpose represents something approaching the ideal political-cultural 
formation. The central question here then for liberal theory is: what measures, if any, 
can be legitimately pursued to generate such sentiments in plural societies? This is the 
crucial difference between liberal group rights and the linguistic human rights attitude 
to nation-building policies because the latter does not even try to answer this question. 
As for the feasibility of answering this question adequately, this is perhaps the most 
pertinent issue. The pluralist dilemma would seem to present an irreducible degree of 
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tension between what Schermerhorn (1970:81) has described as 'centripetal' and 
'centrifugal' tendencies. Centripetal tendencies refer to convergent social trends and 
cultural practices and values which strengthen adherence to the central state while 
centrifugal tendencies refer to those which incite conflict with, or separation from, the 
dominant group and the wider society. This engenders a highly complex problematic 
if theorists are to resolve the dilemma satisfactorily in favour of, or find a favourable 
compromise between, both tendencies. Also, it must be noted that practical resolution 
does not necessarily follow seamlessly on from theoretical resolution. Furthermore, it 
seems that as societies and the demands of groups continue to develop and change, 
conceptions of ideas central to normative political theory such as justice and fairness 
are also likely to evolve. Therefore, while some theorists may have produced 
responses to these questions that are valid and appropriate in synchronic or context-
specific instances, it seems likely that the pluralist dilemma will continue to be a 
matter of considerable debate and contention within the field of political theory. 
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4 Language policy and identity planning in 
South Africa: a historical overview 
4.1 Introduction 
Being an ideological process and a political tool. language policy and planning is 
inevitably reflective of the political and philosophical agendas of those \\'ho formulate 
". 
and implement it (Blommaert, 1999; 2006: Kroskrity, 200 I). Throughout the colonial 
and apartheid history of South Africa and since apartheid's demise in 1994, language 
planning has been a central constitutive feature of the attempts of successive South 
African governments to construct and manipulate group identities, The diffL'n:nt 
identities which have evolved and emerged throughout South Africa's modern history 
have not done so in isolation, but have instead originated through contact between 
different groups, often of vastly differing size and political power. Indeed, the 
construction and consolidation of group identities generally takes place within :1 
framework of unequal power relations and especially so in multiethniclmultilingual 
post-colonial societies such as South Africa. In the light of this insight, Castells 
(1997:8) identifies three types of identity that may emerge in such circumstances: 
Legitimizing identity - introduced by the dominant institutions of ~ocicty to 
extend and rationalize their domination I'is- a- I'is social actors. 
Resistance identity generated by those actors \\ho are 111 
positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination. 
thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principle~ 
different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society, 
Project identity - whcn ~lK'ial actors. on the basis of whate\'er cultural 
materials arc a\ailablc to them, build a new identity that redefines their 
position in society and, by doing so. seek the transformation of merall ~ocial 
structure. (Castells, 1997:X) 
The various group identities that have emerged and competed for political power 
throughout the colonial and post-colonial history of South Africa can, at different 
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stages, be seen as broadly confonning to at least one of the types of identity described 
in Castells' typology. The British colonial policy of anglicisation was obviously an 
attempt to legitimise British identity. The Afrikaner nationalist reaction to, and 
rejection of, the British policy is a classic example of a resistance identity and post-
apartheid nation-building with its emphasis on creating anew, multiracial South 
African nation clearly fulfils the criteria of a project identity. Identities are not static 
concepts, however, and their social meaning is subject to change. Identities that 
initially emerged in resistance to a legitimising identity may themselves in time 
become legitimising identities if their bearers acquire sufficient political power. The 
same is true of project identities which, once they have been constructed and 
internalised by social actors, may also become legitimising identities in order to 
maintain or extend their bearers' political and cultural influence. This is certainly the 
case presently in South Africa, as the ANC seeks to legitimise and universalise its 
own particular vision of South African national identity (see section 6.3). 
This chapter looks at how the ideologies of different political regimes in South Africa 
" 
have influenced attempts to construct and entrench group identities through the 
implementation of language policy and planning. Particular focus shall be placed on 
differing conceptions of nationhood and how they have served (and continue to serve) 
to influence language policy and planning decisions. An assessment shall also be 
made of the relative success or failure of the language policies concerned with regard 
to the achievement of their identity construction goals. 
4.2 Language policy in the initial period of Dutch colonisation 
Contact between different language groups was an observable phenomenon from the 
earliest period of the colonisation of the Cape of Good Hope by the Dutch East India 
Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC) which began on 6th April 
1652 with the arrival of three ships under the command of one Jan Van Riebeeck who 
was charged with overseeing the setting up of a supply station for VOC ships en route 
to the Dutch East Indies (Davenport, 1992: 19). Although this initial colonisation gave 
rise to relatively little by way of official policy statements or proclamations on 
language use, one can note the activation of a number of linguistic ideologies as a 
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result of the language contact that took place. The most conspicuous language contact 
situation was that between the European settlers, most of whom were Dutch-speaking 
but who also included groups of German, French and Scandinavian language 
speakers, and the indigenous inhabitants of the Cape, the Khoekhoe or Khoesan 
whose languages are particularly noteworthy for their numerous, autochthonous 
'click' sounds (Traill, 2002). Steyn (1980: 106) notes that the European settlers had 
extreme difficulty in trying to learn these languages which to them apparently 
sounded like the 'clucking of turkeys'. However, many Khoekhoe quickly learned to 
speak some Dutch, which had established itself as the main language of colonial life 
at the Cape and so also soon became the overwhelmingly dominant medium of 
communication between the colonists and the indigenous inhabitants. The arrival of 
European settlers was to have a catastrophic effect upon Khoikhoi society (Davenport, 
1992:6-8). Elphick (1985:xvii) notes that the combined effects of three smallpox 
epidemics and the new social and political order introduced by the European settlers 
meant that 'the traditional Khoekhoe economy, social structure, and political order 
had almost entirely collapsed'. It is estimated that within a century of the arrival of the 
first Dutch settlers, the variety of the Khoekhoe language spoken in the western Cape 
had largely disappeared (Nienaber, 1963:97). Although the VOC welcomed and 
encouraged the linguistic assimilation of the Khoekhoe for their own instrumental 
reasons, there was never any question of them gaining the social prestige and legal 
privileges that the European settlers possessed. Resistance to the idea of gelykstelling 
(social levelling) across racial boundaries was always extremely strong amongst the 
Dutch-speaking (later Afrikaans) population and, indeed, would culminate some 300 
years after the initial colonisation of South Africa in the policy of apartheid 
(Giliomee, 2003:44 and 88-9). Race had been erected as an immovable barrier of 
identity that no extent of linguistic assimilation could overcome. 
Language contact also occurred as a result of the importation of approximately 63,000 
slaves into the Cape colony between 1652 and 1808. These slaves were removed from 
a range of highly divergent geographical and cultural origins. Initially, most slaves 
came from other locations with Africa such as Angola and Dahomey. The VOC then 
looked eastwards to its imperial possessions in the Indian subcontinent and the 
Indonesian archipelago for additional slave labour to be shipped into the colony. From 
the mid-1780's onwards, Madagascar and East Africa became the most abundant 
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source of slave labour (Shell, 1994: 12-13). Although the slaves brought with them a 
high level of linguistic diversity, social conditions at the Cape did not permit the long-
term survival of most of these linguistic varieties. Slaves were often separated from 
other members of their linguistic and cultural groups meaning that it was impossible 
for the slaves to reproduce any form of community based on their cultural origins and 
traditions (Worden, 1985:86). It was obviously necessary for the European masters to 
be able to communicate with their slaves to a certain degree. For this reason, slaves 
were compelled by their miserable situation to acquire some competence in Dutch. 
Consequently, pidgin, L2 and creolised varieties of Dutch were soon widely spoken 
by the slave popUlation. Some small traces of the linguistic origins of the slave 
population are still to be found in modem day Afrikaans, albeit mostly just at the 
lexical level (Roberge, 2002).13 As with the Khoekhoe, the linguistic assimilation of 
slaves was encouraged for the instrumental benefit of the white settlers but, again, 
there was never any possibility of their assimilation into the identity community of the 
European colonists. 
As already intimated, another type of language contact that occurred in the early Cape 
colony was that between the majority of Dutch-speaking settlers and speakers of other 
European languages. The most numerous non-Dutch-speaking settlers were French-
speaking Huguenot refugees fleeing religious persecution in France, as well as smaller 
numbers of German and Scandinavian language speakers who were also present in the 
colony. The legacy of some of these immigrants is to be found today in the very many 
surnames of French origin within the Afrikaner community, such as De Villiers, 
Terre-Blanche, Du Toit, Joubert and Le Roux. Steyn (1980:111-113) reports that 
within a half-century of the arrival of these immigrants, an almost total process of 
linguistic and concomitant identity assimilation had taken place. The VOC 
encouraged the assimilation of the immigrants into the Dutch-speaking, Christian 
cultural formation urging that the French-speaking children be taught 'our language 
and morals, and be integrated with the Dutch nation' (B6esken, 1964:95). However, it 
would be incorrect to assume that this assimilation occurred solely as the result of 
coercion and linguistic oppression on the part of the Dutch. The non-Dutch-speaking 
13 The most commonly encountered linguistic trace of the slave population in present-day Afrikaans is 
the ubiquitous word baie, meaning 'much' 'many' or 'very' and which serves both adjectival and 
adverbial functions. 
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European settlers were too few in number and resources to establish viable, self-
sufficient communities of their own. Consequently, this meant that contact with the 
dominant Dutch-speaking culture of the colony was both necessary and unavoidable. 
something which gave rise to irresistible assimilationist pressures. As Scholtz 
(1939:232-3) notes: 'The French language was not "oppressed" or "annihilated" in the 
colony. [ ... ] French disappeared through a natural process of assimilation.' This was 
very much an instance in which prevailing social and demographic conditions 
complemented and facilitated the widespread acceptance of the linguistic ideology of 
the dominant ruling class. The fact that the French-speaking settlers shared the same 
skin colour and religion as the Dutch-speaking colonists also allowed for any 
potentially politically significant surviving expressions of French identity to disappear 
from the colony alongside the French language. 
4.3 British colonial language policy in South Africa 
In 1806, the British seized the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch with the intention 
of establishing a colony, which, as Kamwangamalu (2004a:201) observes, was 
'British in character as well as in name.' In other words, the intention was to ensure a 
cultural transformation to complement the political transformation that had occurred 
with the passing of the Cape into British hands. To bring about this cultural 
transformation, the British administration was to pursue a policy of intense 
anglicisation (Giliomee, 2003: 197; Sturgis, 1982). In practice, this was to be a 
reductive, assimilationist policy designed to replace the language of the white settlers 
of Dutch descent (known variously as Cape Dutch or Kaap-Hollands and as Afrikaans 
from 1925) by English in public life and education, in order to impose British cultural 
practices upon the Dutch speakers and marginalise those associated with their own 
cultural heritage. The British attitude towards the Dutch-speaking settlers was typified 
by an unshakeable confidence in their own cultural superiority. This belief was 
confirmed to the British by the fact that '[t]here were no books, paintings or 
innovations on which Afrikaners could pride themselves. They were a rural, isolated, 
relatively backward people with only a few who received more than a rudimentary 
education' (Giliomee, 2003: 195). Afrikaans was also frequently derided in the 
English-speaking community for its supposed paucity of vocabulary and its limited 
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spheres of use. In 1911, The Star, an English language newspaper scathingly 
described Afrikaans as a 'jargon without literature, without scientific basis and 
without practical value outside local confines' (Steyn, 1980:213). Even some 
Afrikaans speakers came to view the language in similar terms: 'The Afrikaans 
language is laughable because it lives in the kitchen, on the street, in the cantines, in 
the houses of the uneducated' (De Waal, 1939:268). The British on the other hand 
were affirmed by their illustrious literary and scholarly cultural history and the fact 
they had the wealth and machinery of the scientifically and technologically pre-
eminent British empire behind them. According to the logic of British imperial 
ideology, then, the assimilation of the Dutch speakers was an almost self-evident 
necessity. Indeed, the British saw it as their solemn duty to anglicise these 
Dutch! Afrikaans speakers since 
they were only a little over thirty thousand in number, and it seemed absurd that 
such a small body of people should be permilled to perpetuate ideas and customs 
that were not English in a country that had become part of the British Empire. 
(Malherbe, 1925:57) 
In this regard, British policy towards the Afrikaners was characteristic of the cultural 
and linguistic assimilationist domestic policies and practices pursued by many 
Western Europe states during this era which had the aim of establishing a single, 
indivisible national identity amongst their diverse populations. Yet the success of 
these domestic policies must be called into question (see section 3.4.3). To take 
Britain's Celtic periphery as an example, Irish, Welsh and even Cornish identities 
have survived despite a very great (total, in the case of Cornish) degree of language 
shift towards English (Agnew, 1981). As was discussed in section 3.3, transference of 
identity does not necessarily fol1ow on from linguistic assimilation (Edwards, 
1985:96-7). Nevertheless, this same assimilationist intent was to drive British 
language policy with regard to the Dutch-speaking population. In 1822, English was 
declared the sole official language of the colony and free English-medium schools 
were established in which Dutch had no place, either as a subject or medium of 
instruction. Indeed, it was decided that 'Dutch should only be used to teach English 
and English to teach everything else' (Zietsman, 1992:23). From 1828, al1 court 
proceedings were to take place in English. The British also brought many Scottish 
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Presbyterian ministers to serve in the Dutch Reformed Church in an attempt to 
promote English at the expense of Dutch (Kamwangamalu, 2004a:216). This punitive 
imposition of English at the expense of Dutch met with huge resistance amongst the 
Dutch-speaking population who, quite understandably, resented being governed and 
having their children educated in a foreign language by a foreign power. 
Consequently, this taalstryd or 'language struggle' was to become the principal site of 
Boer nationalist expression and resistance to British rule. In an effort to counter 
British language policy, the Afrikaners set up private Dutch-medium schools and 
ultra-conservative Afrikaners known as 'Doppers,14 fought against the anglicisation 
and liberalisation of religious life (Giliomee, 2003: 177-179). They viewed the 
preservation of their language as essential for the maintenance of their ethnic/national 
identity. It was in this taalstryd that the absolute link between language and national 
identity became entrenched in Afrikaner consciousness, a belief that would explicitly 
direct language policy during the apartheid era. Writing in the Vriends des Volks 
(Friends of the People, 28th October 1910), W. Postma, a Dutch Reformed Church 
Minister and political columnist, encapsulated the strength of the Afrikaner belief in 
the indivisible link between language and ethnic/national identity: 'Take away our 
language and we will become Englishmen' (cited in Kamwangamalu, 2004a:217). 
The British policy of anglicisation lasted officially until 1910 when the Boer states of 
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State joined the British Cape Colony and Natal to 
form the Union of South Africa. As a consequence of this union, Dutch (later 
Afrikaans) and English were given equal co-official status. However, in practice, the 
assimilationist conviction and intent of the British was changed little by this 
development. The British continued to be convinced of the natural inevitability and 
desirability of the dominance of English in the new union. One G. Heaton-Nicholls, 
an English-speaking politician from Natal, later wrote: 'We had gone about talking of 
a South African nation which would consist of Dutch and English, but at the back of 
our minds we had supposed that they would talk English. We aimed at Anglicisation' 
(Heaton-Nicholls: 1961 :283). The editor of Volksstem, a Dutch/Afrikaans newspaper 
of the time, remarked of the new bilingual policy that: 
14 The name is a corruption of the Dutch noun 'domper' meaning a device for snuffing out candles. The 
mission of the Doppers was, figuratively, seen to be one of extinguishing the light of progress and 
'Englightenment' ideas associated with the British Empire. 
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English-speaking South Africa never took the matter seriously. Bilingualism was 
regarded as nothing more than a polite gesture towards the other section - neither 
more nor less. The average English-speaking South African was inclined to regard 
every political recognition of the Dutch language as a menace to the interests of 
his own race. (Engelenburg, 1929:230) 
Agreeing to an officially bilingual union was an act of conciliatory compromise on 
the part of the British and not an affirmation of a radical departure in linguistic 
ideology, which remained largely unchanged. The de facto language-in-identity 
policy of the British still held the Afrikaners as a popUlation to be assimilated. Yet, 
with regard to its identity construction aims, British colonial language policy towards 
the Afrikaners must be regarded as a severe failure. Not only did the policy fail to 
assimilate the Dutch-speaking popUlation, it actually laid the foundations for the 
crystallisation of an ethnic Afrikaner identity, which was to find expression in the 
formation of a fervently anti-British nationalist movement. Put simply. the 
consequences of the policy were precisely the opposite of what the British had 
intended. Their aggressive, absorptive nationalism was countered by an equally 
belligerent resistant Afrikaner nationalism. Unlike the vast majority of the Celtic 
population of the British Isles, the export of the anglicisation policy to South Africa 
failed to linguistically assimilate its Dutch-speaking target population. However, what 
is significant is that, in both cases, irrespective of whether any language shift took 
place, there occurred no identity shift in the direction intended by the policy. Ethnic 
identities are far more durable and resilient than mere linguistic communities (Smith, 
1986). The number of ethnic identities that have survived total language shift is 
testimony to this. Language shift appears, generally, to be an easier process to initiate 
than identity shift, insofar as either of these processes can actually be consciously 
planned and manipulated. However, the example of the Afrikaners suggests that in 
cases where the language-identity link is so strong and salient as to be perceived as 
absolute by members of the group in question, efforts directed at coercive linguistic 
assimilation seem likely to be met with considerably greater resistance. The notion of 
'core values'. introduced by Smolicz (1979. 1981 and 1995). is of relevance here 
when considering the relationship between the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner 
identity. Smolicz (1981) provides the following definition of 'core values' . 
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Core values can be regarded as forming one of the most fundamental components 
of a group's culture. They generally represent the heartland of the ideological 
system and act as identifying values which are symbolic of the group and its 
membership. Rejection of core values carries with it the threat of exclusion from 
the group. [ ... J Core values are singled out for special attention because they 
provide the indispensable link between the group's cultural and social systems; in 
their absence both systems would suffer eventual disintegration. (Smolicz. 
1981:75) 
Non-core values may often be easily eroded by the assimilationist pressures created 
by the presence of a politically dominant, foreign cultural formation. However, when 
core values are threatened they often become the site of a vigorous nationalist 
resistance movement. Language mayor may not, of course, be a core cultural value, 
depending on the group in question. Some cultures are highly language-centred, 
others less so. The case of Ireland illustrates this point well. The resistance of the 
historically Irish-speaking ethnic group to assimilation to the English language has 
been so weak and ineffective to the extent that everyday use of the Irish language is 
now almost exclusively restricted to a tiny, geographically quite isolated minority of 
the population living in the Gaeltacht (May, 2001:136; Fishman, 1991:124). Yet, Irish 
identity has persisted with great force and vitality despite this linguistic assimilation. 
This is because the everyday use of the Irish language is not a core cultural value 
without which the maintenance of Irish group identity would be impossible. Instead, it 
is undoubtedly Catholicism that fills this role. It has been the maintenance of the 
Catholic religion in opposition to the Protestantism of the British that, historically, has 
been the central locus of Irish nationalist sentiment. 
Bereft of their ancestral tongue. it was in Catholicism that the Irish found the 
refuge and shield behind which they could retain their identity and awareness of 
their distinction from the conquering British Protestants. including the 
descendants of the Cromwellian settlers of the seventeenth century. (Smolicz. 
1981:79) 
The extreme, intense preoccupation of Afrikaner nationalist thought and rhetoric with 
the issue of language demonstrates that the Afrikaans language clearly constitutes a 
'core value' for Afrikaners (Steyn, 1980:428-436 and 1984; Zietsman, 1992:196). 
Comments such as those of Postma, cited above, suggest that the survival of the 
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Afrikaners as a cohesive ethnic group depended utterly on the maintenance of 
Afrikaans. This perception of the central importance of Afrikaans to Afrikaner 
identity remains as strong as ever to this day (Giliomee, 2003:664; see section 5.2). 
Retrospectively, one can see that in trying to eradicate a core value of Afrikaner 
cultural identity, the British policy of total assimilation through anglicisation was 
almost pre-doomed to failure. Indeed, an education report commissioned by the 
British colonial government in 1901 admitted as much, declaring contemptuosly that 
it was hopeless to expect the Afrikaners to use any other language amongst 
themselves since 'their own Dutch idiom [ ... ] is associated with every act and thought 
of their farm life' (cited in Zietsman, 1992:31). The resilience of Afrikaner ethnic 
identity resided overwhelmingly within their language, meaning that the initiation of a 
language shift away from Afrikaans would have required considerably more resources 
and incentives than were available to the British. 
British language policy during the 19th century was not only concerned with the 
assimilation of the white Afrikaans-speaking popUlation. Sections of the native 
African population were also targets of the policy of linguistic and cultural 
assimilation. British missionary schools, their agents fuelled by the belief that they 
were undertaking a mission civilisatrice in addition to furthering British political and 
economic interests, were the main agents of this anglicisation of (proportionately) 
small numbers of the black population (Alexander, 1989: 17-20). These missionary 
schools 
trained and educated a Black elite thus providing an authentic cultural context for 
English [ ... ] The scholarly missionaries educated a group of men and women with 
high competence in English, a deep insight into the world of English ideas and 
values, a strong language loyalty to English and a sense of the 'great tradition' of 
English literature (hence the devotion and attachment to Shakespeare and the 
poets which continue to the present day). (Lanham, 1978:22-3) 
The political consequences of this policy have been far-reaching and continue to 
shape the contemporary political and social life of South Africa. This anglicised black 
elite, who have been described, somewhat mischievously, as 'Afro-Saxo~s' (Mazrui 
and Alamin, 1998; Rubagumya, 2004), survives to this day and has become the new 
ruling class in post-apartheid South Africa. Indeed, current elite language practices in 
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South Africa are a direct reflection of a linguistic ideology that can trace its origin 
directly back to the consequences of this colonial language policy of the British which 
reinforced the tendency among what is known in South African history as the 
'mission elite', i.e. the tiny layer of black teachers, preachers, interpreters, clerks 
and other professionals which the colonial system had necessarily given rise to, to 
view proficiency in the English language as their passport to upward social and 
economic mobility. The yawning gulf between the potential political and cultural 
elite on the one hand and the masses of the oppressed black people, on the other 
hand, was thereby widened beyond any hope of bridging during the next few 
generations. (Alexander, 2003: to) 
Similarly, Heugh (2003:3) writes that: 
[The] pursuit of anglicisation was probably one of the greatest political errors of 
South African history because it set in motion a chain of events which continues 
to haunt education and language policy a hundred years later. (Heugh, 2003:3) 
These 'Black Englishmen', as they were often derogatorily referred to, and most 
notably by president Hendrik Verwoerd (Maake, 1994: 114), were particularly loathed 
by conservative Afrikaner elements who viewed them as an affront to the ideal of 
ethnocultural purity and authenticity that the Afrikaners had fought so successfully to 
preserve in the face of British attempts at anglicisation. A more pragmatic, political 
rationale can also be discerned in the Afrikaner resentment of this culturally 
westernised black elite. An anglicised black population would be likely to support and 
advocate British cultural practices which were seen as a threat to the very existence of 
the Afrikaner volk. Also, if any future conflict with the British were to occur, this 
black elite would possibly be able to mobilise vast manpower resources to side with 
the British against the Afrikaners. As Steyn (1980:259) notes: '[t]he British element 
in South Africa awoke Afrikaner fear in their attempts at making common cause with 
the blacks against the Afrikaners'. Shaw (1987:294) discusses, for example, the long 
history of Afrikaner hatred and fear of the English-language press in South Africa, 
noting that '[ e ]ven today [1987], many Afrikaner nationalists are convinced that the 
English-speaking press is purposefully stirring up the blacks to undermine the 
Afrikaners'. It is in this double-sided combination of philosophical revulsion for, and 
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pragmatic political fear of, a black English-speaking population that one can locate 
the motivations underpinning much of the apartheid era language policy. 
4.4 Language policy during apartheid 
After coming to power in 1948, the Afrikaner-dominated National Party identified a 
key role for language policy and planning in advancing and implementing its policy 
of separate development or 'apartheid', literally meaning 'separateness' in Afrikaans. 
As seen in the previous section, the Afrikaner reaction to the British policy of 
." anglicisation crystallised the belief in the absolute, one-to-one link between language 
and national identity. The philosophical roots of this belief that was to fonn the basis 
of apartheid ideology can, in part, be traced back to the influence of the linguistic 
nationalism of the late eighteenth-century German Romantic thinkers (see section 
2.5.1; Giliomee, 2003:365; Steyn, 1984). Afrikaner conceptions of nationhood have 
typically found expression in slogans such as Die taal is gans die volk (the language 
constitutes the entire people) (Zietsman, 1992). According to such thought, the nation 
or volk has an immutably fi~ed character and identity, expressed through its 
supposedly unique language, which distinguishes it from all others (May, 2001 :57). 
As Kedourie has noted of this school of thought in general terms: 
[L]anguage was [seen as] an outward sign of a group's particular identity and a 
significant means of ensuring its continuity. But a nation's language was peculiar 
to that nation only because such a nation constituted a racial stock distinct from 
thal of other nalions. (Kedourie, 1966:71-2) 
According to the official policy document of Christian National Education 'God [ ... ] 
willed separate nations and peoples, and He gave to each separate nation and people 
its special vocation, task and gifts' (Institute for Christian National Education, 1948). 
In this way then, an organic linguistic nationalism becomes conflated with notions of 
racial distinctiveness and purity. Accordingly, any mixing of racial or national groups 
in South Africa would come to be regarded as a violation of authenticity, as going 
contrary to the natural order of things. The same policy document elsewhere states 
that 'We will have nothing to do with a mixture of languages, of culture, of religion or 
of race' (Institute for Christian National Education, 1948). It would be quite 
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misleading, however, to claim that apartheid policies aimed at reinforcing tribal and 
ethnic divisions among blacks were motivated by concerns for their ethnocultural 
authenticity. Ensuring the survival of the Afrikaners as a distinct volk was always the 
overriding concern. The Afrikaner interpretation of certain primordialist theories of 
nationhood must merely been seen as an attempt to bring some philosophical 
credibility to policies aimed at ensuring their own ethnic survival through the 
continued subjugation of the non-white popUlation of South Africa. 
Language policy and planning was to play a significant role in maintaining a South 
African society divided along both inter- and intra-racial lines. The cornerstone of 
apartheid language policy was the belief in moedertaalonderwys or 'mother-tongue 
education'. The origin of this belief can be traced back to the 19th century taalstryd in 
which the Boers fought for the right to receive education in their own language in the 
face of British attempts to assimilate them through the policy of anglicisation (see 
section 4.3). However, the significance of moedertaalonderwys was quite different 
depending on which side of the racial divide one was located (Reagan, 200 1). For the 
privileged white population, it generally meant education in one of the two co-equal 
official languages of state administration - Afrikaans and English. The emphasis here, 
however, was still on division, as whites were mainly educated in single medium 
schools and universities according to their respective mother tongue (Steyn, 1980). 
Apartheid language policy was not designed to forge a common white South African 
national identity but to "assert Afrikaner national identity vis-a-vis the British while 
subjugating blacks to whites (both British and Afrikaners), (Sonntag, 2003:82). 
Reagan (200 1 :55) points out that language policy and planning sought merely to 
relieve (the often considerable) tensions between white Afrikaans and English 
speakers but not to unify them in a single, indivisible identity. As Wilkins and 
Strydom observe of the 'Broederbond', the secret Afrikaner society that practically 
ran the apartheid state: 
The Broederbond's altitude to Afrikaans-English co-operation is clearly 
demonstrated by its fanatic concern with separate 'pure' Afrikaans organisations. 
Instead of modifying existing South African organisations to make them 
bilingual, they formed their own. (Wilkins and Strydom. 1978: 143) 
114 
The linguistic nationalism of the Afrikaners also did not stretch to include speakers of 
non-native or non-standard mother tongue varieties of Afrikaans, most of whom came 
under the racial categories of 'Coloured' or 'Black' (Van Rensburg, 1999). Standard 
Afrikaans, as spoken by the white population, was fervently promoted and other non-
white varieties frequently disparaged as plat, meaning 'coarse' or 'broad' (see section 
5.2). The notion of a single Afrikaans-speaking identity community then, did not exist 
and was actively resisted through the validation and privileging of a single (white) 
variety of Afrikaans over all others. In this way, amongst Afrikaans speakers, 
language policy was used to promote separate identities based upon a biologicaVracial 
hierarchy. 
While for the white population mother-tongue education meant having access to a 
language of political power and prestige, for the Bantu-speaking black population of 
South Africa it was to have much more sinister connotations. The Bantu Education 
Act of 1953 introduced compulsory mother-tongue schooling for blacks for the first 
eight years of primary education, after which secondary education could be in English 
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or Afrikaans, or a combination of the two (Lodge, 1983: 116-118; Tabata, 1960). Yet, 
by far the majority of black schoolchildren never continued into secondary education. 
Consequently, this legislation was widely regarded by blacks as a 'government trick' 
(Harnischfeger, 2003:3), preventing them from acquiring a sufficiently competent 
knowledge of English, and to a lesser extent Afrikaans, and so closing any channels of 
access to power and social advancement. The National Party's attempts at denying 
black people an English-language education had, in fact, begun in 1949 with the 
closure of many English-medium mission schools. These schools were shut down on 
the recommendation of the Eiselen Commission because they were seen as 
contributing towards the anglicisation of the black population (Louw, 2004:321). The 
Bantu Education Act sought to build on the closure of the mission schools by denying 
English-medium education to the black population in all schools. President Hendrik 
Verwoerd's remark that English-medium education for blacks constituted an 
'unhealthy exception' reveals much of the motivation behind the policy (Brown, 
1992:87). 
However, the purpose of the Bantu Education Act was not merely to prevent blacks 
from acquiring competence in any of the two officia11anguages of the South African 
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state. It was also designed to prevent the black population from uniting together in 
collective action against the system and institutions of their oppression (Giliomee. 
2003: 509-510). 
Mother tongue schooling for blacks was employed [ ... J to support the social and 
educational goals of Verwoerdian-style apartheid. The apartheid regime used such 
programs to reinforce ethnic and tribal identity among black schoolchildren, 
seeking to 'divide and conquer' by encouraging ethnolinguistic divisions within 
the black community. (Reagan, 2001 :55) 
The ambition of the social engineering attempted by apartheid language policy is 
shown by the fact that it did not seek merely to deepen and reinforce existing 
ethnolinguistic cleavages amongst the Bantu population, but actually to create and 
insist upon them where they had previously never existed. Often assisted by the 
'expertise' of white linguists, dialect continua were arbitrarily carved up into 
numerous Ausbau languages which supposedly corresponded with distinct ethnic 
groupings. This is perhaps best illustrated by the case of the North Sotho and 
Setswana languages. These two languages were distinguished from each other for 
purely political and administrative purposes. 
The 'North Sotho language is a fiction' (quoting van Wannelo). Governmental 
creation of ethnic groups and standard languages has been used to justify 
apartheid policy; for example, Lebowa is designated as a 'homeland' for the 
Northern Sotho people who themselves came into existence only through the 
legislative action of apartheid policy. Linguistic autonomy here and elsewhere has 
more to do with socio-political criteria than linguistic ones. (Herbert, 1992:3) 
In the light of the ethnolinguistic classifications imposed upon the black population, 
the African National Congress (ANC) offered a scathing assessment of apartheid 
planning for the African languages: 
Ignorant and officious White professors sitl ting] on education committees are 
arbiters of African languages and books without consultation with the people 
concerned. The grotesque spectacle is seen of the White government of South 
African posing as a 'protector' of so-called Bantu culture and traditions of which 
they know nothing. (cited in Heugh, 1987:269) 
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At this point, it should also be understood that the notion of a 'mother tongue' is itself 
highly problematic since it is not always clear what a particular individual's mother 
tongue may be (Pennycook, 2002). Kamwangamalu notes that 'the concept of a 
"mother-tongue" is essentially vacuous' and illustrates the point by citing the 
following extract from an interview with a 23-year-old black student from Germiston, 
near Johannesburg. 
My father's home language was Swazi, and my mother's home language was 
Tswana. But as I grew up in a Zulu-speaking area we used mainly Zulu and Swazi 
at home. But from my mother's side I also learnt Tswana well. In my high school 
I came into contact with lots of Sotho and Tswana students, so I can speak these 
two languages well. And of course I know English and Afrikaans. With my 
friends I also use Tsotsitaal. (Kamwangamalu, 2004a:227) 
The situation described above is fairly typical of black South Africans, especially in 
the larger urban areas (Webb, 2oo2a:63-4). In such situations, the concept of a 
'mother tongue' has little resonance or, indeed, relevance. The apartheid division of 
the black population into discrete mother-tongue groups, which has also been 
continued by the post-apartheid regime, totally overlooks the very great complexity of 
the relationship between language and identity that is found amongst black urban 
South Africans. Classification according to, and subsequent education in, the 
supposed mother tongue was clearly not a linguistically motivated policy but rather, it 
was an exercise aimed at the construction and entrenchment of divisive identities to 
suit the political objectives of the National Party. It is ironic that in attempting to 
naturalise and retribalise the black population, an initiative styled as a return to 
authenticity, the apartheid regime did so by using a system of ethnolinguistic 
ascription based upon the artificial and inappropriate concept of the 'mother tongue'. 
The educational needs and desires of black learners were clearly of no importance to 
those who formulated and enacted the policy, as Barnard observes: 
Moedertaalonderw),s .. .is not the Afrikaans term for mother-tongue instruction. It 
is a political concept which has its roots in the dogma of Christian National 
Education. According to this dogma, each 'race' or 'volk' has its own identity 
which sets it apart from all others [ ... ] What is being attempted is certainly not 
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mother-tongue education in the interests of the children but the enforcement of 
'moedertaa!onderwys' as an. instrument of social control and subjugation. (cited 
in Heugh, 1987: 143-4) 
The question of whether apartheid language policy was actually successful in creating 
and/or reinforcing divisive ethnolinguistic identities amongst the Bantu population is 
highly debatable. What is certain, however, is that by severely restricting access to 
English-language education, English increasingly became seen by blacks from all 
ethnolinguistic categories as a unifying symbol of opposition to apartheid (De Klerk 
and Gough, 2002:357). 
The language policy of the apartheid regime explicitly fomented fragmentation 
based on parochial ethnolinguistic identity. However, instead of provoking 
linguistic tribalism, the apartheid policy merely incited Blacks to rally around 
global English as the language of resistance and protest [ ... ] Blacks saw English 
as 'the tool to combat divisive Bantu education and the imposition of Afrikaans'. 
(Sonntag, 2003:82) 
Indeed, English was to become the de facto preferred language of the ANC and the 
Black Consciousness movement, both of which refused to validate ethnolinguistic 
differences amongst the black population, the ANC as a result of its policy of 
multiracialism, while Black Consciousness emphasised black unity in opposition to 
white oppression (Gibson, 2004; Lobban, 1996). None of this is to deny, however, the 
success of apartheid policy in ensuring that levels of competence in English remained 
very low amongst the large majority of blacks, a phenomenon which is itself 
symptomatic of the very great poverty and underdevelopment amongst the black 
population, something which apartheid policy entrenched even further and which still 
persists today. The generally low proficiency in English amongst black students is 
highlighted by research carried out in 1986 in primary schools in the Kwa-Zulu Natal 
province (Odendaal, 1986). This research showed that many fifth-grade pupils did not 
understand simple questions in English such as 'Where is your home?' and 'What 
does your father do?' The research also showed that 21.6% of primary school teachers 
claimed their fifth-grade pupils did not understand them if English was used as the 
medium of instruction and 83.5% of teachers said their pupils did not understand their 
text books which were in English. As a further example, the following passage forms 
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part of an examination answer on the role of memory in language learning written by 
a university student who was also an English teacher in a rural area of South Africa. 
Memory help us to recall about the previous events which are very importan in 
our lives. If was not of memory we could be able to have good people in subjects 
like Mathematics and Reporters, Journalists who passed History as a subject 
which need more of passed events even though some could be of current. Even 
Lawyers and Advocates they refere to the past events in judging people in courts. 
(cited in Webb, 2002a: I]) 
This passage would suggest that the examinee in question is clearly quite incapable of 
teaching anything through the medium of English, let alone teaching the language 
itself, to any satisfactory level of competence. Education for black students has 
suffered from being caught in a vicious circle of improficient language learning. 
Inadequate teaching produces inadequate standards of linguistic competence amongst 
students, some of whom go on to become teachers and the whole cycle then repeats 
itself. Of course, the educational difficulties which arise through the inadequate 
proficiency in English on the part of many teachers and pupils could be countered 
effectively through increased use of the African languages as media of instruction 
(Webb, 2004a) but popular language attitudes do not generally favour this option in 
spite of numerous supportive academic research findings (see section 4.5.1). There is 
considerable irony in the fact that even in spite of their generally poor knowledge of 
the language, many blacks came to identify far more with English than their own 
native tongues as both a symbol and tool of political resistance - precisely something 
that apartheid language policy was designed to prevent. This would seem to be 
evidence that the effectiveness of even the most coercive attempts at top-down 
identity construction through language policy are likely to meet with strictly limited 
success if there exists sufficient popular ideological resistance to them (see section 
3.2). In order to be successful, identity-building policies require acceptance and 
affirmation of their core ideological components, of their essential desirability in other 
words, by the social groups and individuals whose loyalty they solicit. Where this 
acceptance and affirmation is lacking, such policies are likely to generate identities of 
resistance and lead to a state of societal conflict, as has happened in the case of 
Afrikaans in the post-apartheid era (see chapter 5). 
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4.5 Post-apartheid language policy 
The post-apartheid era in South Africa began officially in 1994 when the first 
multiracial all-party elections were held which culminated in the Nelson Mandela-Ied 
ANC being voted into power. The new era was to represent a significant break with 
the rigid policy of Afrikaans-English bilingualism that existed during the apartheid 
years. The new South African constitution, a document strongly influenced by the 
values of traditional individualistic liberal human rights discourse and designed to 
ensure inter-ethnic peace, declared eleven official state languages, including nine 
Bantu languages (Sepedi, SiSwati, Sesotho, Setswana, isiXhosa, isiZulu, isiNdebele, 
Xi tsonga, Tshivenda) in addition to Afrikaans and English (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Chapter 1, Section 6, Article 1). In May 2007, the South 
African parliament's Joint Constitutional Review Committee (JCRC) called for an 
investigation into whether South African Sign Language should be made the 
country's twelfth official language (JCRC, 2007). 
According to the post-apartheid constitution, language policy must recognise 'the 
historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages of [the South 
African] people, the state must take practical and positive measures to elevate the 
status and advance the use of these languages' (Chapter 1, Section 6, Article 2). It also 
states that 'all official languages must enjoy parity of esteem and be treated equitably' 
(Chapter 1, Section 6, Article 4). The constitution also ensures against unfair 
discrimination on the basis of language and guarantees the right to receive education 
in the official language of one's choice, although this does come with the qualifying 
phrase 'where reasonably practicable'. The post-apartheid era has seen a flurry of 
language planning activities and governmental bodies set up with the intention of 
implementing these constitutional directives. For example, the National Language 
Service (NLS) was set up as the Directorate in the Department of Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology (DACST) in order to promote 'the linguistic empowerment 
of all South Africa's people' (DACST, 1998:24). In addition, the Pan South African 
Language Board (PANSALB) was set up by virtue of the Pan South African 
Language Board Act (Act 59 of 1995), with the chief purpose of providing for the 
recognition of multilingualism and the development of the country's official 
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languages (see section 6.3). For a detailed overview of PANSALB's activities and 
responsibilities see Marivate (2000). 
In theory then, the post-apartheid constitution commits the government to build upon 
an underlying philosophy of pluralism and linguistic human rights by pursuing a 
policy of equitable multilingualism. The constitution, however, is far from being an 
exercise in pure symbolic idealism, although superficial interpretations of it may lead 
one to such a conclusion. In fact, the emotive, idealistic language of the document 
masks a great deal of political pragmatism, particularly in its treatment of Afrikaans. 
In elevating nine black African languages to the status of official languages, it meant 
that the previous privileging of Afrikaans under the apartheid system could be 
countered without Afrikaners being able to argue with any credible conviction that the 
status of their language had been downgraded. Despite this skilful piece of political 
manoeuvring concerning the issue of Afrikaans, the constitution contains certain 
inconsistencies and omissions which give weight to the widespread perception that 
the ANC government has tended to attach a fairly low priority to language issues 
(Heugh, 2003:4). Firstly, the post-apartheid government has carried over the linguistic 
categorisation of the African population that was imposed upon it by the apartheid 
regime. In doing so, they have also implicitly valorised many of the same putative 
ethnolinguistic identities that were so dubiously and controversially ascribed to the 
black population by the apartheid government. Yet, as Stroud and Heugh (2003:5) 
note, the Northern Ndebele language (also known as SiNdebele) which was officially 
recognised under apartheid, has been curiously excluded from the post-apartheid list 
of official state languages whereas Southern Ndebele (also known as isiNdebele) was 
included on the list (see section 5.4.1.2). 
In addition to the promotion of linguistic pluralism, the South African government has 
also committed itself to undertake a complementary project of identity construction or 
'nation-building'. Unlike the apartheid regime, the current South African government 
has not adopted a policy of multilingualism with the intention of promoting separate, 
divisive identities. Instead, it has, in theory, chosen to view linguistic pluralism as a 
resource for the promotion of a common, non-racial, fully-inclusive South African 
identity. 
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The political philosophy which underlies the South African constitution, and upon 
which the public life of this country is to be built, is pluralism. The government is 
therefore directed at establishing 'unity within diversity', at developing national 
integration, at nation-building. (Webb, 2002a:] 38) 
In the foreword to the government's National Language Policy Framework (2002) 
document the Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, B.S. Ngubane. 
writes that 
the policy [ ... J is fundamental to the management of our diverse language resources 
and the achievement of the government's goal to promote democracy, justice, 
equity and national unity. It is in this spirit that the promotion of all ]] official 
languages of our country, as provided for in the Constitution, takes centre stage in 
the policy. 
As a consequence of this policy of pluralism, no single language has been officially 
designated as the 'national language' , unlike in neighbouring states such as Botswana 
and especially Namibia which, in typical African style, has taken the exoglossic 
option of declaring English as its national language despite the fact that it is known by 
less than 5% of the population (Du Plessis, 2000:96; Fourie, 1997). Former colonial 
languages such as English are often promoted in these circumstances as languages of 
national unity on the grounds that they are somehow 'ethnically neutral' (see section 
3.4.5). Even if this highly dubious assertion were true, it is seriously stretching 
credibility to claim that a language which is unknown by the vast majority of the 
state's citizens can serve as a means of uniting them in a common identity 
community. Such languages actually just serve as vehicles of elite unity (see section 
4.5.3 below). 
In viewing the promotion of linguistic pluralism and national unity as being 
complementary rather than antagonistic, the South African case would appear to 
represent a considerable philosophical departure from classical assimilationist, ·one 
language, one nation' theories of language and nation. Indeed, this traditional 
Eurocentric approach has received explicit official rejection. 
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This paradigm [i.e. mu1tilingualism] [ ... ] presupposes a more fluid relationship 
between languages and cu1ture than is generally understood in the Eurocentric 
model which we have inherited in South Africa. It accepts a priori that there is no 
contradiction in a multicultural society between a core of common cultural traits, 
beliefs, practices etc., and particular sectional or communal cultures. Indeed, the 
relationship between the two can and should be mutually reinforcing and, if 
properly managed, should give rise to and sustain genuine respect for the 
variability of the communities that constitute our emerging nation. (From the 
preamble to the Language In Education Policy In Terms Of Section 3(4)(m) Of 
The National Education Policy Act, 1996 (Act 27 of 1996) 
This paradigmatic shift towards a more pluralistic approach to nation-building has 
received broad support from those working in the field of language policy in South 
Africa. Webb, for example, notes that: 
an emphasis on national unity obviously doesn't diminish the need to preserve 
cultural diversity. The recognition and promotion of cultural identity and diversity 
can, in fact, facilitate nation-building since it can contribute to spiritual and 
intellectual decolonization. (Webb, 2001: 163) 
Also, Bamgbose observes that: 
those wedded to the 'one language, one nation' 19lh century concept of nationhood 
will certainly be appalled by such a policy. But for those who have always 
advocated a multilingual approach to national development and integration, the 
policy is a perfectly logical one in the sociolinguistic and political circumstances. 
(Bamgbose, 2000: 108) 
Elsewhere, Alexander, in rejecting Eurocentric theories of nationality, writes that: 
it is [ ... J pertinent to state clearly once again that national unity and national 
identity are not predicated on the requirement that the people who constitute the 
nation should all speak one and the same language. [ ... ] The real issue in the 
matter of promoting national unity is not that people should all speak anyone 
particular language (although this is clearly very helpful !), but that they should be 
able to communicate with one another. (Alexander, 1999:21) 
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Alexander goes on to support his position by citing the case of Switzerland. Indeed. as 
discussed in section 2.5.2, the Swiss example would seem to suggest that nationhood 
need not necessarily be predicated on the existence of a common national language or 
even on the requirement that all members of the nation be able to communicate with 
each other in any language (see also section 3.4.4). However, to base hopes for the 
emergence of a supralinguistic South African national identity on the Swiss 
experience would appear to be unrealistically optimistic, as it overlooks a number of 
very significant differences between the two countries. Safran (1999:86) notes that 'a 
common Swiss nationalism exists because divisive elements are isolated and 
depoliticized by means of institutional arrangements and because certain political 
values and economic interests are translinguistic.' The same cannot be said in the 
South African case. Unlike Switzerland's federal structure, the South African state 
remains quite highly centralised and its internal political subdivisions (nine provinces) 
have rather ethnolinguistically insensitive boundaries. Furthermore, such is the degree 
of multilingualism and population mixing in urban areas, a territory-based language 
policy does not seem a particularly viable option. Also, economic interests in South 
Africa are emphatically not translibguistic. English (and to a much lesser extent 
Afrikaans) dominates as the language of business and trade and competence in it is a 
prerequisite for any substantial economic advancement. The value of the African 
languages within the formal economy remams very low to non-existent. This 
contributes to the existence of large and, indeed, increasing socio-economic 
inequalities in South Africa because the majority of the population is unable to 
function effectively from an economic point of view in the languages of greatest 
economic value. Although the provisions in the new South African constitution have 
reduced the potential for inter-ethnic conflict, the potential for inter-personal conflict 
in South Africa remains high, as illustrated by the extremely high crime rate and, in 
particular, incidences of mugging, theft and other violent crime (Statistics South 
Africa, 1998; Louw and Shaw, 1997; Demombynes and OzIer, 2(02), all of which is 
likely to seriously inhibit the development of a sense of community and therefore that 
of a fully-inclusive national identity. This suggests that an effective, fully-inclusive 
model of nation-building for South Africa will have to pay great attention to a number 
of deep-ranging social problems that are either much less severe, or not present at all 
in the Swiss case, a fact which strictly limits the usefulness of any comparison 
between the two countries. 
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4.5.1 The language policy-practice gap 
The relatively short post-apartheid period of just over a decade may be too small a 
time-frame for one to make any meaningful deep-ranging judgements regarding the 
success of the South African government's efforts at promoting national unity through 
a policy of multilingualism. However, a number of initial trends and tendencies can 
be noted which suggest the existence of an unharmonised language policy situation 
(see section 3.2), that is to say a significant gap between stated policy objectives and 
actual language practices. Kamwangamalu (2oo4a:249) summarises the situation 
succinctly: 'What is clear [ ... ] is that language practices in most of the country's 
institutions flout the principle of language equity enshrined in the Constitution.' In 
contrast to the equitable promotion of all eleven languages envisaged by the country's 
constitution, there seems to be an increasing tendency towards English 
monolingual ism in all spheres of South African public life. Quite a clear language 
hierarchy has emerged with English at the top, the Bantu languages at the bottom and 
Afrikaans somewhere in the middle but gradually sinking. A striking example of this 
hierarchy is to be found in language use in the media. For example, in a typical week 
in May 1998, English-language programmes took up 91.95% of the airtime of the 
three television channels of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 
(Kamwangamalu, 2oo4a:239-40). Afrikaans-language programmes had 5.66% of 
airtime while Zulu, numerically the country's largest language, had just 1.01 % of 
airtime. Four of the smaller Bantu languages - isiNdebele, SiSwati, Tsonga and 
Venda - had no airtime at all. Moreover, the website of the SABC J5 is almost 
exclusively in English. In the website's television listings section, even programmes 
which are broadcast in a language other than English, such as the highly popular, if 
dubiously acted, Afrikaans soap opera '7de Laan', are only described or synopsised in 
English! The section entitled 'SABC Africa' actually contains nothing written in an 
African language, in spite of its stated mission to 'meaningfully participate in the 
African Renaissance by bringing quality, pride-instilling family entertainment, news 
and actuality programming from Africa to Africans all over the world'. It seems a 
curious type of African Renaissance which almost totally overlooks the most obvious 
and recognisably authentic expression of African cultures, i.e African languages. 
I' http://www.sabc.co.za 
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Elsewhere, Pandor (1995) has noted that in 1994, 87% of speeches in the South 
African parliament were in English, 5% in Afrikaans and 8% in one of the remaining 
nine African languages, something which rather undermines aspirations towards 
achieving a credibly representative democratic political culture. Several authors have 
also drawn attention to the increasing dominance of English in the previously 
Afrikaans dominated military, despite the fact that Afrikaans speakers continue to 
constitute the single greatest language group in the South African Defence Force (De 
K1erk and Barkhuizen, 1998; Van Zyl, 2001). This is attributed to the large number of 
black Africans who have come to occupy posts in the Department of Defence and 
who overwhelmingly favour the use of English as a lingua franca amongst the 
linguistically diverse members of the defence services (see section 5.4). 
Language use in the educational sphere is also reflective of this linguistic hierarchy. 
It seems obvious that the country's new constitution commits the government to using 
all eleven official languages as media of instruction at al1 levels, although this is 
qualified somewhat by the addition of phrases such as 'where reasonably practicable' . 
However, the position of the Bantu languages within education remains very weak, 
while English continues to become ever more dominant. Afrikaans again occupies 
something of a middle position although this has weakened considerably in the post-
apartheid era (see section 5.3.1). The South African case (as do many others no doubt) 
seems to confirm the view outlined by Harlech-lones (1995) that the declaration of 
official status for a language is not a necessary indicator of its role in education. A 
number of factors can account for this initial failure at language policy 
implementation. First, for many, the promotion of the Bantu languages as media of 
learning and teaching is all too reminiscent of apartheid moedertaalonderwys policies. 
As Reagan (2001 :56) observes, 'the legacy of apartheid includes suspicions about 
mother-tongue instruction in any form, which has led to on-going tensions with 
respect to educational language policy in post-apartheid South Africa.' It is clear that 
the thrust of the constitutional commitments regarding language policy do not reflect 
the language attitudes of the vast majority of South Africans, whose thirst for English-
medium education, even in the earliest stages of primary education, remains 
unquenched. Such is the resistance to the idea of mother-tongue education, black 
parents and students overwhelmingly continue to favour English-medium education 
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from an early age, in spite of the evidence which shows that this option generally 
results in poor cognitive proficiency in English, high levels of drop-out and 
educational failure. For example, Heugh (1999:302) shows that in 1994 only 49% of 
African language speaking school students obtained a pass rate at the matriculation 
level. 
It is an irony not appreciated by advocates of an English-only or English-mainly 
education for African language speakers that the most competent and effective non-
native users of English tend to be white Afrikaans speakers, the great majority of 
whom have learnt through the medium of their mother tongue throughout all 
educational levels. If one looks outside of Africa, perhaps the most competent of all 
non-native speakers of English are the citizens of northern European states such as the 
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries who, again, overwhelmingly receive most 
of their education through the medium of their respective mother tongue from primary 
to university levels. Webb (2002: 10) utterly deconstructs and shows the fallacy of the 
argument which advocates the use of English as a medium of instruction for mother-
tongue speakers of African languages (for other discussions of the benefits of mother 
tongue education see Baker and Garcia, 1996; Cummins, 2000; R. Ellis, 1994; 
Macnamara, 1967; UNESCO, 1968). 
It is plain common-sense that cognitive development can only occur in and 
through a language the learner knows very well. Cognitive skills, such as the 
ability to understand the central purpose of a text or to summarise its main line of 
argument, the ability to select information and to organise it into a new coherent 
whole, the ability to discover and formulate generalisations, the ability to 
understand abstract concepts and to manipulate them in arguments, the ability to 
recognise relations between events (e.g. cause and effect) and so on, can only 
develop in and through a language in which learners are highly proficient. 
GeneraJly, such a language is the learner's first (or primary) language. [ ... ] In 
spite of this generaJly accepted view black parents in South Africa 
overwhelmingly prefer English as the language of learning and teaching for their 
children, for the simple reason that English is equated with success and 
opportunity. Parents argue, quite rightly, that their children will only be successful 
in life in South Africa if they know English, since English is the dominant 
language of all public domains in the country. They then argue, wrongly, that the 
only way their children can acquire English effectively is if it is used as language 
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of learning. This is a typical case of putting the cart before the horse: the 
development of cognitive skills does not take place because the language of 
development is not known well enough and English is not acquired because 
learning skills have not been developed adequately. (Webb, 2002a:] 0) 
Research by Desai (2001) undertaken amongst native Xhosa-speaking school children 
in the Cape Town area provides a highly illuminating demonstration of the difficulties 
faced by such students when attempting to perform cognitive tasks through the 
medium of English. The pupils, some from Grade 4 and others from Grade 7, were 
given six picture cards and asked to arrange them in such an order that they told a 
story. They were then asked to write two versions of the story, one in Xhosa and one 
in English. One Grade 4 student produced the following two texts: 
Translation from Xhosa: There was a father (old man) who put his box down, 
conversing with his father. Then a certain young man (brother) appeared and took 
that old man's box and ran away. He was chased by a child and the one blew a 
whistle, and the other one pointed at him. He ran away with it and got into the car 
and drove very fast. The others opened the box and a big snake. The other was 
shocked by the snake and his sunglasses fell down. 
Written in English: Once upon a time 
Long long ago 
Ly Buter uteatsha fourboy late my father 
I taket my tyesi 
I goiu my father is goiu boeke 
Look my boy (cited in Desai, 2001 :333-334) 
Whilst the Xhosa text constitutes a reasonably coherent piece of storytelling for a 
child of that age, the sense of the English text is practically unfathomable. It contains 
several words (Buter, tyesi) that are either in no way identifiable as English or are 
totally irrelevant to the context. Use of the word 'boek~' is possibly a borrowing from 
Afrikaans (it means 'books') although this is only a speculative claim since it is not 
possible to understand the sense in which the term has been employed. The only 
intelligible pieces of English in the text are the first two lines and the final line. 
However, even these lines, and particularly the first two, represent a highly cliched 
and, in this context, rather inappropriate, manner of beginning a story. This is a clear 
indication of the inability of the pupil to think spontaneously and innovatively and to 
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construct original sentences in English. Therefore, with regards to the optimisation of 
the academic performance of the many pupils throughout South Africa who are in a 
similar language-in-education situation to the student discussed above, it seems 
shatteringly obvious that to use English instead of these pupils' mother tongues as a 
medium of instruction at these early stages of education is extremely counter-
productive. The above example clearly demonstrates the spectacular disadvantage at 
which present language-in-education practices place so many students who have an 
African language as their first language. 
The concept of mother tongue, or, preferably, what is perhaps best conceived as 
'primary language' (i.e. the language the individual is most compentent in) education 
is in dire need of rehabilitation in order that it may first be accepted as desirable by, 
and then facilitate the educational empowerment of, black South Africans. 
Theoretically, the language and education clauses of the new constitution permit 
moves towards this rehabilitation but because they are not being usefully 
implemented this does not happen. The most significant factor of all which continues 
to prevent the effective implementation of official language policy remains the 
linguistic ideology of the ruling political elite (see section 4.5.3 below). Elite 
language attitudes in South Africa have facilitated the continued dominance of 
English over the African languages in all domains of education, particularly higher 
education, where the use of African languages as media of instruction is extremely 
low. Afrikaans has also given away some important ground in higher education. The 
traditional Afrikaans-speaking universities, such as the University of Pretoria, the 
University of Stellenbosch and the former Rand Afrikaans University which, after 
having merged with several other institutions, now forms part of the University of 
Johannesburg, are increasingly operating as dual-medium (Afrikaans and English) 
institutions. This is widely attributed to the fact that these historically white 
universities are now welcoming black students, the large majority of whom are not 
native Afrikaans speakers and come from communities with extremely negative 
attitudes towards Afrikaans but highly favourable ones towards English (for an in-
depth discussion of this see section 5.3.1). 
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4.5.2. Language policy and South African national identity 
Evidence suggests that the failure of the post-apartheid regime to properly implement 
its policy of equitable multilingualism has seen a concomitant failure to engender any 
noticeable supralinguistic sense of national identity. Research by Bekker and Leilde 
(2003) has shown that government efforts aimed at identity construction 'from above' 
have had negligible resonance amongst what they call the 'underclass', which they 
define as follows: 'These are South Africans who speak little or no English and who 
live in dense informal settlements on the peripheries of South African cities as well as 
in rural areas (particularly within former homelands), (Bekker and Leilde, 2003: 129). 
They show how members of this underclass display strongly localised identities, i.e. 
restricted to the immediate neighbourhood. Amongst this class there does not even 
seem to be any expression of a sub-state ethnolinguistic identity (the respondents were 
mainly Xhosa speakers), let alone any identification with a wider South African 
nation. 
Members of the underclass appear to draw minimal meaning from public 
participation in the local sphere. Their social exclusion individualises and 
marginalises them. [ ... ] Their strategy, typically expressed in individual terms, is 
one of opting out of civil society. (Bekker and Leilde, 2003: 130-1) 
It seems clear that the present language practices of civil society serve only to further 
marginalise and exclude this underclass. Consequently, members of this underclass 
seem likely to remain almost totally immune to government attempts aimed at the 
construction of a national identity based upon identification with, and recognition of, 
the legitimacy of the state, when this almost exclusively takes place in a language that 
they barely, if at all, understand. 
Bekker and Leilde also undertook research amongst what they call 'Rank-and-File 
South Africans' . According to these researchers, 
this section of society comprises the state and a vibrant civil society, economic 
relations characterised by corporatism, and a dominant cultural ethos we have 
)abeJJed as international ang)ophone. (Bekker and Leilde, 2003: 129) 
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Their research, carried out in the Western Cape, again indicates the importance of the 
local in the construction of identities, although it does also reveal the emergence of a 
weak national identity, which mainly expresses itself through the stigmatisation of 
alien Africans, i.e. black non-South African citizens. Reitzes and Crawhall (1997) 
make similar observations regarding the increased xenophobia towards African 
immigrants in the post-apartheid era. In particular, they identify 
two processes [ ... J currently unfolding around language issues in South Africa. 
The first is the construction of a new national identity in the country. This identity 
is partially being constructed by growing xenophobia and the 'othering' of 
foreigners, particularly people of colour. Some South African citizens have begun 
to portray immigrants as fundamentally 'non-South African', 'foreign' or 'alien'. 
[ ... J The second process is the growing displacement of Afrikaans by English as 
the administrative medium in state departments. This process actually discourages 
multilingual policy development and practice. [ ... ] This weakens commitment to 
multilingualism, thereby fostering the notion of an exclusive national identity. 
(Reitzes and Crawhall, 1997:5-6) 
Such instances of xenophobia, while negative and undesirable, are of significance for 
nation-building. As discussed in chapter two, ethnic/national identities are the 
property of a relationship between groups, that is to say the product of an in-
group/out-group distinction between 'them' and 'us'. For most communities in South 
Africa, throughout the colonial and apartheid eras the 'Other' has always been defined 
in terms of another section of the South African population e.g. Afrikaner against the 
English-speakers, Black against White, Coloured against White etc. The fact that that 
it is foreign immigrants and, in particular, poor, unskilled ones from even poorer 
countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe that are increasingly seen as the 
'Other' may suggest the emergence of some, albeit poorly articulated, latent sense of 
commonality amongst some South African citizens. As Castells (1997:30) states: 
'national identity is always affirmed against the alien'. However, these xenophobic 
reactions cannot, on their own, really be regarded as a sufficient indicator of the 
current existence or, indeed, necessarily as a portent of the future existence of a 
genuine, pervasive, fully developed national identity. 
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Expressions of a (albeit still rather weak) South African national identity seem 
restricted to those South Africans who participate in civil society and the public 
sphere, which is becoming ever more monolingual as Afrikaans increasingly gives 
way to English and the African languages continue to remain highly marginalised. An 
interesting piece of research carried out by Chick (2002) in six schools in the 
predominantly Zulu-speaking province of Kwa-Zulu Natal supports the thesis that a 
linguistically exclusive national identity is emerging in South Africa. Developing the 
idea of language policies as ideological discourses (Blommaert, 2006; Hornberger. 
2000), Chick identifies the dominance of what he terms an 'English-only discourse' in 
the educational environment being studied. He names the assumptions associated with 
this discourse as 
those associated with the subtractive approach to bilingualism, namely that 
learning English should start as soon as possible; that the maintenance of first 
language is not necessary/desirable; and that the best way to acquire English is 
immersion [ ... J English-only discourse also constructs an identity for non-native 
speakers of English who persist in speaking Zulu as language deficient or 
rebellious and for the Zulu language as having low social and economic value 
[ •.. J English-only discourse helps maintain the existing power relationships, 
providing native speakers of English with a distinct advantage in the educational 
realm. (Chick, 2002:469-70) 
The 'English-only' discourse leads to the promotion and reinforcement of a South 
African national identity which Chick describes as 'exclusive, hegemonic and 
conflicted.' While this is certainly a valid conclusion, Chick comes to some curious 
conclusions regarding ANC policy. He rejects the view that ANC policy is consistent 
with the promotion of an English-only discourse by stating that 'the ANC sees the 
promotion of multilingualism rather than of English proficiency as the instrument 
through which a broad South African identity is to be achieved'. Either Chick is 
showing an inordinate, perhaps even naIve, amount of goodwill in taking official 
ANC policy declarations on language at face value or he is working with an 
inadequate notion of discourse, whereby it is defined purely in tenns of what is said 
officially or 'on the record' in policy statements. In the previous chapter (see section 
3.2), the distinction was made between overt and covert language policies and it was 
remarked that when the two are contradictory or in conflict it is covert policies, i.e. 
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language practices, which are generally more revealing and politically influential. In 
contradiction to its 'official' position, the language practices of the ANC strongly 
reinforce an 'English-only', certainly an 'English-mainly', discourse. Evidence of this 
can be found on the ANC website. 16 Apart from a brief overview of the organisation 
entitled 'What is the ANC?' which is translated into all eleven official languages, the 
rest of the website appears to be entirely in English. Even policy documents 
advocating multilingualism and cultural diversity are only available in English. 
Membership forms to join the organisation are also only available in English thereby 
rendering them impenetrable to the majority of black South Africans whom the 
organisation claims to represent. When the president, Thabo Mbeki, speaks in public 
it is very rare for him to ever to do so in a language other than English. This, despite 
the findings of a PANSALB (2001 b: 13) survey which reveals that practically one half 
of South Africans (excluding native English speakers) either 'often do not understand' 
or 'seldom understand' speeches and statements made in English. In a discussion 
document on the 'national question' the ANC mentions the need for a 'critical mass of 
common culture and cultural practices that all South Africans practice and identify 
with' (ANC, 2005). It is very difficult to practise or identify with a language of which 
one has poor or zero knowledge, as is the case for the majority of South Africans with 
regard to the English language. Consequently, this critical mass of common culture 
which the ANC seeks to establish must contain space for more than just one language 
if it is to avoid the effective exclusion of the majority of South African citizens. 
However, the political culture established by the ANC, which has very much become 
the 'mainstream' in South African public life, would seem to contain no such space. 
Therefore, by looking beyond mere 'official' policy we can see that ANC language 
practices (covert policy) very much advance the perception of South African national 
identity as something which is exclusive and elitist. Furthermore, the dominance of 
the ANC's political discourse leads to the widespread acceptance of the notion that 
the exclusive nature of South African national identity is both natural and 
incontestable. 
The construction of anew, common, inclusive national identity depends greatly on the 
ability of South African citizens to identify with, and legitimise the existence of, the 
16 http://www.anc.org.za 
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South African state and its institutions. Those citizens who are linguistically excluded 
from the public space and governed in a language that they have little or no 
competence in, i.e. the majority of South Africans, are unlikely to feel represented by 
the state's institutions. Consequently, it is highly improbable that they will come to 
possess any profound sentiments of shared identity and solidarity with those who are 
able to fully participate in the public life of the state. In contradiction to the 
government's stated policy aims then, early indications from the post-apartheid era 
would seem to point towards the emergence of a linguistically exclusive, i.e. English-
speaking South African national identity. Those who identify with the embryonic, 
state-associated South African 'nation' are, at this present moment, drawn mainly 
from a thin layer of the mostly black, English-speaking middle-class elite (Alexander, 
1999). Bamgbose' s observation that 'the interest of the educated elites who form a 
minority [ ... ] is equated with the interest of the nation' seems particularly relevant in 
the South African context (Bamgbose, 1991: 18). A competent knowledge of English 
appears to serve as an important boundary mechanism in determining the parameters 
of this elite group's identity. Furthermore, given that the elite has an almost exclusive 
access to resources of political and economic power, i.e. the state, which itself 
becomes an important constitutive factor of their group identity, it is not surprising 
that they employ what are frankly authoritarian identity strategies to restrict mass 
membership in their groups (see section 6.3 on authoritarianism in post-apartheid 
South Africa). In this way, the elites' monopoly on these resources of socio-economic 
power can be maintained, which in tum further fortifies the perceived integrity and 
putative situational 'naturalness' of their group identity. In this regard, Neocosmos 
(2004:220) notes correctly that the 'elite constitutes itself as a political unity through 
its melding with state power' . 
4.5.3 'Elite closure' as a barrier to inclusive nation-building 
A common misconception in the South African (and other post-colonial) context is 
that the great attachment of many non-native English-speaking South Africans to the 
English language stems from a purely instrumental motivation, whilst the African 
languages are retained as home or community languages for reasons of identity. 
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While there is certainly a great deal of truth in such reasomng, such a sharp 
instrumentaVidentity distinction, while useful as an analytical construct, ultimately 
provides an inadequate reflection of the complexity of motivations underlying such 
language acquisition and usage (Gardner and Lambert, 1959; Ager, 2(01). A more 
appropriate heuristic device would be a type of continuum, as proposed by L.Wright 
(2004: 177), with instrumental motivations at one extreme and affective/identity 
motivations at the other. To paraphrase Chomsky somewhat, questions of language 
cannot be divorced from questions of power and therefore, questions relating to 
motivations surrounding the acquisition and competent use of English (indeed, any 
language) in South Africa cannot be addressed effectively without recognition of the 
political and socio-economic significance which that language has for the different 
sections of the South African population. 
It goes almost without saying that for many non-native speakers of English in South 
Africa, acquiring competence in English represents a means to an economic end. 
However, to practise this kind of economic reductionism is to overlook the very great 
emotional significance that the English language has come to acquire and the role that 
it plays in processes of identity formation within the black population. The failure to 
undertake the kind of multilingual nation-building envisaged by the South African 
constitution cannot be explained in purely material terms. The economic and political 
dominance of the English language at the expense of the ten other official languages 
is reinforced by a psychological dimension engendered by the colonial history of 
South Africa and which is most readily observable in the linguistic behaviour of the 
present ruling elite. 
Current elite language practices in South Africa are preventing the type of nation-
building envisaged by the South African constitution by continuing to reflect 
language-identity strategies fostered by an 'elite closure' mentality. 'Elite closure' 
refers to the means by which that thin stratum of society which has a stake in the 
allocation and acquisition of power attempts to maintain and reproduce itself as a 
group. According to Myers-Scotton (1993:148), it occurs when 'the elite successfully 
employ official language policies and their own non-formalised language usage 
patterns to limit access of non-elite groups to political position and socio-economic 
advancement'. Elsewhere, Kamwangamalu describes it as 
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'linguistic di_vergence' created as a result of using a language which is only 
known to or preferred by the elite. This divergence may be purposeful, as a 
measure of control [ ... J In order to preserve the privileges associated with 
knowledge of the preferred language, the elite tend to resist any language 
planning efforts which seek to promote the languages of the masses. 
(Kamwangamalu, 2004:253) 
Apartheid-era South Africa obviously provides us with an example par excellence of 
'elite closure.' The ruling Afrikaner elite of the time not only implemented a language 
policy which prevented mass access to channels and resources of power and 
influence, they also erected impenetrable barriers of racial categorisation to ensure 
their continued in-group integrity and political dominance. In theory, anyone can 
learn the language of an elite group but one cannot alter one's biological ancestry and 
skin colour to match. In this way, apartheid policy can be seen as an example of 
almost total elite closure. The end of apartheid in 1994 did not signal the end of 
tendencies towards elite closure in South African society, however. There has merely 
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been the replacement of one political elite (white, Afrikaans-speaking) with another 
(mostly black, English-speaking). This phenomenon has been neatly captured in the 
title of a book by Patrick Bond (2000) - Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-
Liberalism. Clearly, the potential for such an extreme level of elite closure is currently 
less than during the apartheid years because of the constitutional commitments aimed 
at the deracialisation of South African society. Nevertheless, strong tendencies 
towards elite closure still exist, chiefly as a result of the linguistic attitudes and 
practices of the current ruling class and the global economic system with which it is 
strongly integrated. 
Myers-Scotton's definition above may have to be amended slightly in the case of 
South Africa, since it is not the official language policy which perpetuates elite 
closure. Indeed, quite the reverse seems to be true since 'the II-language national 
policy accords not one iota of privilege to English' (L.Wright. 2002:166). Rather, the 
position of the English-speaking South African elite is strengthened by the failure to 
effectively implement the official language policy. Instead, it is covert language 
policy, whether consciously or unconsciously pursued, in combination with prevailing 
language practices and attitudes, which favours the continued dominance of English 
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and permits elite closure to occur. The tendency towards elite closure in South Africa 
is an indication of the lack of active support for the official policy of equitable 
multilingualism, despite the existence of a more widespread passive, 'in-principle'. 
non-committal goodwill, which in reality, does very little to change the status quo. 
Consequently, despite the constitutional provisions to the contrary, a situation of 
severe linguistic inequity persists. 
Linguistic theory and political strategy intersect in a manner that reinforces the 
democratic aspirations of most of the people who constitute the citizens of post-
apartheid South Africa [ ... ] [B]ecause of elite closure, this deep-rooted 
disposition has not prevented the situation from arising in which English is treated 
by most South Africans as the first among equals. (Alexander, 2004: 117-8) 
The South African case may be regarded as quite progressive in one sense, however, 
since in many post-colonial contexts there is not even the pretence of linguistic equity, 
nor any explicitly stated aspiration to achieve it. If native languages are accorded any 
official status it is usually at the sub-state level. Often, however, the only language(s) 
with any official status is the ex-colonial language(s). Botswana represents one such 
example in which the language practices that facilitate elite closure are endorsed by 
constitutional arrangements and official policy. Nyati-Ramahobo observes that 
although Setswana is spoken as a first language by 80% of the population, 
English is the official language of Botswana. It permeates the social, economic 
and cultural lives of all educated Batswana and the government prefers the use of 
English to any other language in the country. [ ... ] English is currently used in the 
judiciary, in administration, in education, and in the business sector. [ ... ] All 
government correspondence and records are in English. All meetings in the civil 
service are conducted and recorded in English. (Nyati-Ramahobo, 2004:30-3] and 
52-53) 
This bias towards English is clearly evident from the following passage from the 
Botswanan constitution. 
A person shall be qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly if, 
and shall not be qualified to be so eJected unless [".] (d) he [sic] is able to speak, 
and unless incapacitated by blindness or other physical cause, to read English we)) 
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enough to under take [sic] an active part in the proceedings of the Assembly. 
(cited in Nyati-Ramahobo. 2004:52) 
This effectively prohibits those who do not have a competent command of English 
from membership of, and representation in, the civil society of the Botswanan state 
and, as such, represents a classic example of elite closure since English is only 
'spoken and read by 40% of the population, mainly by the educated elite living in 
towns' (Nyati-Ramahobo, 2004:53). The fact that Botswana and South Africa display 
very similar language practices despite highly divergent constitutional arrangements 
regarding language usage gives further credence to the view that official language 
policy is largely decorative and ineffective where there does not exist the sufficient 
political will to implement it. 
However, elite closure should not be regarded purely as a phenomenon associated 
with colonial or post-colonial societies. Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 199) make the 
point that some degree of elite closure exists in most polities. In pre-nationalist 
Europe ruling elites frequently spoke linguistic varieties that would have been 
incomprehensible to the vast majority of the populations that they governed 
(S.Wright, 2004:25). Mild forms of elite closure are still observable in most Western 
societies. For example, the use and mastery of a prescriptively defined standardised 
language continues to be characteristic of most Western elites. However, the crucial 
point is that, in Western societies, access to the language of the elite is greatly 
facilitated by the availability of extensive, mass, formal education and the fact that 
there is often a high degree of mutual intelligibility between demotic and elite 
linguistic varieties. Consequently, tendencies towards elite closure are significantly 
countered and mass participation in public/political life becomes more possible. So, 
although technically elite closure may indeed be observable in most polities, it tends 
to occur in its strongest and most deleterious form in colonial or post/neo-colonial 
societies. 
Strong elite closure occurs more frequently in multilingual polities where the 
official language may not be part of the repenoire of many members of society 
and where access to the elite language through schooling is limited. In such 
circumstances, the language used in the educational institutions may have greater 
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power than either the community or official policy. (Kaplan and Baldauf, 
1997:2(0) 
In post-colonial settings, the ruling elites' near exclusive use of the ex-colonial 
language(s) coupled with inadequate educational systems is a highly efficient means 
of preventing mass participation in the political life of the state. The dominance of the 
ex-colonial language-speaking elite is further enhanced by the extremely negative 
attitudes that invariably exist towards the indigenous languages spoken by the large 
majority of the population. Furthermore, it is usually in the interest of these elites to 
propagate such negative attitudes, which they inevitably do, at least implicitly. As 
Mansour highlights in the case of Tunisia: 
Why does the Tunisian elite (and other Third World elites) consider their own 
mother tongue to be inferior? Because it does not provide them with access to 
power, and since the main goal of an elite is to remain in power and give their 
children the same chances, such an attitude is not very surprising. Furthermore, 
they have been brain-washed by western education into believing that this 
inferiority is inherent and cannot be mended. (Mansour, 1993: 102) 
The promotion of the African languages in South Africa is greatly hindered by such 
negative attitudes and internalised inferiority. This is a legacy of the colonial mindset, 
which, to some extent, continues ~o be reproduced by the present regime. In some 
sense, this is unsurprising since the current ruling elite are the descendants of a socio-
economic and identity group born out of, and socialised into, the colonial system. The 
effect of the Bantu Education Act and other apartheid-era legislation in further 
entrenching this colonial mindset, which taught that African languages were incapable 
of being applied to higher order pursuits, should also not be underestimated. President 
Hendrik Verwoerd, for example, writing a policy statement on Bantu Education, was 
of the opinion that there was little point in teaching a black child mathematics when it 
was unlikely to ever use it and that there would be no place for black people 'above 
the level of certain forms of labour' (Verwoerd, 1954:23). Although the idea that 
blacks should not receive training or education to allow them to rise above the lowest 
forms of labour has by now thankfully been comprehensively rejected by all 
mainstream political actors in South Africa, the concomitant idea that their native 
languages should also be developed for use beyond their traditional, low-order 
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domains has not taken hold with equal force. For example, in a private conversation 
with a professor of sociology at a leading South African university I was asked 
rhetorically 'What's the bloody point of teaching mathematics in Zulu?' It would 
seem that genuine sociolinguistic enlightenment is still an elusive, sporadic 
occurrence even amongst many of those most committed to the genume 
democratisation of the country. 
The economic exploitation of the black population by the capitalist colonial system 
also inevitably served to validate the language(s) of the colonial powers as the 
languages of economic prestige and advancement to the detriment of the African 
languages. The South African situation can be seen as slightly exceptional in that 
there were two colonial languages - standard white Afrikaans 17 and English _ 
competing with each other, as well as with the native African languages. However, 
this did not really affect the dynamics of the coloniser-colonised relationship, as the 
majority of blacks had little or no knowledge of either standard Afrikaans or English. 
Yet Afrikaans, because of its direct and blatant association with apartheid, its 
inauspicious origins as a Kombuistaal or 'kitchen vernacular' of Dutch and also 
because of its negligible economic value outside of South Africa, did not acquire any 
great prestige amongst the black population. Indeed, Afrikaans was the subject of 
extreme hostility and loathing which culminated in the Soweto riots of June 1976 (see 
section 5.2). This further increased the prestige of English, which became widely 
viewed as the language of liberation as it was the only language that could seriously 
challenge the dominant position that Afrikaans had come to acquire. However, the 
black elite's preference for English over Afrikaans and the African languages dates as 
far back as the beginning of the 20th century and is itself evidence of that elite's 
intemalisation of the validity of a colonial linguistic hierarchy. For example, in 1902 
Abdullah Abdurahman, president of the African People's Organisation, exhorted the 
black and coloured population to 
endeavour to perfect themselves in English - the language which inspires the 
noblest thoughts of freedom and liberty, the language that has the finest literature 
on earth and is the most universally useful of all languages. Let everyone [ ... J 
17 Known as Aigemeen BeskODfde AfrikODns which translates as 'General Civilised Afrikaans'. 
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drop the habit as far as possible, of expressing themselves in the barbarous Cape 
Dutch that is too often heard. (cited in Adhikari, 1996:8) 
Current language practices in South Africa suggest that the language attitudes of the 
black elite have changed very little in the century or so since Abdurahman wrote these 
words. In this regard then, they must be seen as acquiescing to the stigmatisation of 
the African languages and to the perpetuation of what Alexander refers to as 'Static 
Maintenance Syndrome' which 
debilitates and paralyses most African language speakers. [Static Maintenance 
Syndrome] refers to an attitude of mind, which is prevalent throughout the 
African continent, and which manifests itself as a sense of resignation about the 
perceived and imputed powerlessness of the local or indigenous languages of 
Africa. Most of the people are willing to maintain their primary language in 
family, community and religious contexts but they do not believe that these 
languages have the capacity to develop into languages of power. (Alexander, 
2003: 10-11) 
If the South African government is senous about constructing a fully inclusive, 
supralinguistic national identity, it is incumbent upon it to address this cognitive 
paralysis associated with the African languages and the language attitudes that sustain 
it. Otherwise, the South African nation-building project faces the prospect of going 
further down the path of Western-style assimilationism. 
The ANC elite deploys English as its language of state administration, and has 
effectively promoted Atlantic Charter modernisation and nation-building. The 
ANC's nation-building programme is now grounded in the logic of neoliberal 
globalisation. This nation-building programme promotes both the use of English 
as lingua franca, and de facto assimilationism into an Anglo-American cultural 
and socioeconomic formation. (Louw, 2004:322) 
Currently there are strong tendencies towards linguistic and cultural homogenisation 
at the elite level of South African society and one can see the emergence of a 
linguistically exclusive civic culture. Not only is English becoming ever more 
dominant as the language of public and political life, research has shown that it is also 
beginning to replace African languages as the home language in some black urban 
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families (see De Klerk, 2000; Kamwangamalu, 2003 and 2004b). In addition, 
language shift towards English has also long been recognised as taking place within 
traditionally Afrikaans-speaking so-called 'coloured' communities (Webb, Dirven and 
Kock, 1992:42-43; see section 5.2). These tendencies towards a reduction in linguistic 
diversity in the public sphere and in some (mostly middle-class) private domains 
resemble the way in which certain state-bounded national identities emerged in 
Western Europe. Rokkan identifies the first phase of European state-building as being 
'typically a period of political, economic and cultural unification at the elite level' 
(Rokkan, 1975:572). Indications are that South Africa is going through just such a 
period despite its constitutional commitments to maintain and promote linguistic and 
cultural diversity. Whether the South African government will be able or, indeed, 
willing to take effective measures to combat these trends towards cultural and 
linguistic homogeneity at the state level or will just continue to reproduce 
Eurocentric, assimilationist patterns of national integration remains to be seen. 
However, present indications and historical precedents are not overly encouraging. 
The history of attempts to construct identities through language planning in South 
Africa has largely been one of failure. Language policies have sometimes had an 
effect on identity but generally not in the manner intended. Instead, they have mostly 
generated identities of resistance. 
The success of a state-led nation-building project which adheres to the principles 
expressed in the constitution requires the generation of an inclusive, negotiable, 
project identity of consensus. For such a change to begin to take place, the paralysing 
effects of elite closure must be addressed. This means that language must cease being 
a barrier to participation in the education system and other areas of public life. This 
implores the use of the African languages in all higher domains. Yet, this is a task 
which is faced by numerous daunting obstacles. Not only is one faced with a lack of 
will and incentive on the part of the ruling elite to usher in a system of genuine 
inclusive linguistic democracy - the 'narcissism of the African middle classes' 
(Maphalala, 2000: 150), one also encounters the external pressures of the Western-
style neo-liberal global capitalist economy which influence most significant economic 
and development policies and which are generally unfavourable to the promotion of 
multilingualism (Heugh, 2002a:449). The implicit policy of the ANC government 
which largely obeys the demands of prevailing global economic conditions does not 
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support the kind of interventionist language planning necessary for the emergence of a 
genuinely multilingual political dispensation. Even the widely promoted policy of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is hostile to multilingualism as it is essentially 
a market driven initiative of recruitment to the (mostly English-speaking) middle-
class (L. Wright, 2002: 166; Alexander, 2004: 120; Neocosmos, 2004:225). One might 
equally call it a policy of 'Black Economic Embourgeoisment.' 
It seems increasingly clear that a policy of nation-building that will pay more than 
mere lip-service to the idea of multilingualism requires an alternative model of social 
and economic development to the one presently being pursued in South Africa. 
Nation-building is not a uniform process as it may be attempted by adhering to any 
one of a number of different models and conceptions of nationhood. The normative 
motivations and tendencies behind the current de facto patterns of national integration 
in South Africa are strongly capitalist and elitist and therefore do little to address the 
socio-economic retardation of the vast majority of South African citizens. Unless this 
problem is effectively addressed, and language policy and planning has an important 
role to play in this regard, a situation of rising inequality will continue and the socio-
economic and collective psychological rehabilitation of the non-white population of 
South Africa will remain an increasingly distant prospect. 
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5 Language policy, identity conflict and nation-
building: the case of Afrikaans 
5.1 Introduction 
The most high profile and certainly the most passionate linguistic debate to have 
taken place in post-apartheid South Africa has been that concerning the functions and 
status of Afrikaans. Although Afrikaans has retaineu its de jure status as an official 
state language in the post-apartheid era, it is widely perceived as being the 'great 
loser', in linguistic terms at least, in the transition from separatist white rule to 
universal suffrage and an officially non-racial dispensation in South Africa. The 
position of English, on the other hand, has been greatly strengthened as a consequence 
of these political changes. The elevation of nine indigenous African languages to the 
status of official language alongside Afrikaans and English has meant that Afrikaans 
is no longer privileged as was formerly the case anu this has therefore contributed to 
the undermining of the previously stable. strictly adhered to bilingualism that 
characterised the apartheid years (Van Rensburg. 1999:92). However, the linguistic 
equilibrium between English and Afrikaans that was maintained during the apartheid 
regime has not been undermined through the Llshering in of a truly multilingual 
dispensation as is putatively envisaged by the new South African constitution. 
Instead. it has been replaced by an increasingly monolingual situation in which 
English alone fulfils ever more of the functions that were previously performed 
bilingually. 
It was discussed in the previous chapter how the tacit political ideology and linguistic 
behaviour of the current ruling elite in South Africa endorses the dominance of 
English anu the marginalisation of Afrikaans and the other official languages from the 
public life of the state, in spite of constitutional and other policy commitments to the 
contrary. The most vociferous and organised opposition to this anglicisation of 
political life in South Africa has come from the white Afrikaans-speaking or 
Afrikaner population'S which fears for the future of the Afrikaans language the more 
it becomes removed from public life. Although there does exist a degree of language 
activism within some African language communities, this tends to be on a much 
smaller scale and hence has a much lower political profile than the language activism 
which takes place within the Afrikaner community. The purpose of this chapter is to 
characterise the debate surrounding the present and future position of Afrikaans by 
analysing the various political and linguistic ideologies and strategies which are 
locatable on all sides of the discussion. The Afrikaans issue will then be situated and 
discussed in the context of post-apartheid nation-building. In particular, it will be 
shown how Afrikaans is presented as a problem and an obstacle to national unity by 
the model of national integration presently being pursued by the current ruling regime 
in South Africa. The discussion will focus on how the declining position of Afrikaans 
in certain key linguistic domains such as tertiary education and place names is 
facilitated by the ideology of the ruling ANC government. Finally, the question of 
how a language policy might be conceived with the aim of allowing all Afrikaans 
speakers to make a positive contribution towards nation-building through the medium 
of Afrikaans shall be examined. 
5.2 Characterising the debate surrounding Afrikaans 
The attitudes of most sections of the South African population towards the Afrikaans 
language have historically been characterised by a strong emotional content, both 
positive and negative. Indeed, the strength of emotional feeling towards Afrikaans is 
such that questions and opinions regarding the practical or instrumental values of the 
language have tended to be greatly overshadowed or even ignored, particularly at the 
level of popular, non-academic linguistic and political debate. The depth of the 
taalliefde ('love of the language') felt by Afrikaners towards Afrikaans and which 
was born in resistance to the assimilationist policies of the British (see section 4.3) is 
well known and has been the subject of much Afrikaner nationalist introspection and 
veneration (Swanepoel, 1992:123). The titles (and subsequent contents) of two of the 
18 It should be noted that by no means all white speakers of Afrikaans necessarily regard themselves as 
Afrikaners. Interestingly. research by Bornman (1994) has shown that identification with an ethnic 
Afrikaner identity becomes stronger the more Afrikaans speakers are perceived as being unfairly 
treated. 
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most notable books written on the relationship between the Afrikaners and Afrikaans 
are illustrative of the deep emotional nature of this bond - Die taal is gans die volk _ 
'The language is the entire people' (Zietsman, 1992) and Tuiste in eie taal- 'At home 
in one's own language' (Steyn, 1980). The following words, spoken by a character in 
a novel by Hennie Aucamp, a renowned Afrikaner writer, also sum up the strength of 
feeling many Afrikaners have towards Afrikaans: 'My existence, my identity, my 
core, my everything is locked up in Afrikaans. An existence in another language will 
be second-hand for me' (cited in Steyn, 1980:460). For the Afrikaners, Afrikaans has 
been, and continues to be, the ultimate, non-negotiable symbol and defining content 
of their national identity. The struggle to maintain their language has frequently been 
depicted as a battle for the very survival of the Afrikaners as a distinct people. Indeed, 
the relation between the Afrikaners and Afrikaans has often been portrayed by 
nationalists as one of critical symbiosis despite the fact that the numerical majority of 
mother-tongue Afrikaans speakers are not Afrikaners but the so-called 'coloureds' or 
kleurlinge or bruin mense (literally 'brown people') as they are variously labelled in 
Afrikaans. As one writer has noted, '[ w]ithout Afrikaans no Afrikaner people and 
without the Afrikaner people no Afrikaans (Zietsman, 1992: 1). Statements such as 
this are clearly not of a scientific nature or of dispassionate sociological analysis but 
must instead be seen as part of the affective rhetoric of a nationalist discourse which 
often tends to accompany discussions of the Afrikaans issue. 
In contrast to the fiercely positive sentiments felt by Afrikaners towards their 
language, Afrikaans has historically aroused (often extremely) negative emotions 
amongst other sections of the South African population. Amongst the black 
population Afrikaans became highly stigmatised as a tool of their oppression and as 
the 'language of apartheid' (Senekal, 1984:217). Following the introduction of a 
policy requiring black students to study through the medium of Afrikaans, black 
loathing of Afrikaans and the political culture that it symbolised famously erupted in 
the Soweto uprising of 1976 in which banners bearing such slogans as 'Kill 
Afrikaans', 'We are not Boers' and 'If we must do Afrikaans Vorsterl9 must do Zulu' 
were carried by protesters (Hartshorne, 1992: 195-205; Zietsman, 1992:200-201; 
Giliomee, 2003:578-580). Another memorable slogan associated with the uprising 
J9 B.J. Vorsler. former National Party leader and Prime Minister from 1966-1978. 
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was 'liberation before education' indicating that the rejection of Afrikaans was not so 
much concerned with the (potential) educational value of the language per se. Instead, 
resistance to the learning of Afrikaans was an act of ideological, symbolic resistance 
to the whole policy of apartheid. Apartheid policy became inseparable and almost 
conceptually indistinct in the popular psyche from Afrikaans, the language through 
which it was largely formulated and administered. In so far as the popular perception 
of the relationship between Afrikaans and apartheid is concerned, Van Rensburg's 
(1999:87) observation that 'there is a close connection between a language and the 
government that accords it official status' is a model of understatement. 
The privileging of the white standard variety of Afrikaans (Algemeen Beskaafde 
Afrikaans) by the apartheid system has also succeeded in creating highly uneasy, 
ambivalent attitudes towards the language amongst the mixed-race or so-called 
'coloured' community, around 90% of whom speak Afrikaans as their first language. 
For the coloured population, it was their own mother tongue (or, at least, the 
externally determined standardised variety of it) that became the linguistic vehicle of 
their oppression under apart~eid. It undoubtedly inculcated a sense of linguistic 
inferiority and alienation amongst the non-white speakers of non-standard varieties of 
Afrikaans. Van den Heever writes of the coloured Afrikaans-speaking youth that they 
still don't see the eie20, the I in Afrikaans. In Standard Afrikaans they still see the 
Boer language of the apartheid order which they must learn against their will in 
order to gain their matriculation qualification. (Van den Heever, 1988: I) 
Esterhuyse (1986:36-40) shows how apartheid-era Afrikaans dictionaries reflected 
Afrikaner dominance and the racist apartheid ideology through an overtly negative 
representation of the coloured population and a generally sympathetic, favourable 
representation of the Afrikaners. Esterhuyse makes a comparison of the entries under 
Kleurling and Boerlboer in the Verklarende Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse 
Taal (Explanatory Dictionary of the Afrikaans Language). 
Coloured is used as a determiner together with some sixteen core words. of which 
the overwhelming majority are pejorative. or with created terms which give 
20 An Afrikaans word. literally meaning 'owness·. i.e. 'the peculiar character of one's own self: 
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linguistic stature to the political manoeuvres of the dominant Afrikaner group in 
the speech community. In contrast, the extensive number of entries under 
Boerlboer offers the image of a group which has elevated its own culture and 
language to normative status. [ ... ] With regard to the entries under these two 
words, it is clear that the dictionary makers are working completely within the 
apartheid paradigm. (Esterhuyse, 1986:39-40) 
Perhaps the most revealing entry is that of Boeretaal (Boer language) which is 
defined by the dictionary makers simply as 'Afrikaans'. This is most definitely not a 
politically unbiased definition since it creates the impression that Afrikaans is only the 
language of the Boers. It represents an attempt to systematically exclude coloured 
speakers from membership in the Afrikaans speech community by claiming, in effect, 
that the Afrikaans spoken by the Boers is the only normatively valid variety of the 
language. A more accurate, objective definition of Boeretaal would be something 
along the lines of 'the variety of Afrikaans spoken by the white, Afrikaner population 
of South Africa, commonly known as Algemeen Beskaafd Afrikaans'. 
Language standardisation may be instrumentally motivated (Ager, 2001; Gellner, 
1983) but it also serves an important ideological symbolic function. The 
standardisation of Afrikaans served the Afrikaner ideology (or myth) of in-group 
homogeneity, frequently styled in terms of racial purity, by excluding and denigrating 
the varieties spoken by coloured speakers of Afrikaans. 
Coloured Afrikaans is crude of tone [ ... J To be sure, there are individual 
differences and degrees of coarseness but we can nevertheless not escape from the 
verdict that Coloured Afrikaans seems to come from another sphere of life and is 
the mouthpiece of a very primitive and emotional sense of life [ ... ] It seems that, 
in comparison with Boer-Afrikaans, a value of ill-mannerliness and crudeness 
attaches itself to Coloured Afrikaans. (Nienaber, 1942:xxx) 
Afrikaner prejudice towards coloured speakers of Afrikaans and the coloured 
population's reciprocal feelings of suspicion towards, and alienation from, the 
Afrikaners has a long pre-apartheid history (Steyn, 1980:264-283). However, it was 
undoubtedly the apartheid division of Afrikaans speakers into a formalised, state-
sanctioned racial hierarchy that had the greatest influence in preventing the language 
from serving as a positive symbol and expression of ethnolinguistic consciousness for 
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the coloured population in the way that it did for the Afrikaners. A consequence of the 
coloured community's difficult relationship with Afrikaans, combined with the socio-
economic allure of the English language, has been a widely remarked upon, long-term 
language shift away from Afrikaans towards English, particularly in urban areas of 
the Western Cape. 
Among so-called Coloureds, especially, there is a marked language shift taking 
place out of Afrikaans into English so that whereas older middle-class Coloured 
people speak Afrikaans to one another, they tend increasingly to rear their 
children in English. (Alexander, 1989:57) 
The course of the modern history of South Africa has resulted in a situation whereby 
often antagonistic affective attitudes towards Afrikaans have come to represent 
politically significant elements of the group identities of the different ethnic and racial 
groups that make up the South African population. 10rdaan highlights what she 
describes as 
the two most important and largely opposing myths surrounding Afrikaans. 
namely: 
'Afrikaans, language of the Afrikaner' as embodied within the context of 
Afrikaner nationalism, above all during the first fifty years of the last century; and 
'Afrikaans, language of the oppressor', above all as manifested during the period 
of institutionalised Apartheid (1948-1994). (Jordaan. 2004:23) 
Given the deep emotive nature of the Afrikaans issue, it is not surprising that any 
attempt to promote, restrict or marginalise the language through the (non) 
implementation of language policy and planning measures is often experienced as a 
threat to the identity of one group or another. It is quite obviously inconceivable that 
the Afrikaners could ever regain the political power that they possessed during the 
apartheid years. However, on an irrational, emotional level Afrikaner attempts to 
promote and maintain their language and attendant culture may dredge up painful 
reminiscences and insecurities in the collective psyche of the non-white population in 
South Africa related to the oppression they suffered during apartheid. Equally, 
policies (both explicit and implicit) inspired by attitudes of indifference or hostility 
towards the fate of Afrikaans on the part of the mostly black, present ruling elite in 
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South Africa are interpreted by many Afrikaners as a grave attack upon the core 
element of their ethnocultural identity. Swanepoel (1992: 125) notes that emotionally 
instigated action on language questions frequently leads to a state of language 
conflict. The sociolinguistic histories of countries such as Belgium, Canada or India 
are testament to the often highly emotionally charged nature of language conflicts 
(Baetens Beardsmore, 1980; Nelde, 1997; Schiffman, 1996). Given the contrasting 
emotions towards the language, it is clear that there is also high potential for language 
conflict over the issue of Afrikaans in South Africa. Language conflict may not just 
be about symbolic or identity issues of course. Economic and other instrumental 
factors may also be causes of conflict. However, language conflicts which arise, or are 
concentrated, around the emotional, symbolic dimension of identity and in which 
some element of symbolic prestige is at stake are often the most intractable since 
actors in such disputes may be less likely to entertain or adopt rational, dispassionate, 
fact-influenced modes of thought and behaviour. Senekal (1984:217), writing on the 
Afrikaans issue, makes the pertinent observation that 'uncontrolled emotions, fire and 
stone-throwing [ ... ] offer no sol ution to language questions'. 
In this regard, Swanepoel (1992: 129) goes on to mention the 'ABC' theory of 
emotional disturbance advanced by cognitive therapist and pioneer of 'Rational 
Behaviour Therapy' Albert Ellis (Ellis, 2004) and he then shows how it may be of 
relevance to instances of language conflict. Swanepoel summarises the ABC theory as 
follows: 
It is rarely the stimulus, A, which gives rise to a human emotional reaction, C. 
Rather, it is almost always B - the individual's beliefs regarding, attitudes toward, 
or interpretations of A - which actually lead to his reaction, C. (Swanepoel, 
1992:129) 
Indeed, this theory can provide us with some useful insight into both the nature and 
extent of the actions taken, and the opinions formed, on the basis of emotional 
reactions to questions of language. Applied to the matter of language conflict, this 
theory would seem to suggest that the emotional, irrational behaviour of actors in a 
language conflict situation leads them to adopt a distorted interpretation of the 
objective empirical reality of the situation which proceeds to manifest itself in the 
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form of an emotional disturbance at the group level. One would presumably imagine 
this distorted interpretation takes the form of an amplification of the negative or 
sinister characteristics of the opposing side and an overestimation of the positive 
virtues and motivations of one's own side - a form of binary 'othering' so common to 
many nationalist discourses (Eriksen, 2002: 19; GOl, 2005; I. Young, 1993). 
Consequently, this renders the persistence and intensification of language conflict 
more probable because appropriately measured, mutually acceptable solutions are less 
likely to be formulated and then implemented. The current debate surrounding 
Afrikaans suffers greatly from this problem. For example, Vic Webb, a prominent 
South African sociolinguist, notes that: 
In general the language debate, including the debate over Afrikaans is at a 
relatively low level. Opinions are either over-emotional or uninformed and you 
hear the same prescriptions over and over. (Webb, 2004b) 
The following discussion aims to show how emotionally governed responses on all 
sides of the debate regarding the status and role of Afrikaans exacerbate the potential 
for language conflict by promoting exclusive, oppositional ideological discourses and 
prevent the debate from focusing upon discussion of the potential instrumental values 
of the language. This leads to a situation in which effective remedial prescriptions are 
either not made or go unheeded because available factual evidence is routinely 
undervalued or even ignored. As a result of this, the prospects of Afrikaans speakers 
making a substantial and meaningful contribution to the creation of a fully-inclusive, 
multilingual South African national identity through the medium of Afrikaans remain 
greatly diminished. 
5.3 The problematisation of Afrikaans 
As seen in section 4.5, the South African constitution theoretically allows for anyone 
of the eleven official languages to be a medium through which a South African 
national identity may be expressed. However, due to the great mainstream dominance 
of the political culture shaped and maintained by the ANC, a consequence of which is 
the ANC's de facto monopolisation with regard to the detennining of which cultural 
symbols and practices may be termed 'national', languages other than English are 
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prevented from making their proportional contributions towards nation-building. 
Because of the overwhelmingly monolingual ideology of the ANC, the use and 
promotion of languages other than English at the national or state level is experienced 
by the ANC as a threat to its de facto preferred assimilationist model of national 
integration. Consequently, languages other than English are, in reality, presented as 
problematic and as obstacles to the realisation of the type of national identity the ANC 
is trying to promote. This is most extreme and most readily observable in the case of 
Afrikaans. The extremity of the problematisation of Afrikaans can be largely 
attributed to the fact that the current political order in South Africa arose out of a long 
struggle for liberation from the oppressive rule of the mostly Afrikaans-speaking 
white population. The feeling still lingers amongst many that the linguistic interests of 
the Afrikaners are at odds with the interests of those wishing to build a new, united 
South Africa. As one writer has noted: 'It has been stated openly [presumably by 
individuals loyal to the ANC] that Afrikaans is the price that Afrikaners will have to 
pay for Apartheid' (Krog, 1998:99). 
The linguistic interests of the Afrikaans-speaking coloured population are rarely 
countenanced in the mainstream debate over the issue of Afrikaans. The impression 
that the Afrikaans issue is purely an Afrikaner issue very much persists (Kriel, 2(02). 
The reason for this is simply that it is white Afrikaans speakers who have challenged 
and disputed the linguistic ideology of the ANC most insistently and with the greatest 
degree of political organisation and media coverage and debate. This can be seen from 
some of the statistics regarding language activism and media coverage of language 
rights issues within different linguistic communities in South Africa. For example, T. 
Du Plessis (2004: 180) reports that between April 1994 and March 2002, 60.5% of the 
complaints made against public and state organisations regarding issues of language 
rights were in relation to Afrikaans. Du Plessis also notes that of the 207 newspaper 
articles concerning language rights which appeared in the same period, 85% appeared 
in Afrikaans papers and just 15% in English papers. Another pertinent statistic is that 
concerning instances of litigation over language rights. In the period April 1994-
March 2002, 60.9% of all cases of language rights litigations were made in 
connection with Afrikaans. No complaints or litigations by aggrieved English 
speakers were recorded during this period. Although no figures are given regarding 
the race of those making complaints and litigations, one can reasonably assume that 
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the large majority of those made in connection with Afrikaans were made by white 
Afrikaans speakers. These figures serve to illustrate the disproportionately high rate of 
language activism amongst the white Afrikaans-speaking community in comparison 
with other, even more marginalised, linguistic groups in South Africa. 
Some Afrikaans language organisations and activists have, though, sought to combat 
the perception that they are simply just Afrikaner organisations by promoting the idea 
of a single, inclusive Afrikaans community (Kriel, 2(02). This may be seen as part of 
an on-going attempt to 'de-ethnicise' language (see section 2.2.2), a phenomenon 
which has been witnessed in other contexts around the globe, such as Quebec (Oakes 
and Warren, 2007). The suspicion remains, though, that attempts to de-ethnicise a 
particular language merely seek to legitimise otherwise politically incorrect or 
unpopular nationalisms through the diverting appropriation of a universalist civic 
discourse. Whether a language such as Afrikaans can be stripped of all ethnic bias and 
association in the South African context is highly doubtful. For example, the 
influential Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuun1ereniginge (Federation of Afrikaans 
Cultural Bodiesi l claims to promote 'Afrikaans' culture (Afrikaanse kultuur) and to 
work in the interests of a single 'Afrikaans' community (Afrikaanse gemeenskap), as 
if such a thing existed, in order to avoid accusations of racial exclusivity. Since the 
organisation officially opened its membership to all Afrikaans speakers, regardless of 
race, in 1990 (Zietsman, 1992:204), references to the racially exclusive term 
Afrikaner, whether as a noun or adjective, are noticeably rarer in contemporary FAK 
literature and press releases. However, the notion that the FAK is a purely Afrikaans 
language body rather than an Afrikaner organisation defies credibility. Firstly, the 
organisation's headquarters are located within the grounds of that great shrine of 
Afrikaner nationalism - the Voortrekker Monument, located just outside of Pretoria -
surely no coincidence. Secondly, if one looks at the pictures of the FAK directors on 
the organisation's website, one does not see a single non-white face amongst them. 
The aura of racial exclusivity that organisations such as the FAK fostered during the 
apartheid years is not something that will be easily shed. As Brand notes: 
21 http://wwwJak.org.za 
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[T]raditional Afrikaans organisations such as the FAK and the AKTV22 cannot act 
_ as network organisations to unite the whole Afrikaans community because, rightly 
or wrongly, these organisations are still associated with the old Afrikaner 
establishment. (Brand, 2(04) 
All of this has helped towards the creation of the widespread perception that 
dissatisfaction with ANC language policy resides if not solely, then to quite a 
considerable extent, within the Afrikaner community and, indeed, there would seem 
to be some supporting evidence for this view. For instance, a survey carried out by 
PANSALB (2001b) amongst 2160 South Africans drawn from all social categories 
reveals that 14% of all respondents were dissatisfied with the official treatment of 
their language. Amongst the Afrikaans speakers questioned, this figure rose to 32%. 
This in tum feeds the perception that demands for the implementation of language 
rights for Afrikaans speakers constitute the continuation of ethnic-based politics, 
traditionally anathema to the ANC, on the part of the Afrikaners. The ANC is then 
able to exploit this by styling Afrikaner language activism as a threat to the otherwise 
supposedly universal consensus regarding the linguistic identity of the South African 
nation that it seeks to fashion. As Pillay (2005:71) notes: 'The Mbeki government 
[ ... ] has tended to treat all Afrikaner recognition claims, whether about language or a 
Volkstaat, as threatening to the sovereignty of its nation-building project'. The 
widespread popular suspicion that white Afrikaans speakers who express 
dissatisfaction with the increasing marginalisation of Afrikaans serve, albeit perhaps 
covertly, an anti-statist Afrikaner nationalist agenda, while perhaps understandable 
given the historical sensitivity of the issue, is nevertheless difficult to prove or 
disprove in individual cases. Certainly, there is still a vocal nationalist element within 
the Afrikaner community opposed to the current political dispensation in South 
Africa. Yet, many Afrikaans language activists, such as the Groep van 63 (an 
organisation consisting mainly of white Afrikaans-speaking academics), have denied 
pursuing ethnonationalist interests and have affirmed their commitment to the 
political principles expressed in the post-apartheid constitution (Laurence, 2(03). It 
appears, however, that not all are prepared to take such assurances at face value and it 
is likely that while the vast majority of language activism on behalf of Afrikaans 
22 Afrikaanse TaaJ- en Kulluurvereniging (Afrikaans language and culture union). 
http://www.aktv.org.za 
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continues to be conducted by white Afrikaans speakers, and particularly by academics 
from institutions that were formerly pillars of the apartheid system, the suspicion that 
the language of minority rights and linguistic pluralism is merely being appropriated 
in order to mask more sinister political intentions is likely to persist (Kriel, 2006). 
The perception that all language activism on behalf of Afrikaans serves a racially 
divisive Afrikaner nationalist agenda has actually also meant that the potential of non-
white Afrikaans speakers to contribute towards nation-building through the medium 
of Afrikaans has also been seriously compromised. This is most evident when one 
considers the policy of the ANC regarding the medium of instruction in the 
historically Afrikaans-medium universities - a clear example of an emotionally 
charged policy with an overtly symbolic and defensive identity-related agenda rather 
than a policy which pays due heed to sociolinguistic and socio-political fact. 
5.3.1 Afrikaans as a barrier? The anglicisation of the historically 
Afrikaans-medium universities 
During the apartheid regime there were five single-medium Afrikaans, white-only, 
indisputably Afrikaner, universities in South Africa - the University of Stellenbosch, 
the University of Pretoria, the University of the Free State (formerly Orange Free 
State), the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education and the Rand 
Afrikaans University in Johannesburg, while the University of Port Elizabeth operated 
as a bilingual English-Afrikaans institution. However, in the post-apartheid era the 
linguistic and racial character of these universities has undergone quite a drastic 
transition. Obviously, none of these universities could have reasonably hoped to 
remain white-only institutions following the demise of apartheid nor, to be fair, did 
they express any overt wish to do so. Indeed, it was an immovable demand of the 
ANC that all previously white-only educational establishments be opened up to 
students of all races and that they take into account the linguistic preferences of their 
students when deciding on the language(s) of instruction (Giliomee, 2003:644). And, 
indeed, many former Afrikaner universities appear to have fallen into line with such 
requirements. For example, the University of Pretoria, according to its official 
language policy, now recognises, amongst other things, 'the right of every individual 
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to receive tuition at a tertiary institution via the medium of the official language or 
languages or his or her choice' and also affirms 'the principle that a language policy 
may not cause any persons to be denied reasonable access to higher education' 
(University of Pretoria, 2002). 
In reality, this has meant that by welcoming growing numbers of black students and 
because of acute political pressure from above, formerly single-medium Afrikaans 
institutions are increasingly having to operate as dual or parallel-medium institutions. 
offering classes in English in addition to, or alongside, those in Afrikaans since 
English is overwhelmingly the language of instruction favoured by black students. 
The extent to which English has entered into the historically Afrikaans universities is 
illustrated by the following figures from the University of Pretoria. In 1995, 70.8% of 
students at the university chose Afrikaans as their medium of instruction, while just 
29.2% chose English. By 2001, these figures had changed to 53% and 47% 
respectively (Webb, 2002b:50). 
This anglicisation of the historically Afrikaans universities has led to a situation 
which has generated widespread discontent amongst many Afrikaans-speaking 
students and academics who claim and fear that the increased use of English in these 
institutions will increasingly diminish and marginalise the role of Afrikaans to the 
extent that its status as a language of higher education will be seriously threatened 
which, in tum, will signal the end of Afrikaans as a public language. One 
commentator has remarked that '[t]he greatest danger for education in Afrikaans lies 
at the university level' (Beeld, 21109/2006) Indeed, it is quite realistic to expect that 
the impact of choices concerning the issue of medium of instruction at the university 
level will reverberate throughout the whole educational system. Alexander (2001 b:6), 
for instance, warns of a 'backwash effect', highlighting the fact that the social prestige 
of universities is such that lower-stage educational institutions are liable to imitate 
many of their practices. One could imagine some of the possible arguments that might 
surface as a result of this backwash effect. For example, something along the lines of 
'if the use of language X is not deemed suitable or desirable for use in universities, 
why should it be used in schools and if it is not suitable for use in schools, why should 
it be used for any important public functions at all?' If one gets trapped in a spiral of 
pursuing such damaging logic, it is easy to see how certain languages can become 
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highly stigmatised. This insight underlines the potential significance of the medium of 
instruction issue for the whole linguistic landscape of public life in South Africa. 
There are also fears that the increasing anglicisation of the historically Afrikaans 
universities will lessen the quality of the education service that they provide. For 
example, Webb (2002b:50) reports that a 'sizeable number' of Afrikaans-speaking 
staff members at the University of Pretoria are not sufficiently proficient in English to 
teach effectively through it. Giliomee and Schlemmer (2001 :2) summarise the 
dilemma facing the historically Afrikaans universities as follows: 
For the historically Afrikaans universities the core of the problem is how they 
adapt their medium of instruction policy without losing their power to attract 
promising students that pay regularly and want to study in Afrikaans. The 
universities want to continue using Afrikaans as a medium of instruction as well 
as maintaining their Afrikaans character and to join in with new commitments to 
accessibility, non-racialism and service to the whole society. (Giliomee and 
Schlemmer, 200 1:2) 
Once agam, it is interesting to note how Gilomme and Schlemmer refer to the 
maintenance of the 'Afrikaans' and not 'Afrikaner' character of the universities in a 
politically correct attempt to emphasise the multiracial background of Afrikaans 
speakers despite the fact that these universities very much had an Afrikaner character 
in the past and are still widely perceived as having so today. The ANC's oft-repeated 
argument for forcing this change in language practices in these universities and other 
fonnerly monolingual Afrikaans educational establishments is that language 
requirements may not be used to exclude students from formerly disadvantaged 
groups (i.e. non-white) from any higher education institution in the way that racial 
categorisation had excluded them from so many educational establishments during 
apartheid. The government's National Plan for Higher Education of February 2001 
contained the following statement: 
[AJlthough the historically white Afrikaans-medium institutions are gradualJy 
moving towards the adoption of a combination of dual and parallel-medium 
language strategies. language continues to act as a barrier to access at some of 
these institutions. This is especially the case at the undergraduate level within 
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some of the universities. [ ... ] This is unacceptable and cannot continue. 
(Government of South Africa, 2(01) 
The implication here is of course that Afrikaans excludes non-white students whereas 
English includes them. But just how far does this idea stand up to factual scrutiny? In 
truth, the answer is not very far at all. Firstly, it completely overlooks the fact that 
Afrikaans is the mother tongue of over 90% of the three million or so 'coloured' 
citizens of South Africa who, as Giliomee and Schlemmer (200 1: 121) point out, 
comprise the most educationally backward and disadvantaged group in the land. They 
note that between 1991 and 1997 the proportion of coloured students amongst all 
students graduating from a South African university fell from 6.7% to 5.3% despite 
the fact coloured people make up 8.9% of the total South African population. It is 
quite apparent, then, that accessibility to higher education has not been facilitated for 
the coloured population as a whole through the increasing presence of English in the 
former Afrikaans universities. Admittedly, though, it is also difficult to ascertain to 
what degree these statistics can be explained as the result of the muscling in of 
English into former Afrikaans-only institutions. A wide range of other, non-linguistic 
social and economic factors must also be taken into consideration. However, the 
argument that the maintenance of Afrikaans-only educational institutions acts as a 
barrier to accessibility is patently absurd when applied to the coloured population. If 
anything, the increasing anglicisation of these institutions is far more likely to block 
access since English is a language that the coloured population as a whole is 
considerably less familiar with, and less competent in, than Afrikaans - according to 
Gough (1996:ix), in the 1991 census, only 51 % of the coloured population indicated a 
'speaking knowledge' of English23• Indeed, it is the case that coloured speakers of 
Afrikaans stand to lose most from the increasing marginalisation of Afrikaans in 
higher education since Afrikaners are, on the whole, able to function quite effectively 
in English. English is generally not the great barrier to accessibility for most 
Afrikaners in the way that it is for the more disadvantaged non-white population. 
If Afrikaans is forced out at the university level, the young white middle-class 
Afrikaners will be able to move into English language institutions, here [i.e South 
Africa] or abroad, comparatively easily. The case for the maintenance of 
23 Unfortunately. subsequent censuses have not included data on speaking competence. 
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Afrikaans is much more about the needs of the academically undeveloped brown 
(and white, as well as some black) Afrikaans-speaking communities. (Schlemmer 
and Giliomee, 2001: 132) 
It is almost certain that the ANC does not have the coloured population wholly in 
mind when it invokes the 'barrier to accessibility' argument to attack the medium of 
instruction policies of Afrikaans-only, or even Afrikaans-mainly, institutions. After 
all, the coloured community has not traditionally been particularly supportive of the 
ANC. In the first post-apartheid general election in 1994, only 27% of the .coloured 
electorate voted for the ANC, a level of support which has remained fairly constant in 
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the decade or so since (Giliomee, 2003:647). Political parties inevitably pursue 
policies which please and find support amongst their most significant power base(s). 
In the ANC's case, this power base is overwhelmingly the black African population, 
81 % of whom voted for it in 1994, compared with just 3% of white voters. Therefore, 
when the ANC talks of improving accessibility to higher education through 
combating linguistically exclusive practices, it is obviously primarily the black 
population on whose behalf it is implicitly speaking. The belief that Afrikaans is an 
exclusive, white man's language, whereas English is the language of universal 
inclusion is undoubtedly a strong one amongst sections of the black population. 
However, again, empirical analysis of the sociolinguistic facts at hand soon uncovers 
the falsity of this belief. For example, the 2001 Census shows that Afrikaans is the 
home language (and therefore one can reasonably assume in most cases the first 
language or language best understood) of over 250,000 black Africans while English 
is only the home language of around 180,000. Furthermore, Afrikaans is spoken as a 
second, third or even fourth language by approximately nine million black people, 
often to a far higher level of competence than English (Van Rensburg, 1999:85). This 
is particularly true in some of the northern and more rural regions of the country such 
as the provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga where native speakers of English 
comprise only a tiny fraction of the population (according to the 2001 Census, English 
is the home language of 0.5% of the population in Limpopo and of 1.7% in 
Mpumalanga) and the presence of English is considerably less than in the large urban 
areas and coastal regions. These areas also contain some of the most isolated and 
deprived communities in the country. 
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In a press conference in 2002, the chainnan of the Pan South African Language Board 
- the body created to promote the linguistic principles expressed in the South African 
constitution - made the remark that 'we need to promote the spread of lingua francas' 
(Kumalo, 2002:3). Indeed, it has been shown that the development of a common 
national identity depends greatly on the ability of citizens to be able to speak to each 
other through the creation of a 'community of communication' (S. Wright, 2000a). 
Many languages presently already serve important communicative functions between 
the different linguistic communities in South Africa. White South Africans normally 
communicate with each other through English or Afrikaans, many being functionally 
bilingual, particularly native Afrikaans speakers who are more likely to switch to 
English than English speakers are to Afrikaans. Afrikaans, and to a lesser extent 
English, also serve as the communicative bridge between the coloured and white 
communities, being not so much lingua franc as as shared mother tongues. English is 
overwhelmingly the most common means of communication between the Asian, 
white and coloured communities. Amongst the black population, which is by far the 
most linguistically diverse section of the population, numerous languages serve as 
communicative bridges. Some languages, such as Fanakolo which is a Zulu-based 
pidgin variety used mainly in the mining industry (Adendorff, 2(02), occupy highly 
specific niches. The high level of multilingualism within the black population and the 
fact that many of the African languages are mutually intelligible to a reasonably high 
degree has entailed a situation whereby it is rare for any two black South Africans to 
be unable to communicate effectively with each other. Which particular language is 
used as the communicative bridge depends both on the linguistic origin of the 
respective speakers and their geographical location. Zulu is probably the widest 
known of the African languages followed by Xhosa, although in Pretoria, for 
example, it is Northern Sotho which serves as the most common medium of linguistic 
exchange between blacks. The greatest communicative gaps in South African society 
are between the black population and the rest of the population, i.e. white, coloured 
and Asian. Knowledge of the African languages outside of the black population is 
miniscule and knowledge of English and Afrikaans within the black population. while 
much greater and widespread, is often poor and insufficient for anything more than 
the most basic of communicative requirements. Therefore, it is between these 
communities that a lingua franca or bridge language is in most urgent need of 
promotion. It is obvious that the only language currently being promoted as a lingua 
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franca and de facto national language by ANC policy is English which is (falsely) 
styled as an ethnically neutral means of nationwide communication. The 
communicative value of Afrikaans is either generally ignored or denied. However, 
Conradie (2004) shows that within South Africa, Afrikaans would seem to have great 
potential to serve as a linguistic bridge between the various population groups, 
particularly in the workplace and in other lower level social domains. 
Afrikaans [has] a strong local mother-tongue base, its vocabulary and associated 
culture is strongly South Africa orientated, the language itself the result of 
grammatical simplification and speakers are accommodating in the use of their 
language in contact situations r ... ] [B]etween Afrikaans and other-language 
speakers Afrikaans has a strong position as a contact language at basic levels of 
communication. Afrikaans can therefore empower speakers at higher as well as 
lower levels and can be used across a wide social spectrum from being a language 
of science, education and administration to everyday communication, for example 
in work situations. (Conradie, 2004: 154) 
In this respect then, Afrikaans could potentially be seen, by those concerned with 
maximising levels and efficiency of linguistic exchange, as suitable for playing a 
complementary role to English in the form of a diglossic relationship with it 
(Ferguson, 1959; Fishman, 1967), since English is the most common, indeed 
increasingly exlcusive, lingua franca for 'higher' functions and at the elite level of 
South African society in general. Moreover, advocacy of Afrikaans as a language of 
inter-ethnic and inter-racial communication may allow for the language to become 
uncoupled from its association with Afrikaner nationalism which would then provide 
far more favourable circumstances for it to make a positive contribution towards 
nation-building. However, this is prevented from happening because of the ANC's 
continued ideological infatuation with the English language, something which has the 
effect of utterly stifling the potential of Afrikaans and the African languages to be 
used as resources for the promotion of social development and national integration. 
Inherent in the 'Afrikaans excludes, English includes' argument is an overestimation 
of the ability of much of the black population to function effectively in English (see 
section 4.5.1). The comparatively extremely high drop-out and failure rate of black 
students, many of whom study solely through the medium of English, particularly at 
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the tertiary level, highlights this fact although, of course, this phenomenon cannot be 
attributed solely to linguistic factors. Judging purely in terms of the linguistic 
competence of students from previously disadvantaged communities (i.e. non-white 
communities), the 'Afrikaans excludes, English includes' argument is difficult to 
sustain with any conviction or credibility. In terms of the linguistic competence of 
such students, Afrikaans would seem to be no more exclusive than English. Indeed, 
Afrikaans may even have credible claims to be potentially more inclusive of 
previously disadvantaged communities than English since it is the mother tongue of 
the great majority of the coloured population and of significantly more black people 
than English. The real exclusionary and failure-inducing factor in South African 
education, of course, is the extreme absence of the African languages as media of 
instruction at most levels of post-primary education. Yet, this rather obvious fact 
remains largely unacknowledged at the governmental level, the ostensible reason for 
which being that, in a spirit of individual liberty and human rights, the government is 
anxious not be seen to be prescribing citizens' linguistic behaviour. 
Liberal capitalist economies, of which South Africa is undoubtedly one, supposedly 
thrive upon the maximisation of operational efficiency. In so far as language policy 
and planning impacts upon economic activity and vice-versa (Grin, 1999; 2(06), such 
economies would seem to require that language policies operate as efficiently as 
possible. That is to say that the money and time involved in educating citizens should 
ideally see a profitable return by maximising their potential to contribute to the 
vitality and prosperity of the economy, notwithstanding the implementation of certain 
other necessary or desirable, although possibly cost-inducing, language planning 
measures. A policy of English-only or English-mainly education for black students 
which sidelines their mother tongues, implicitly rejects Afrikaans and which is very 
often conducted by unqualified teachers, many of whom have an unsatisfactory 
competence in English and have insufficient teaching resources available to them, is 
clearly highly inefficient (Y.Young, 1995:107-8). Consequently, the South African 
educational system generates a large amount of waste in the form of high levels of un-
or underqualified students. As Alexander has observed: 
[U)nless we tackle the issue aggressively. we are dooming countless generations 
of South Africans. especially black South African youth. to a destiny of 
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mediocrity and failure. For, we cannot repeat often enough the paradoxical fact 
that the only children in South Africa who are the beneficiaries of mother-tongue 
education from the cradle to the university are first language speakers of English 
and many first language speakers of Afrikaans. And every single year the results 
show up in the Matriculation examination results as we]] as in the disastrous drop-
out rates which render most of our learners functiona]]y ilJiterate. If nothing else, 
the economic costs of the system manifest in the bi1Jions of Rands wasted 
annua]]y in paying teachers to produce a 50% failure rate (using criteria which are 
pathetically low by any standard) should give us pause to reconsider the issue. 
(Alexander, 2001 b:7) 
No educational system can realistically hope to be perfectly efficient in this sense, of 
course, but the medium of instruction issue is plainly an area in which there is great 
potential for the efficiency of the system to be improved. However, this potential 
remains unrealised because the medium of instruction issue is still seen largely as 
being about choosing between Afrikaans and English, as the notion of using the 
African languages as languages of teaching and learning beyond primary education is 
" still not seriously countenanced by the governing elite of South Africa despite some 
well-sounding, but frankly hollow, policy statements. Setting aside the issue of the 
African languages, the inefficiency of the education system is heightened further by 
the increasing pressures being placed upon Afrikaans-medium educational institutions 
resulting from the demand for the increased use of English as a medium of 
instruction, pressures which partly stem from, and are given ideological credibility by, 
the ANC. 
Given the empirical, factual unsustainability of the 'Afrikaans excludes, English 
includes' argument, one is forced to reflect upon what forces are actually sustaining 
the strong persistence of this belief within ANC circles. While deep ignorance of the 
sociolinguistic realities of South African society is certainly a contributory factor, this 
alone represents an inadequate explanation. Instead, one needs to go further and also 
consider the emotional ideological content and significance of this belief for the ANC 
and its adherents. Landman (2002:7) describes the ANC's attitude towards the 
medium of instruction issue in the Afrikaans universities as representing a 
'camouflaged ethnic phobia', by which is presumably meant an irrational fear of 
ethnic mobilisation around the issue of language by white Afrikaners. Now, it may 
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very well be a harsh judgement to characterise ANC fear of Afrikaner ethnic 
mobilisation as 'phobic' or 'irrational' given the events of modem South African 
history. But what this observation does highlight is that the debate and the situation of 
language conflict around the issue of Afrikaans is being experienced by the 
protagonists themselves primarily as an identity conflict - the anglophone ANC 
versus Afrikaans speakers. Since it has become unacceptable to cite racial differences 
as motivating causes of political action in the post-apartheid era, at least in the 
mainstream, it seems as if language is increasingly becoming the new 'politically 
correct' issue around which the old identity conflicts are being played out. The 
employment of dubious accessibility and opportunity arguments etc. merely cloaks 
(albeit not that well) the identity agenda of the ANC. Equally, the sincerity behind the 
promotion of the idea of a single, multiracial 'Afrikaans' community originating from 
many white Afrikaans speakers and Afrikaner organisations, such as the FAK, 
remains highly questionable. 
Given the highly emotional nature of identity conflicts, each side in the debate is often 
able to recruit large political support from its respective grass-roots constituency 
without necessary recourse to a coherent, dispassionate, fact-based argument. When 
ignorance supports a popular, strongly emotive ideology, political actors often have 
little incentive or willingness to combat that ignorance through advocacy of 
rigorously determined fact. For example, one need only witness the lunatic episodes 
of Holocaust denial on the part of some politicians designed to attract support from 
those on the far-right or from certain Muslim extremists to encounter this 
phenomenon. Such unreason is extremely difficult to combat since rational arguments 
that challenge the prejudices held by the actors in the conflict tend to fall on deaf ears. 
It is easy to see how an identity conflict could degenerate into a vicious circle of 
intensification. Consider the following scenario, in which A is the dominant ruling 
group and B is the minority ethnolinguistic group: A seeks to deny linguistic rights to 
B because it fears that to do so is to serve B' s nationalist interest. As a result, B feels 
that A is anti-B which arouses heightened nationalist sentiment and dissatisfaction 
towards A within B' s community. This increase in B' s nationalist sentiment leads A 
to feel vindicated in its initial belief and A becomes ever more resistant to the 
granting of linguistic rights to B and the cycle then repeats itself at an increasingly 
heightened state of tension and conflict. Such a scenario is clearly possible, even 
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probable, in South Africa if the medium of instruction issue continues to be 
experienced as an identity conflict between the ANC and the Afrikaners. 
In some sense, the persistence of this identity conflict acts as a psychological 
reinforcement of the historical identities of both the ANC and the Afrikaners but, in 
doing so, it acts as a barrier to the development of a fully inclusive South African 
national identity. ANC identity, which basically poses as the new, post-apartheid 
South African identity, has largely developed in contradistinction to the traditional 
enemy or 'other', which is (principally) the white Afrikaans-speaking community. For 
the Afrikaners, the current threat posed to their language reinforces the traditional 
nationalist interpretation of Afrikaner history which emphasises the recurring theme 
of a struggle for cultural survival in the face of out-group persecution, the core 
element of which is the taalstryd or 'language struggle' (see section 4.3). One 
Afrikaner linguist has described the present linguistic situation as a 'crisis of despair' 
for the Afrikaners (Steyn, 2006). The use of such dramatic language plainly clearly 
panders to the emotional side of Afrikaner nationalist feeling. The current state of 
language conflict around Afrikaans is characterised by mutual mistrust and, as such, 
the group actors in the conflict find themselves in familiar psychological territory, 
something which has the effect of strengthening or, at least not weakening, the 
oppositional nature of their identities. This is particularly observable in connection 
with the issue of place names and the proposed and, in many cases, instigated changes 
to many of them, an issue which has been the cause of considerable controversy and 
identity conflict. 
5.3.2. The place name issue as a source of identity conflict 
Place names, which Nahir (1984:318) refers to as one of 'the marginal, auxiJIary 
aspects of language', have an inescapably symbolic and emotive nature in that their 
use may trigger any number of emotional behavioural responses and mental 
associations, at the individual or group level and either positively or negatively 
orientated, amongst those who have some form of sentimental attachment to the 
places that such names refer to. Place names, then, may be of considerable 
significance for identity insofar as they provide a referential psychological link 
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between an individual or group and a particular place and, as such, may be the bearers 
of important historical memory. Lock (1981), for example, notes that: • [p ]lace-names 
appear to be among the universally occurring categories of deitic markers'. Place 
names are a semiotic expression of the ideology of the groups with which they are 
associated and, therefore, they may acquire ideological force in themselves. As 
Volosinovobserves: 
The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They equate with one 
another. Wherever a sign is present, ideology is present, too. Everything 
ideological possesses semiotic value. (Volosinov, ] 973:] ]; emphasis in original) 
When one group actively seeks to change and, in doing so, delegitimise the name of a 
place which is of emotional significance to another group, the seeds of an identity 
conflict around the issue of place names are sown. Just such a conflict is being acted 
out in South Africa at present in connection with the ANC's policy of changing the 
official appellation of many settlements with Afrikaner or Afrikaans names. The most 
high-profile instance of this has been the official renaming of Pretoria, named after 
the 19th century Voortrekker leader and military commander Andries Pretorius 
(Liebenberg, 1977), as Tshwane. There are also apparently plans on the part of the 
government to change the name of Bloemfontein, the capital of the Free State, to 
Thabure which was the name of a local Basotho chief s horse. According to a 
spokesman for the Sotho Culture Organisation, such a move would apparently 
'recapture the history of the nation' (Die Volksblad, 08/n12005). Quite which 
r 
particular nation is being referred to here is not explicitly obvious. The Sotho nation? 
The South African nation? What does seem to be clear is that the Afrikaans name 
Bloemfontein, meaning simply a 'fountain of flowers', is being consciously 
delegitimised and therefore placed outside of the state determined consensus of what 
is deemed to be rightly national or South African. 
Other examples of place-name changes have included the renaming of Pietersburg as 
Polokwane, Potgietersrus as Mokopane, Naboomspruit as Mookopong and Nylstroom 
as Modimolle24• Indeed, as of June 2005, all but two towns (Burgersfort and 
Groblersdal) with Afrikaans names in the Limpopo province (itself renamed, as it was 
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fonnerly known as Northern Province) have been renamed supposedly as part of an 
initiative to 'get rid of colonial, offensive and meaningless names' (African Eye News 
Service, 28/06/2005). Several municipalities in the Limpopo province have also 
changed many street names which reflect Afrikaner history to those which reflect 
black African history. For example, the former Church Street In 
NylstroomIModimolle is now known as Chief Albert Luthuli Street (Beeld, 
20/0112005). Elsewhere, in Mpumalanga, the province's Geographical Names 
Committee has targeted more than forty settlements for renaming. For example, 
Buffelspruit is to be renamed as Mhlambanyatsi, Haartebeespruit as Moloto and Treur 
River as Sefogane (African Eye News Service, 26/04/2005). 
Unsurprisingly, these name changes have been the cause of considerable protest and 
conflict. For example, on 21 st May 2005 thousands of (almost exclusively white) 
demonstrators marched through PretorialTshwane in protest at the renaming of the 
city. The issue has also been the subject of great media attention, particularly in the 
Afrikaans press. A search of the archive of an Afrikaans newspaper such as Beeld will 
reveal, almost on a weekly basis, articles concerned with the issue of 
pleknaamverandering (changing of place names). The ANC's principal argument in 
defence of this policy of place-name change is that many of these place names are 
evocative of the injustices and oppression suffered by the indigenous populations 
during the colonial and apartheid eras. The ANC mayor of Tshwane described 
changing the name of Pretoria as a chance to make 'a brave and positive break with 
the past' (Beeld, 18/02/2006). However, the suspicion that the ANC is chiefly 
motivated by attacking Afrikaner sensitivities is strengthened by the fact that place 
names which are the legacy of British colonial rule seem to have been largely left 
unchanged. For example, the settlement of Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape, named 
after a notoriously vicious British army colonel, John Graham, who masterminded the 
slaughter of numerous Xhosa, has not been the subject of any name change. Other 
similar examples include King Williams Town, named after King William IV of 
Britain and the city of Port Elizabeth, named in honour of the wife of a 191h -century 
acting governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Rufane Donkin. Unsurprisingly, this has 
spawned the belief amongst many Afrikaners that they are being unfairly victimised 
24 http://africanlanguages.comlsouth_africalplace_names.html 
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by the ANC government. Even Afrikaans place names that make no reference to any 
potentially politically divisive historical Afrikaner figure, such as Naboomspruit. 
naboom being the Afrikaans name for the euphorbia tree and spruit meaning a small 
stream, have had their name rendered unofficial and hence illegitimate in the eyes of 
the state purely, it seems, for being Afrikaans. 
One often hears Afrikaners complain that they do not feel safe in the new South 
Africa. Partly, one may interpret this as a reference to physical safety given the 
extremely high levels of violent crime throughout the country. However, one should 
also interpret this as a reference to a collective psychological insecurity on the part of 
the Afrikaners which stems from the fact that they are being ideologically excluded 
from the ANC nation-building project. The controversy over place names and the fact 
that there has seemingly been little willingness to compromise on this issue on the 
part of the ANC, which behaves as if a settlement could only ever possibly have one 
official name, further fuels such anxiety. Instead of some bi- or multilingual/cultural 
approach to the place-name issue, designed to serve as a measure of conflict 
prevention, the ANC's approach is typically and predictably subtractive. While there 
are many practical advantages to having single standardised place names, for example 
in the production of maps and for general bureaucratic efficiency, the subtractive 
approach may be unwise in multicultural, multilingual societies since it will be 
unavoidably ethnocentric unless an acceptable supra-group compromise name can be 
adopted. Consequently, a subtractive place-name policy is highly likely to foment 
inter-group conflict. In Belgium, for example, the authorities have realised that the 
only way to get round this problem of conflict potential is to adopt a bilingual place 
name policy (McRae, 1986). Most Belgian cities and large town, even those in 
monolingual areas, have two official names, one FlemishlDutch and one French, e.g. 
BrussellBruxel1es, Antwerpen/ Anvers, Bergen/Mons, LuiklLiege. Sometimes a 
measure of efficiency needs to be sacrificed in order to prevent such conflict. In fact, 
arguing for single, standardised place names in the name of clarity or bureaucratic 
efficiency may often just be a covert way of promoting an ethnocentric agenda since 
the conflicts that arise in such instances are actually likely to reduce efficiency in 
other areas as some human endeavour will inevitably be diverted to participating in, 
or attempting to resolve, such conflicts. For discussions of place names issues in other 
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sociolinguistic contexts see, for example, Gorter (1997) on Friesland and Hicks 
(2002) on Scotland. 
Obviously, it would be equally unhelpful and undesirable for Afrikaners to contest the 
right of other groups to use alternative place names if they so wish. This too would 
promote identity conflict. Admittedly, some Afrikaans place names are inexcusably 
offensive and it is difficult to make a credible argument for their retention. Examples 
include settlements such as Kaffirspruit and Kaffirskraal, 'kaffir' being a popular term 
of abuse for non-white people in South Africa, roughly equivalent in strength to 
'nigger' in Britain or the USA. Also, it should not be forgotten that the apartheid 
government was also guilty of pursuing a policy of subtractive settlement renaming. 
The most famous instance being the highly cruel, gloating renaming of Sophiatown, a 
suburb of Johannesburg, as Triomf (Triumph) following the. forced removal of the 
black population from the settlement in 1954 (Giliomee, 2003:507). Inclusive nation-
building cannot take place in an atmosphere of highly salient inter-ethnic conflict. It 
requires co-operation and compromise. Given that the use of place names by the 
authorities and other public organisations is, just like their use of particular linguistic 
varieties, unavoidable (Kymlicka, 1995: Ill; Walker, 1999: 153; Rubio-Marin, 
2003:53; see section 3.7), an inclusive model of nation-building clearly requires a 
multilingual policy in this regard. Such a policy would also be in line with 
constitutional commitments to promote inter-cultural tolerance and linguistic 
diversity. Given the predominantly symbolic significance of place names at the level 
of inter-group relations, place names may provide the most realistic short-term 
domain for the achievement of something approaching the constitutional aspiration of 
'equitable multilingualism' (see section 4.5). It would not seem to require much more 
than the production and installation of multilingual signs. Clearly, such a policy does 
not require that each settlement in the country should have 11 different official names. 
Some settlements in more ethnolinguistically homogenous areas may still only require 
one name. What the policy does require is that in those cases where there is some 
conflict potential and group sensitivities are aroused over the issue of a particular 
settlement's name, some attention is given to appeasing these sensitivities and 
resolving the conflict in the form of a multilingual solution. A correspondent to Die 
Volksblad newspaper recently asked 'Can we trust that the present government, in the 
spirit of constitutional loyalty, will make a contribution towards positive nation-
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building through inclusive place name additions instead of replacements?' (Die 
Volksblad, 261I 112005. my emphasis). Current indications are that any such trust in 
the implementation of such a policy would be quite misplaced. 
Admittedly, there may be some potential problems with such a policy. Firstly, there is 
the cost, both financial and in terms of time, involved in the production of new signs, 
paperwork etc. when a settlement is renamed. This may divert resources from 
arguably more pressing concerns such as the atrocious state of education, housing and 
healthcare for most of the black population. One may reasonably question why the 
ANC government is expending so much energy and money on the rather banal, in 
both the general sense and in that of Billig's (1995:6) usage of the term ('banal 
nationalism') which refers to 'the ideological habits which enable the established 
nations of the West to be reproduced', matter of the renaming of settlements given the 
huge social problems which exist in South Africa. Secondly, there is always the 
danger of overindulging demands for particular groups' rights to symbolic 
representation in public life, as this may provoke jealousy and accusations of 'special 
treatment' from other groups in society. Also, bowing to excessive group demands 
may facilitate the rise of 'ethnic entrepreneurs', by which is meant those 'whose sole 
interest [ ... ] is ethnic mobilisation in order to get parliamentary votes and by this 
means get a little closer to the gravy train' (Alexander, 1999:25). The spectacle of 
numerous such 'entrepreneurs' each demanding -that places names which were 
previously uncontested all be given additional names which reflect their supposed 
constituents' identities is clearly undesirable and, indeed, would be harmful to the 
nation-building project. The tensions, so evident in media coverage of the issue, that 
have arisen around the matter of place name changes in South Africa are open to 
potential exploitation and prone to escalation either as a result of a lack of indulgence 
or overindulgence of group demands. Constant vigilance is therefore required in order 
to ensure that possibilities for language conflict are minimised, notwithstanding the 
irreducible amount of conflict potential that inevitably exists in unequal, multilingual 
societies. However, ANC ideology is continuing to prevent effective moves towards 
any form of satisfactory resolution of this conflict. 
The ANC's provocation of a conflict around the place-name issue by refusing to 
countenance a mutually satisfactory compromise solution, which would involve the 
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adoption of a multilingual place-name policy, must be seen as an attempt to further 
legitimise and extend its ideological hegemony in South Africa. Consequently, it has 
the effect of promoting an exclusive sense of South African national identity. This is 
certainly how many in the Afrikaner community experience the conflict. For example. 
Gert Opperman, head of the Voortrekker Monument Heritage Site, has remarked that 
'the question of place-names generates a lot of emotion and it seems as if the 
Afrikaners sense of history and cultural identity is being purposely upset' (Die 
Volksblad, 01105/2005). Elsewhere, Pieter Mulder, leader of the mainly Afrikaner 
supported Vryheid Front Plus party, has remarked that 'the one-sided changing of 
historic names remains an affront. The message is that South Africa only belongs to 
one group' (Beeld, 18/02/2005). Indeed, the ANC's attitude towards the question of 
national identity is, in many ways, strongly Jacobinist. For example, former chairman 
of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, once remarked that the ANC 'demands to determine the 
form of our nationhood' (Giliomee, 1991 :71: Geldenhuys, 2000). In addition, an ANC 
discussion document from 1997 entitled Nation-Formation and Nation-Building 
described the nation-building process as a 'continuing battle to assert African [widely 
perceived as a euphemism for 'black'] hegemony in the context of a multi-cultural 
and non-racial society' (ANC, 1997). Such remarks would seem to leave in little 
doubt the fact that there appears no ideological space for Afrikaans (indeed any 
language other than English) in the ANC's chosen model of nation-building. Because 
of its monolithic, hegemonic nature, the ANC's nation-building ideology must be 
recognised as having an innate conflict potential. For Afrikaans (and other languages) 
to contribute positively towards nation-building, this conflict potential around the 
issue of language has to be eradicated or, failing that, at least rendered dormant. For 
this to happen, a paradigmatic ideological shift away from the notion of Afrikaans as 
a 'problem' or 'barrier' to a view of Afrikaans as a resource for nation-building is 
necessary, something which necesarily entails that the present weakening position of 
Afrikaans in many areas of national importance be resisted and reversed. 
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5.4 ANC ideology and the decline of Afrikaans in other areas of 
national importance 
Although higher education and the place name issue are the two Afrikaans related 
matters upon which most attention has focused and which have been the subject of 
greatest media coverage and debate, the post-apartheid period has also witnessed a 
decline in the use of Afrikaans within numerous other domains of national 
importance. Observation of the emerging linguistic trends in some of these domains 
gives one a greater appreciation of the very great extent to which the ANC's anti-
Afrikaans, or indeed 'anti-any language other than English' ideology has become 
dominant in South Africa. The following discussion considers a number of these 
domains in tum. 
The postal service 
The South African Post Office represents a clear case in which ANC linguistic 
ideology has penetrated into an institution of national impol1ance. The postal system 
may be of great national importance on two main counts. Firstly, it facilitates state-
wide (and beyond) exchanges of communication, which are a necessary condition for 
the emergence and consolidation of a common national identity (S. Wright, 2000a). 
Secondly, the ancillary equipment of the post system (pillar boxes, stamps, 
postwomen/men etc) may serve as significant symbolic daily reinforcements, or 
'banal' (Billig, 1995) representations, of national identity. Consequently, the decision 
of the South African Post Office to abandon Afrikaans and use only English on its 
stamps, to have an English-only website and its decision that many place names 
which contain Afrikaans words are no longer acceptable and are only to be used in an 
anglicised form (e.g. Melkrivier becomes Milk River and Pelgrimsrust becomes 
Pilgrim's Rest) (Die Volksblad. 26/11/1999) even though such settlements are 
predominantly Afrikaans-speaking, must be seen as part of an ideological process 
supporting the emergence of a purely anglophone South African national identity. 
Airline Industry 
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South African Airlines, another institution of symbolic and practical national 
importance, has also adopted language practices similar to those of the South African 
Post Office (Mkhulisi, 2000: 126). The company has dropped the formerly used 
Afrikaans version of its name - the Suid-Afrikaanse Lugdiens - from its official 
literature and plane livery and now uses only the English version. Its website is 
available in two languages (English and German), only one of which is an official 
language of South Africa. As a result of the adoption of these new language practices, 
the airline has been the subject of a number of complaints made by passengers unable 
to follow instructions and safety announcements made only in English or other non-
South African languages (The Star, 13/03/2(06). The major South African airports 
have also seen a decline in the use of Afrikaans. At Johannesburg International 
Airport, the country's largest and busiest airport, the present author's own 
observations have indicated that signage is totally in English and that the number of 
announcements made in Afrikaans or, indeed, any of the African languages, is 
roughly zero. 
Sport 
The language practices of many of South Africa's sporting governing bodies are 
strongly compliant with the linguistic ideology of the country's present governing 
regime, the consequence of which being the increasing marginalisation of Afrikaans 
and the continuing total marginalisation of the African languages from the public 
sporting domain. The most popular sports in South Africa are undoubtedly football, 
cricket and rugby union. The popularity of each of these sports varies significantly 
amongst different sections of the South African population (Webb et ai., 1992:56), a 
fact reflected in the make up of the national teams in each sport. Football is widely 
seen as the major black sport in South Africa. A majority of players in the South 
African domestic league and national team are black and the national team is widely 
known as Bafana Bafana, meaning 'The Boys, The Boys' in isiZulu. Cricket, 
although predominantly still a white sport, is perhaps the most multiracial and 
multiethnic sport. The South African national cricket team regularly includes several 
black and/or so-called 'coloured' players, as well as white players from both English 
and Afrikaans-speaking communities. Indeed, in 2006, Ashwell Prince, a coloured 
player, was named as the first non-white captain (albeit temporarily) of the national 
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cricket team. Rugby union has long been regarded as the most exclusively white sport 
in South Africa .. In particular, it is especially popular amongst white Afrikaans 
speakers and, indeed, it is seen as the Afrikaner national sport. The national team 
remains predominantly white and Afrikaans-speaking, although some non-white 
players now regularly play for the Springboks. 
Despite the popularity of these three major sports across different linguistic and racial 
communities, the South African governing body of each sport has followed the ANC 
lead and now conducts its official business almost exclusively through the medium of 
English. Evidence of this is to be found on the websites of each organisation and the 
press releases contained therein which are solely in English25. Although Afrikaans is 
the language most commonly heard on and around the cricket and rugby field, the 
games' administrators at the national level in no way reflect this through their public 
linguistic behaviour. To the great dissatisfaction of many members of its 
predominantly Afrikaner fanbase, even the Blue Bulls (Blou Bulle in Afrikaans) rugby 
union club from Pretoria have fallen in line with ANC linguistic ideology and taken 
the decision to conduct all external correspondence exclusively in English (BBC 
Sport, 2001). 
The ANC has often attempted to associate itself with South Africa's sporting teams in 
order to promote its particular vision of the South African nation. One thinks of 
Nelson Mandela wearing the Springbok rugby jersey at the 1995 World Cup final in 
Johannesburg in which the South African team was victorious, widely seen as a 
symbolic gesture of reconciliation between the ANC and the Afrikaner community. 
However, from a linguistic point of view at least, it has become clear that any such 
inter-community reconciliation is strictly on the ANC's terms. In 2006, President 
Mbeki saw fit to criticise the South African football team for their poor performance 
at the African Cup of Nations, saying that the team did not understand what the youth 
of 1976 (a reference to the Soweto riots in reaction to the forced imposition of 
Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools; see section 5.2) had set out to 
accomplish and that it was necessary to ensure that 'our country and the nation 
becomes a winning nation. We cannot be a losing nation in the way that Bafana 
25 http://www.cricket.co.za • http://www.sarfu.org.za • http://www.safagoaJ.net 
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Bafana lost in Egypt' (South African Press Association26, 29/01/2006). This frankly 
authoritarian outburst from the president is illustrative of the way in which the ANC 
has sought to extend its ideological power into the domain of national sport, a domain 
which seems to be becoming increasingly hostile to the public use of Afrikaans. 
Media and advertising 
In the prevIous chapter, it was discussed how the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation has increasingly favoured the use of English at the expense of the other 
official languages in the post-apartheid era (see section 4.5.1). Afrikaans language 
programmes have seen both a decline in airtime and, many believe, in quality. In the 
words of one writer 'the SABC [ ... ] restricts Afrikaans mainly to tde laan, feeble 
sitcoms and the news which has never been as parochial as it is nowadays. Good 
quality dramas and documentaries belong to the past' (Steyn, 2006). It has also been 
noticed that the SABC frequently adopts a policy of non-reciprocal subtitling. 
Afrikaans programmes such as tde laan frequently run with English subtitles but it is 
extremely rare for English-language programmes to contain subtitles in any other 
languages. The absence of reciprocal subtitles on English programmes has been 
described as 'a clear attempt to promote English because the perception exists that 
"all South Africans (including children) understand (American!) English'" (Ou Toit, 
2004:46-7). Van der Walt (2004) makes the observation that Afrikaans television 
programmes (indeed, this is true of all non-English programmes on the SABC) are 
also frequently interrupted by English-language advertisements, despite the fact that 
Afrikaans speakers constitute the largest group in the middle and higher sectors of the 
consumer market. Also noticeable is the increasing frequency with which English-
language advertisements appear in the daily Afrikaans press. According to a senior 
advertising manager of the Media24 organisation, the reason that many companies 
now advertise in English in Afrikaans newspapers is that 'we've just had to face that 
fact that the advertising industry is English' (cited in Financial Mail, 24/05/2(02). 
This sort of resigned, docile acceptance of the 'inevitable' dominance of English is 
widespread, particularly in capitalist enterprises, and has the effect of strengthening 
the status quo ideological hegemony of ANC discourse. Language usage in these 
26 http://www.sapa.org.za 
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domains cannot be viewed as neutral or insiginificant. Martins, for example. 
underlines the importance of language in the field of advertising: 
Language is a significant factor in marketing and market communication. 
Understanding and acceptance of and preferences for the language of an 
advertisement undoubtedly influence the impact and effectiveness of an 
advertisement. (Martins, 2000:3]) 
In so far as many South African companies are concerned, with regards to advertising 
the commonly heard business adage 'you can buy in your own language but you must 
sell in the language of your customer' often does not seem to apply in the case of 
Afrikaans-speaking consumers. While the ideological thrust of such a marketing 
strategy is obvious, the actual commercial merit of advertising in English in Afrikaans 
publications must be questioned on a number of counts. Firstly, this strategy again 
unquestioningly assumes that all Afrikaans speakers understand English. While many 
Afrikaans do indeed understand English to a very high level, a considerable number 
understand it less well to varying degrees. Therefore, it seems inarguable that English-
language advertisements will, on the whole, inevitably be understood less well by 
readers of these publications than if they were produced in Afrikaans. Secondly, given 
the highly defensive sense of linguistic pride felt by many Afrikaans speakers, 
particularly in relation to the English language, one is entitled to ask whether placing 
English advertisements in Afrikaans publications may not be more likely to generate 
hostile reactions towards both the advertisers and the publications in question on the 
part of many readers. P. du Plessis notes that 
Advertising is used as an instrument for building relationships with the target 
market with the aim of improving loyalty towards the commercial brand. 
Improved brand-loyalty will ensure a profitable long-term relationship with the 
target market. (P. du Plessis, 2004: 128). 
With this in mind, it is very difficult to envisage how some companies can hope to 
build significant brand-loyalty amongst Afrikaans speakers by utterly and blatantly 
rejecting the Afrikaans language in favour of English. It seems that many advertisers 
have been blinded to this insight by the wider, hegemonic, ideological forces at play 
in South African society and which stem, to a great degree, from the current 
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governing regime and the dominant global economic system which it has so 
enthusiastically embraced. 
Police force 
In January 2007, the Western Cape (a provInce In which Afrikaans is the first 
language of around 60% of the population) police force introduced a policy requiring 
that only English be used for internal communication within the service (Mail and 
Guardian, 25/0112007). According to Ganief Daniels, a deputy commissioner of the 
Western Cape police service, this decision was made to 'reflect the country's 
demographics' (SABCnews.com, 25/0112007). The decision was met with the threat of 
legal action by the FW de Klerk Foundation who argued that it breached the 
constitutional rights of Afrikaans-speaking officers. The director of the Foundation's 
Centre for Constitutional Rights, Paul Hoffman, ridiculed the decision, saying: 
If you have a Constable Fortyn and an Inspector Van der Merwe chasing an 
Afrikaans-speaking suspect on behalf of an Afrikaans complainant and they're 
expected to have radio communication in English, you can, see that the situation 
is quite laughable. (cited in Mail and Guardian, 25/0112(07) 
The decision would also seem to explicitly contradict the Western Cape's official 
language policy which promises, amongst other things, 'to ensure that the Western 
Cape is a caring home for all by promoting multilingualism' and 'to ensure social 
cohesion and improve relationships by promoting language diversity' (Western Cape 
Language Committee, 2004).27 Such was the degree of opposition to this policy 
decision, the Western Cape police soon issued a memo announcing the revocation of 
the interim policy (SABCnews.com, 26/02/2007). This situation represents a rare 
victory for Afrikaans speakers in their struggle to resist the growing tide of English 
monolingual ism that is being implemented at the ideological behest of the ANC 
government. 
The judicilll system 
27 The Western Cape is currently the only South African province with its own official language policy. 
The three official languages of the province are Afrikaans, Xhosa and English. 
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The post-apartheid era has also seen a decline in the use of Afrikaans in judicial and 
legal circles as English has become increasingly dominant (Barker, 1998). Indeed. no 
national legislation has been published in Afrikaans since 1998. For example, the 
Employment Equity Act of 1998 was only published in English and Xitsonga, a 
curious combination considering Xitsonga is the third smallest of the eleven official 
languages and not mutually intelligible with any of the other official African 
languages (Loubser, 2001 :88). Also, in 1999, the South African Minister of Justice, 
Penuell Meduna, announced, despite much opposition from the Afrikaans-speaking 
community and contrary to the obligations to promote multilingualism contained in 
the South African constitution, the government's intention to abandon Afrikaans and 
introduce English as the sole language of record in courts of law on the grounds that 
such a move would be more 'cost-effective' (Die Volksblad, 19/10/99). T. Du Plessis 
highlights the covert intentions behind this change in linguistic practice. 
The repeated attempts to introduce English as the only language of record clearly 
confirm a lack of response on the part of an important ann of government to the 
institutionalisation of societal multilingualism. One receives the impression that in 
spite of constitutional obligations the official downgrading of Afrikaans 
outweighs the enhancement of the status of African languages. (T. Du Plessis, 
2001 :102). 
On occasions, anti-Afrikaans attitudes in legal circles have been rather more overtly 
and forcefully expressed. For example, in January 2006, a military judge, Lieutenant 
Colonel Mbulelo Mandela caused great controversy during a trial in Cape Town with 
the following remark: '1 must say it on record that to me it is disgusting that at this 
time and age we still find official correspondence or official communication in 
Afrikaans' (South African Press Association, 3010112006). This led to accusations of 
impartiality from the Vryheid Front Plus, a spokesman of the organisation saying of 
the judge that '[h]e not only insults Afrikaans, but also infringes upon the 
Constitutional rights of the accused'. Complaints were also submitted against the 
judge to the Pan South African Language Board by the Democratic Alliance political 
party. However, at the time of writing, no sanction or further action of any sort 
appears to have been taken against Colonel Mandela. 
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Although Afrikaans was, together with English, the language in which modem South 
African law was developed and despite the fact that it has a fully-developed legal 
terminology and literature, its use in academic legal publications has also declined 
since 1994. For example, Loubser (2001 :87) notes that the Afrikaans-orientated 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (Journal for Contemporary 
Roman-Dutch Law) contains increasingly more articles in English whilst the English-
orientated South African Law Journal no longer publishes contributions in Afrikaans. 
This tendency can be linked to the decision of some legal departments at historically 
Afrikaans universities to introduce courses taught in English instead of, or alongside. 
courses taught in Afrikaans. 
The legal system is one of the most important foundations of a nation's civic culture. 
As far as the national community is concerned, the legal system has the dual function 
of both prescribing and protecting the particular rights and duties of citizens, thus 
helping to define the civic character of the nation. The rejection of certain languages 
as languages of legal culture implicitly contributes to the delegitimisation of their 
potential civic character. The South African legal system and some aspects of its 
associated culture are currently contributing to the undermining of the civic character 
of the Afrikaans language and therefore also towards the linguistic and cultural 
homogenisation of public life in South Africa. 
5.5 Conclusion: Afrikaans - a language for nation-building? 
The mam theme of this chapter has been that ethnically based language conflict 
greatly inhibits efforts to foster the development of an inclusive, overarching national 
identity. Such conflicts are frequently characterised by a highly emotional content and 
are often fought as a symbolic battle of group identities. Such identity conflicts 
around the issue of language are generally the most difficult to resolve as actors in the 
conflict are often unreceptive to rational, reason-based solutions. The current identity 
conflict in South Africa which is being played out around the issue of Afrikaans is 
typical of such a situation. The maintenance or marginalisation of Afrikaans as a 
public language is widely experienced as being a battle between Afrikaner identity 
and an ANC-Ied, Anglophone, so; d;sant 'genuine' South African national identity. 
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Current language use patterns in various domains of public life indicate that the ANC 
is winning this identity conflict. For the ANC elite, language activism on behalf of 
Afrikaans works against its implicit ideology of assimilation into an English-speaking 
national community. For the Afrikaners, no longer able to rely on political institutions 
to protect their ideology of racial separateness and facing the increasing 
marginalisation of their languages, the present situation is being experienced as a 
crisis. Zietsman (1992:203) neatly summarises the choice facing the Afrikaner 
community in post-apartheid South Africa: 'Afrikaners must choose whether they 
want to be exclusively white or Afrikaans because the two are mutually exclusive'. 
This observation underlines the fact that it is no longer acceptable or possible for 
Afrikaners to maintain themselves through adherence to an ideology of racial 
superiority and distinctiveness and that co-operation with non-white Afrikaans 
speakers is necessary for the maintenance of their language. 
This chapter has not just been concerned with the maintenance of Afrikaans per se 
but, rather, how the maintenance of Afrikaans may be secured so as to contribute 
towards nation-building in South Africa. Advocacy of inclusive nation-building must 
emphatically reject the idea that Afrikaner nationalism is the only guarantee for the 
long-term prosperity and survival of the Afrikaans language. Certainly, a vigorous 
political mobilisation of the Afrikaners at the group level may very well secure the 
continued use of Afrikaans amongst themselves but it is unlikely that such a 
movement could have anything but harmful effects upon the promotion of an 
inclusive South African national identity. Steyn (1980:437), writing some quarter of a 
century or so ago, was of the opinion that an Afrikaans 'language nationalism', 
including both white and coloured speakers of the language, would be necessary in 
order to guarantee the prosperous survival of Afrikaans in the post-apartheid era. As 
far as nation-building is concerned, the attractiveness of Steyn's opinion rather 
depends on what the character of such a 'language nationalism' would likely be. If 
such a nationalism was strongly political insofar as it sought to weaken Afrikaans 
speakers' ties to the South African state and demanded special representation rights at 
the group level then it would most likely work as counterforce to nation-building. 
However, an Afrikaans 'cultural nationalism' (Hutchinson, 1994; May, 2001 :78) 
which restricts its concerns to the maintenance, strengthening and broadening of grass 
roots cultural networks can perhaps act as an important counterweight to the 
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dominance of the elitist Anglophone culture and, in doing so, contribute towards the 
creation of favourable conditions for the strengthening of all marginalised cultural 
networks in South Africa. Whether ethnocentric political movements can be avoided 
or not in practice remains to be seen. The point here though is that the dissatisfaction 
with the present model of national integration being pursued by the ANC government, 
which is so fervent amongst many Afrikaans speakers, does not necessarily require 
that those committed to the maintenance of the vitality of Afrikaans advocate total 
rejection of the notion of national integration altogether. Indeed, one (admittedly 
Afrikaner) writer has suggested that Afrikaans, and not English, has the greatest 
potential of any language to become a genuine vehicle and expression of South 
African identity. 
English can never truly become the most important marker of South African 
cultural identity. English is the world language, the language of wider 
communication and of 'great learning.' This is all part of the myth-creation around 
English, and above all by the so-called 'agtergeblewenes,28 of the country who can 
acquire upward social mobility through English. Afrikaans, on the other hand, is 
unique to South Africa - just like Zulu, Xhosa, Venda, Tswana, the two Sotho 
languages, Tsonga, Swazi and the two Ndebele languages. Afrikaans, as we know it 
with all of its varieties [ ... J took root in South Africa and therefore deserves its 
special place in the country. At the same time, Afrikaans is sufficiently developed 
tenninologically to send people to the moon - or Mars. Few other languages which 
have had to compete side-by-side with English have ever achieved what Afrikaans 
has achieved. Afrikaans is therefore one of the most distinctive national languages 
of South Africa and in my opinion has a much greater claim to the role of marker of 
South African national identity than English, the 'faceless' world language. 
(Jordaan, 2004:343-344) 
There is undoubtedly a strong aspirational element to Jordaan' s comments above. 
However, it would be a mistake to write off English as a potential marker of South 
African national identity on account of the fact that it is a language spoken by many 
different communities throughout the world. It was discussed in section 2.5.2 how 
language still had an important link to ethnic identity in many English-speaking 
countries because of the many localised varieties of the language which exist and 
28 This tenn has been left untranslated. It is the Afrikaans tenn for the underdeveloped population, and 
comes from the verb Qgterbl)', meaning 'to stay or remain behind'. The tenn carries with it suggestions 
of backwardness. 
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which act as distinctive expressions and markers of the national identities of the 
communities that speak them. South Africa is just one such country. Indeed, linguists 
claim the existence of several varieties or ethnolects of English peculiar to South 
Africa, namely white South African English, often just referred to as South African 
English (SAE) in a clear demonstration of the socio-historical pre-eminence of this 
particular variety (Lass, 2002), Indian South African English (Mesthrie, 2002) and 
Black South African English (De Klerk and Gough, 2002). It does not follow, then, 
that because of its worldwide distribution, the English language is some kind of 
'faceless' monolithic entity. The distinctive varieties of English spoken around the 
world, which are very often linked to the expression of particular ethnic or national 
identities, may be seen as giving many different faces to the English language (see 
section 2.5.2). While it is true that there currently does not appear to be a recognisable 
single variety of South African English which cuts across ethnic, racial and class 
boundaries and so is able to act as a fully inclusive marker of national identity, one 
should not necessarily rule out possible tendencies towards the future emergence of 
such a variety should the requisite socio-economic conditions prevail. As an 
additional point, 10rdaan's assertion that Afrikaans is unique to South Africa might 
come as a shock to many Namibians, a sizeable number of whom (over 130,000 
according to Ethnologue and 25% of the population of the capital city, Windhoek) 
speak Afrikaans either as a first, second or even third language (Combrink, 1984). 
Equally, Tswana is the most widely spoken language in Botswana, as is Swazi in 
Swaziland and Ndebele is also spoken as a first language by many Zimbabweans. 
To return back to the main point of this section, rejection of the exclusivist model of 
national integration being promoted and pursued by the ANC regime need not amount 
to an outright rejection of the notion of integration into the national system. It simply 
requires the formulation of a viable alternative and inclusive model of national 
integration. Admittedly, such a model is likely to reject a whole tradition of (mainly 
European) thought on the relationship between language and national identity and its 
formulation is also to be done largely 'blind' insofar as there are very few, if any, 
examples of successful pluralistic, multilingual, inclusive nation-building from other 
post-colonial contexts around the world. It is the formulation of just such an 
alternative model of national integration that will be considered in the following 
chapter. 
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6 Towards an alternative, inclusive approach to 
language policy and national integration for 
post-apartheid South Africa 
6.1 Introduction 
A key point that must be taken into consideration when attempting to den-lop a 
strategy for something as avowedly future-orientated as a language policy for nation-
building is that there is likely to be an irreducible degree of tension between what is 
ideally desirable and what is realistically possible. Obviously. no coherent approach 
can be without some form of directional motivation or ideological conviction. 
However. in the inevitable absence of absolute harmony bet\\ccn ideology and 
feasibility, the question becomes one of deciding to what degree ideological ambition 
is to supersede potentially anti-ideological practical considerations. For a country 
such as South Africa, which is characterised by such high levels of socio-economic 
equality and marginalisation, a strategy which promotes a rigid. highly abstracted 
conception of an ideal-type egalitarian society which is far removed from prevailing 
contemporary conditions is unlikely to provide an especially useful basis for making 
sh0l1-term. practical progress in addressing sociolinguistic problems. The advocacy of 
language policy and planning measures which, in reality, have little or no hope of e\'cr 
being accepted or implemented, while perhaps an engaging theoretical and intellectual 
exercise. does not really meet the demands of those anxious to bring about meaningful 
sociolinguistic change. The problem which then presents itself is that given the 
extreme dominance of the current political formation in South Africa plus the very 
real difficulties. not to say impossibilities in many cases. of initiating genuine 
sociolinguistic change through language policy and planning (see scction 3.2), one is 
entitled to ask oneself if indeed any language planning activities which challenge the 
prevailing status quo might be regarded as realistic or feasible options. The theoretical 
perspectives on language policy and planning developed earlier in this thesis (notably 
chapters 3 and 4) sef\'e as a severe brake on ambition in languagc planning. 
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Nevertheless, it seems incumbent upon one to at least attempt to make some positive 
contribution, however limited, towards the development of an improved linguistic 
strategy for South Africa. 
This chapter seeks to identify some of the key principles and practices of a language 
policy that might facilitate the creation of a common South African national identity 
by contributing to a programme of social development aimed at reducing social 
inequality and ensuring the integration of all South African citizens into the national 
system. This approach makes no claim to any moral status and should not be 
interpreted as normative but, rather, as an expression of a preference for an alternative 
model of language and society to the elitist, exclusionary one currently being pursued 
by the present ruling ANC government in South Africa. No normative argument is 
made for the desirability of social equality and development per se. It is assumed that 
some people will inevitably share these preferences and that some will not. For those 
who do not share these preferences, this chapter makes no attempt to persuade them 
otherwise. For those that do broadly share these preferences, it is hoped that the ideas 
expressed here will prove informative and enlightening, at least in some small 
measure, with regards to how one might go about working towards the realisation of 
such preferences. 
The chapter begins by addressing some of the central ideological and structural 
factors preventing the incorporation of the most marginalised members of South 
African society into the national system. One of the greatest causes of the continuing 
high levels of marginalisation is recognised as being the liberal, capitalist nature of 
the post-apartheid political dispensation which has unavoidably given rise to 
authoritarian governing practices. The linguistic dimension of this authoritarianism is 
to be located in the ruling elite's near-universal use of the English language which 
ensures the continued banishment of the African languages (and increasingly 
Afrikaans) from use in public life. It will be argued that the South African state and its 
constitution institutionalises a culture of competitive ethnocentric language activism 
which heightens the potential for inter-ethnic conflict and which is also incapable of 
addressing, both theoretically and practically, issues of socio-economic equality and 
development and is therefore unable to resolve the 'national question' in favour of the 
majority of South African citizens. The issue of language activism is also considered 
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at some length. While some scholars avidly promote language activism as a means of 
making meaningful strides towards linguistic democratisation, it is argued that the 
potential of such activism to initiate counter-evolutionary social change is strictly 
limited. Finally, two further related issues are discussed in depth. The first of these is 
the proposal to create overarching standardised varieties of the Nguni and Sotho 
language clusters. This is an issue which has been mooted for some time as an 
alternative solution to the linguistic dimension of South Africa's 'national question' 
but without ever gaining mainstream approval. The proposal is examined from a 
national integration perspective with the conclusion that although it may have some 
theoretical attractiveness, any language policy which promoted such a proposal would 
likely face serious impediments to its implementation. The most potent obstacle 
concerns the issue of acceptance, that is to say that the proposal appears to be either at 
odds with the wishes and beliefs of much of the South African population or finds 
very little positive affirmation amongst it. The second issue to be discussed is that of 
individual multilingualism and its relevance to the issue of national integration. It is 
argued that while a form of reciprocal individual multilingualism is ideally desirable 
for the realisation of linguistic equality, it cannot hope to occur unless the African 
languages are imbued with some instrumental, economic value which would motivate 
English and Afrikaans speakers to learn them. 
Finally, a brief word on terminology in this chapter. It shall become apparent that, for 
the purposes of the approach being developed in this chapter, the term 'national 
integration' is preferred to the term 'nation-building'. Although the two terms are 
often used fairly synonymously, there is some good reason for retaining a conceptual 
distinction between the two. While 'nation-building' is certainly an appropriate term 
to describe the attempts of top-down, non-consultative governmental planning 
measures to engender a sense of common national identity, the term does not 
necessarily carry with it any suggestion of a commitment to consensual material 
social development. On the other hand, with the use of the term 'national integration' , 
the emphasis is placed less on matters of pure identity and more on matters of 
incorporation and inclusion into a material system. The term also avoids any 
suggestion of top-down, possibly coercive, attempts to manipulate social identities to 
the advantage of certain vested, elitist ideological interests. 
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6.2 Democracy, marginalisation and political legitimacy in post-
apartheid South Africa 
In the thirteen or so years since the formal end of apartheid to the time of writing, it is 
clear that constitutional aspirations regarding the establishment of a 'democratic and 
open society' and the commitment to 'improve the quality of life of all citizens' 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, preamble) remain largely unrealised. 
However, because of the new progressive, liberal constitution with its emphasis on 
human rights and the introduction of universal suffrage in the post-apartheid era, the 
contemporary political consensus, moulded and led by the ANC, has enthusiastically 
and uncritically hailed the arrival of democracy in South Africa. Yet, as Holden notes, 
there is often 
a tendency to call a system 'democratic' simply because we approve of it. When 
we do this, however, we convey information only about our views, not about the 
system itself. When this happens, it has been said that 'democracy' becomes 
merely a 'hurrah! word' (meaning 'hurrah! for this political system'), emptied of 
all descriptive meaning. (Holden, 1993:2) 
The current political system in South Africa obviously constitutes an enormous 
'hurrah!' for the ANC (and those organisations which benefit from a symbiotic 
relationship with it) since it has assured it a position of almost untouchable political 
dominance. However, for those not wedded to the ANC and ~ts political and economic 
ideology, claims lauding the arrival of democracy in South Africa must be met with a 
considerable dose of sober scepticism. The precise determination of what constitutes 
'democracy' is, of course, a notoriously contested matter (Connolly, 1983; Graham, 
1986; Hoffman, 1988). However, most would be in agreement that democracy 
denotes something resembling 'rule by the people'. The question then becomes, of 
course: how do we arrive at a satisfactory definition of 'people rule'? This intricate 
question will not be dealt with in depth in this study but it suffices here to say that the 
elitist nature of contemporary South African politics promotes a highly inadequate 
conception of democracy for those committed to reducing social inequality and 
bringing about the integration of the whole of South African society into the national 
system. One of the most noticeable characteristics of post-apartheid society is not a 
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trans-societal atmosphere of elated liberation but the continuation of high (in many 
cases increasing) levels of socio-economic marginalisation from the national system. 
Thus far, for most South Africans liberation has only come in the form of certain 
basic, 'first generation' human rights (Robins, 2005b:2) which protect against 
discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual preference 
etc. Socio-economic liberation and the freedom to effectively participate in public 
political life which requires, amongst other things, an adequate level of education, 
continue to remain unknown for most South African citizens. As one commentator 
notes: 
In contemporary South Africa the introduction of democratic political 
arrangements has gone hand in hand with the unmasking of widespread 
marginalisation. While the majority of people's legal status is assured, their 
experience of citizenship remains ambiguous. They continue to be excluded from 
economic equality and empowerment and effective, democratic participation in 
the public sphere. If the South African case is emblematic of anything, it is the 
intertwining of democracy and marginalisation in contemporary life. (Von Lieres, 
2005:23) 
Marginalisation from the public life of the state and, by consequence, the state's 
associated national identity, may take several forms and operate both at the individual 
and group level. In cases where a state methodically marginalises sections of its 
citizenry from material participation in, and ideological acceptance into, the national 
system, a problem of political legitimacy is created. According to Kelman: 
Two ultimate sources of legitimacy for the national system can be distinguished: 
(1) the extent to which it reflects the ethnic-cultural identity of the national 
population and (2) the extent to which it meets the needs and interests of that 
population. In the long run, a political system cannot maintain its legitimacy 
unless, at least, a significant proportion of the population perceives it as meeting 
their needs and interests (although it can, of course, retain power by relying on 
coercive means, even if only a small elite are adequately integrated into the 
system). (Kelman, 1972: 188) 
Kelman notes that these two sources of legitimacy give rise respectively to what may 
be termed sentimental or instrumental attachments to the national system. If we 
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consider the South African population as a whole, it is apparent that the ANC-Ied 
national system has a problem of legitimacy on both of these counts. Furthermore, 
returning to the main emphasis of this study, language can be identified as an 
important factor in the creation and maintenance of these two sources of political 
illegitimacy. As far as the first source of illegitimacy is concerned, the linguistic 
practices of the ruling government and other agencies of the state manifestly do not 
reflect the ethnolinguistic identities of the whole South African population. In fact, 
they do not, on the whole, even reflect the ethnolinguistic identities of the majority of 
South Africans. Most South Africans can therefore be said not to enjoy a sentimental 
linguistic attachment to the current state, most notably and vocally the white 
Afrikaans-speaking population (see chapter 5). Indeed, such is the centrality of 
language to their identity, the declining use of Afrikaans in public life arguably 
prevents many Afrikaans speakers from enjoying any significant form of sentimental 
attachment to the South African state. For many Afrikaners, the fact that the new 
rulers of South Africa are mostly black creates an additional source of sentimental 
alienation while conversely being a novel source of sentimental attachment to the 
state for the black population, a fact which reflects the historical centrality of racial 
categories in the formation and politicisation of social identities in South Africa. The 
fact that many white Afrikaans speakers are highly competent in English has, on the 
whole, meant that the socio-economic effects of the anglicisation of public life have 
been less severe on them than on speakers of African languages and so-called 
coloured speakers of Afrikaans. 
In addition to the fact that most black South Africans are symbolically alienated by 
the state's linguistic practices which promote an English-speaking, self-styled 
universalist, pan-South African identity, they are also instrumentally and materially 
marginalised by the increasing dominance of the English language in public life. For 
example, a survey by PANSALB29 (MarkData and PANSALB, 2000) revealed that 
47% of all South Africans were unable to access services in their own first languages. 
For African language speakers, this figure was even greater. For example, for 
speakers of isiNdebele, in tenns of speakers the smallest official language, the figure 
rose to 75%. A government which rules in a language poorly understood by the 
29 Pan South African Language Board 
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majority of its population is, by any measure, clearly not meeting their (linguistic) 
needs and interests. State-endorsed language practices and ideologies alone are not, of 
course, the sole reason for the failure to adequately address the problem of severe 
levels of marginalisation from the national system in South Africa. They are merely 
symptomatic of a wider political and economic system which cements the 
institutionalisation of an elitist ruling structure which, by the innate logic of the 
conditions that nourish and sustain it, is incapable of satisfactorily addressing the 
problem of social inequality (and hence, social justice) and political marginalisation. 
A model of national integration for South Africa which seeks to include all of the 
country's citizens as equal and active members of the national community must 
address, above all else, the problems of socio-economic marginalisation described 
above. 
6.3 Authoritarianism, liberalism and laissez-faire language policy in 
post-apartheid South Africa 
It has been argued that the ultimate root of the present crisis of political and social 
marginalisation in South Africa (and, indeed, African states more generally) does not 
originate in the ideological tendencies of the ruling ANC elite, which themselves are 
largely symptomatic, but from the fundamentally authoritarian nature of the state that 
was inherited from the colonial period. 
[The] colonial experience [ ... ] enables us to speak of an African state as a general 
type, for despite many differences in form, such states have been founded on a 
common colonial inheritance which has stamped contemporary state forms with 
fundamentally similar structural continuities. From the proliferation of petty 
authoritarianism by state officials in search of a fast buck to the genocidal 
practices of the central state, from the systematic control of women [ ... ] from the 
regular oppression of ethnic minorities and state xenophobia to the plunder of 
treasuries by greedy and corrupt politicians, the African state is at the core of the 
crisis which the continent's people have had to endure since the historical period 
when its populations were enslaved en masse by merchant capitalists both 
domestic and foreign bent on 'primitive accumulation'. It is also at the core of the 
failure of the 'top down' nation-building project which dominated the immediate 
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post-colonial 'developmentalist' period and of the alienation of ethnic and 
religious minorities from that project. (Neocosmos, 2004:209-10) 
Although many post-colonial states such as South Africa have appropriated the 
rhetoric and many of the symbols and tokens of liberal democracy, the systematic 
failure to effectively address the marginalisation of the majority of their populations 
and thereby legitimise their rule has necessarily meant the entrenchment of 
authoritarian forms of government (Mamdani, 1996; Von Lieres, 2005:22). 
Authoritarianism may occur by degrees and be more or less overt. The new, liberal 
South African state obviously represents a progression of sorts towards popular, 
democratic rule. However, at the same time, it is also not making meaningful strides 
towards the full, or even marginally satisfactory, realisation of emancipatory 
democracy in South Africa. Wamba-dia-Wamba' s (1994:250) observation that in 
Africa 'politics is the state and the state is politics' highlights the restricted way in 
which the state determines, to its own advantage, the consensually legitimate terrain 
of political debate and activity. Of central relevance here is the way in which 
liberalism conceptualises and attempts to naturalise the legitimacy of that conception 
of the political character of society or, as it is commonly known, civil society 
(Gibbon, 1996). Neocosmos (2004:215) draws attention to the way in which, for 
liberalism, civil society only exists 'under conditions of mutual recognition between it 
and the state'. That is to say it is the state which recognises the legitimacy of 
particular political groupings or organisations within society. Civil society therefore 
becomes officialised and ideologically moulded through its formal recognition by the 
state. In order to be recognised and legitimised in state discourse, political 
organisations are forced to compete for inclusion into the state domain of politics, 
something which necessarily requires their broad conformity to the state's 
fundamental ideological tendencies. The state is consequently left free to implicitly 
legitimise itself by, firstly, selecting which organisations to recognise and, secondly, 
forcing them to conform to the ideological and operational requirements of the 'liberal 
democratic' system. The effect of this is to depoliticise civil society since any 
dissenting voices which contest the basic character of the liberal state are placed 
outside of the realm of legitimate debate. Organisations within the state-delimited 
civil society are incapable of opposing the underlying nature of the state. The state is 
therefore in a position to style itself as apolitical, as some kind of objective guardian 
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of the supposed 'liberal democratic' consensus. The consequence of these prevailing 
political conditions is that meaningful emancipatory political and social measures are 
not effectively implemented since 
frankly political questions regarding the social entitlements and needs of various 
groups which may touch on the transformation of this order, become subsumed 
and hidden under issues of technical expertise, claims for greater access to state 
resources, and the deployment of state largesse within a discourse of state 
'delivery'. In neo-liberal thinking in Africa, even power is to be apparently 
'delivered' through so-called empowerment projects funded by (Western or state) 
donors and enacted by NGOs, in which people are taught about rights they can 
rarely access and which therefore remain meaningless to them. (Neocosmos, 
2004:217) 
The manner in which the post-apartheid state has had a paralysing effect upon civil 
society, insofar as the promotion of social development and transformation is 
concerned, can be illustrated by the case of the Pan South African Language Board 
(PANSALB). Part of the reason why PANSALB has had so little success in 
institutionalising genuinely transformative multilingual practices can be explained by 
the highly limited mandate it was given by the 1996 South African constitution and by 
subsequent amendments to it in 1999 (Marivate, 2000: 131). Section 6(5) of the 1996 
South African constitution defined the mission of PANSALB thus: 
A Pan South African Language Board established by national legislation must: (a) 
promote, and create conditions for, the development and use of (i) all official 
languages; (ii) the Khoi, Nama and San languages; and (iii) Sign language; and 
(b) promote and ensure respect for (i) all languages commonly used by 
communities in South Africa, including German, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, 
Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu; and (ii) Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and other 
languages used for religious purposes in South Africa. 
There is clearly no mandate here, implicit or explicit, for PANSALB to pursue 
policies that would effectively contribute to the realisation of genuine social 
transformation through the introduction of societal multilingualism. The use of 
nebulous terms such as 'promote' and 'create conditions for the development and use' 
effectively serve as escape clauses, allowing the state to avoid implementing policies 
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which would promote meaningful and lasting social improvement. It is useless 
decrying PANS ALB for being toothless and failing to successfully implement or 
'deliver', to use the governmental buzz word, multilingual practices since its hands 
are tied by the state. The level of government funding received by PANSALB is, 
comparatively, wholly inadequate given the sociolinguistic problems that exist in 
South Africa. For example, in 2004, language planning bodies received only 6.84% of 
the Department of Arts and Culture's total budget, of which PANSALB itself 
received only around one third (Ad Hoc Committee on Arts and Culture, 2004). In 
comparison, a programme to promote 'Arts and Culture in Society' received over 
19% of the budget and the department's 'Heritage Programme' designed to 'ensure 
transformation of the heritage landscape as a vehicle for nation-building and social 
cohesion, through the implementation of heritage policies and legislation' received an 
enormous 52% of the departmental budget. Since 2004, there still seems to have been 
no significant increase in expenditure on PANSALB. For example, it has been stated 
that 'the R39 million that PANSALB has been allocated for the 2006/2007 financial 
year is simply spread too thin [ ... ] to institute meaningful change' (Mail and 
Guardian, 2211112006). The same article goes on to note that this inadequate funding 
has meant that PANSALB has had difficulties in recruiting and retaining skilled staff 
despite the fact that 'language experts abound in the country'. Other consequent 
problems include a long-malfunctioning website and the 'fizzling out' of a campaign 
to promote awareness of language rights. Budgetary expenditure is usually a good 
guide to the priorities of a governing regime. The figures cited above constitute 
incontestable evidence that state-facilitated social transformation through linguistic 
transformation is not an urgent priority of the present South African government. 
Aside from funding issues, PANSALB' s powers are further restricted by the fact that 
the government is not obliged to act upon its findings, advice or reports. Instead, it is 
merely required to 'consider' them (Marivate, 2000: 137). As far as contributing to 
emancipatory nation-building is concerned, the rather non-commital nature of its 
mandate and the restrictions placed upon it by the state render P ANSALB effectively 
impotent. Instead of making a significant contribution to the linguistic 
democratisation of the country, P ANSALB' s resources are frequently taken up 
dealing with ethnocentric claims to inclusion into, and recognition by, the liberal state 
(Alexander, 2000:173; Perry, 2003: 160; see section 6.5 below) or by lexicography 
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units whose activities consist mainly of translating specialist books into the various 
official languages and publishing dictionaries in indigenous languages, something 
which is all very well but in reality does very little to bring about meaningful 
emancipatory sociolinguistic transfonnation. P ANSALB has also devoted valuable 
time and resources to what are, frankly, rather less pressing exercises, such as the 
study commissioned to detennine whether Sepedi was a dialect of Sesotho sa Leboa. 
or not (Brand, 2006:72). 
My own impression of PANSALB, after visiting their headquarters in a somewhat 
shabby office block in downtown Pretoria on several occasions, including a meeting 
with the head of the Status Language Planning Division, was that of an organisation 
whose morale was bordering on the despondent, such was the frustration at not being 
given the adequate means with which to carry out any genuinely effective initiatives 
and the lack of commitment to multilingualism from the higher echelons of 
government. Of course, lack of adequate government funding alone does not explain 
the failure of PANSALB to realise its stated aims of language policy development -
these include ensuring the use of at least two official languages in official domains, 
supporting the elimination of the 'lack of equity' with respect to indigenous 
languages, supporting the 'progressive elimination of language barriers to 
participation in political cultural, social and economic life and ensuring 'access to 
services, resources, programmes, infonnation and knowledge for all South Africans' 
(PANSALB, 2001 :4). Any level of funding cannot get round the more fundamental 
theoretical problem that faces language planning bodies, namely that initiating 
counter-evolutionary sociolinguistic change through language planning activities is 
generally a highly unlikely prospect. While the figures on government expenditure on 
language planning bodies are strongly indicative of the ANC's low prioritisation and 
rather unconcerned attitude towards its official policy of multilingualism, this alone is 
an inadequate explanation of the failure to effectively implement that policy. 
Although the ANC government, even in the absence of genu me ideological 
commitment, promotes the dubious notion that the 'delivery' of multilingualism is 
something achievable simply through competent, state-led management practices and 
the employment of expert knowledge, the transfonnative political implications of the 
wholesale linguistic democratisation/emancipation of South African society preclude 
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the actual realisation of that delivery. The elitist state is therefore logically compelled 
to resist challenges to the hegemonic domination of English. From this, it is apparent 
that a model of societal development which aims for the equal incorporation of the 
whole of the South African population into the national system must be one not just of 
opposition to the ideology and practices of the ruling ANC government but also one 
of opposition to the fundamental character of the present state which, in a society as 
deeply unequal as South Africa, cannot resist maintaining its rule without resource to 
authoritarian and exclusionary measures. 
6.4 Symbolic vs. instrumental attachments to the national system 
It is manifest that the South African state with its present liberal, capitalist orientation 
predominantly serves the political and socio-economic interests of a relatively small, 
though expanding, domestic middle-class elite. Given that material and financial 
resources are finite, one can see that the interests of the dominant elite and the society 
at large are clearly in conflict with each other. For some to have more, others must 
have less. The elite who run the state have no motivation in spending resources on 
improving socio-economic conditions and building instrumental attachments to the 
state for the majority of the population beyond a level which ensures the stability of 
the contemporary political environment which sustains its rule. In order to 
compensate for this disinclination or inability to increase popular, i.e. beyond the 
middle-class, levels of instrumental attachment to the national system, what one might 
call the 'material stuff' of nation-building, the South African state has eagerly 
embarked upon a ploy of symbolic promotion of South African nationhood. The state 
has sought to generate much fervour around elements such as the new, ubiquitous, 
post-apartheid national flag, national sporting teams (see section 5.4) and the new 
national anthem, a hybrid medley of the black African hymn Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika 
(God Bless Africa) and the white apartheid-era national anthem Die Stem van Suid 
Afrikaffhe Call of South Africa, which is frequently played on SABC television 
channels with an accompanying film of it being sung by multiracial groups of 
attractive, apparently joyful young people against the backdrop of famous South 
African scenery and landmarks. While the importance of fostering the symbolic 
dimension of national identity should not be denied or underestimated (see section 
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2.4), to divert attention and resources away from efforts aimed at the more urgent 
need to create and consolidate the material foundations of the national community is 
to neglect one of the duties that the government has committed itself to, namely social 
development and regeneration. As Kelman notes: 
I am afraid that a concentration by central authorities on the direct manipulation 
of sentimental attachments may serve as a substitute for the work they should be 
doing at the instrumental level and as a cover for failures to create adequate 
socioeconomic institutions and to provide meaningful roles for all segments of 
society. (Kelman, 1972:201) 
Such an approach may be seen as a kind of attempted quick-fix approach to nation-
building, as it seeks to skirt the highly complex, resource- and time-consuming issues 
of societal regeneration, development and material integration which require long-
term commitment and engagement. Furthermore, it is also highly doubtful that such 
excessive preoccupation with the manipulation of national symbols is actually an 
effective method of promoting a national identity. It is no coincidence that, in South 
Africa and more generally in Africa, symbols of national identity are most 
enthusiastically embraced by the ideologically conditioned middle-classes who also 
have a strong instrumental attachment to the liberal capitalist state. The state's 
manipulation of sentimental attachments amongst the most marginalised sections of 
society does not bring about their positive emancipation from poverty and social 
alienation by ensuring their integration into the national system. If effective, such 
manipulation only ensures their continued docile acquiescence to the maintenance of 
present authoritarian political and socio-economic forms. A genuinely emancipatory 
model of national integration needs to take inspiration from sentiments such as those 
of Wamba-dia-W amba (1994:257) when he writes that 'instead of society serving the 
state, the empowered society should make the state serve it'. These sentiments echo 
those of Marx (1973:326) who argued that real democratisation requires 'converting 
the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinate to 
it'. The central concern of democratic nation-building, then, must be the creation of 
instrumental attachments to the state through the provision of meaningful and 
rewarding roles in society and its economic system for all South Africans regardless 
of origin. 
195 
The view taken here is that a common, sentimental sense of national identity should 
ideally be regarded as a desirable by-product of initiatives which actively promote 
social equality and allow for all citizens to participate in the national system. The case 
of the Afrikaners (see chapter 5) would seem to confirm Kelman's (1972:202) 
suspicion that 'direct efforts to create national identity may bring [ ... ] ethnic subgroup 
identities to the fore and lead to a structuring of the situation in competitive terms, in 
which the more primordial attachments are more likely to prevail' . Connor 
(1994b:208) expresses a similar view when highlighting the tendency of state 
nationalisms to underestimate the 'emotional power' of older, sub-state nationalisms. 
It is of great importance that a state identity is not promoted directly and thereby 
perceived as being in competition with other sub-state identities. The social 
development strategy proposed in this chapter should therefore only be interpreted as 
a nation-building strategy in an indirect, almost incidental, sense (Weinstock, 
2004:53). The fundamental goal of the policy is not the identity itself but the 
realisation of desirable social and economic conditions, which may, incidentally, 
facilitate the development of a common national identity. Geldenhuys' (2000:2) 
remark that 'new political loyalties cannot be easily forced upon people from above' 
is particularly relevant here. Elsewhere, Neocosmos (2004:226) notes that: 'Only 
society can democratise the state, not the other way round, at most all the state can do 
is to provide some of the conditions for society to democratise itself'. This would 
seem to suggest that emancipatory, democratic nation-building must therefore find its 
motivational impetus in a political movement emanating from popular society 
although this does not deny that such a movement will, though, inevitably require the 
input of ideologically sympathetic technical expertise, particularly in connection with 
complex, often counter-intuitive matters such as language policy and planning. The 
essential problem here, as far as language policy and planning is concerned, is 
whether any national language policy, given that it will inevitably be formulated and 
implemented by language experts and/or organs/agents of the state, can avoid being 
top-down in character. It is all very well advocating a bottom-up approach to the 
formulation of a language policy for national integration but, at the present time, the 
fact is is that co-ordinated agitation for a change in national language policy almost 
exclusively takes place outside of the lower levels of society. Until an ideology 
consistent with the linguistic empowerment of all South African citizens actually 
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penetrates into the lowest socio-economic levels of society, it is difficult to conceive 
of how authoritative language planning measures at the national level can be 
experienced as anything other than top-down efforts at social engineering. How might 
this situation be changed so that the impetus for empowering, inclusive language 
planning measures comes from popular society? This is undoubtedly a highly 
complex question. The next section considers one possible approach to this problem 
which has been widely advocated as a means to linguistic democratisation and 
empowerment, namely language activism. 
6.S Language activism: a route to linguistic democratisation? 
The importance of language activism for the achievement and maintenance of 
democracy in competitive multilingual contexts is something which has been widely 
asserted (e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000; Kontra et aI., 1999). For example, Tollefson 
(1991:211) notes that 'a commitment to democracy requires a commitment to the 
struggle for language rights.' The belief that language activism represents a means of 
initiating democratic linguistic change also appears to be prevalent in the South 
African context. T. Du Plessis (2004: 169). for instance. argues that 'Language 
activism [ ... ] forms an important element in the process of democratising a 
multilingual society.' 
For the sake of conceptual clarity and understanding, it is important first of all to 
reflect upon what is meant by language activism and the various forms that it may 
take. Following Martel (1999:47-48), T. Du Plessis (2004: 169-70) defines activism as 
a 'rights-orientated process whereby influence can be exercised so that socio-political 
practices and structures can change'. This definition seems a reasonable one, although 
one could argue that language activism need not necessarily be explicitly concerned 
with, or couched in the language of, rights. For example, some language activism may 
simply be concerned with providing information and promoting arguments with the 
aim of persuading people to come to a certain viewpoint regarding a particular 
linguistic matter - what may be termed 'language attitude planning' (Verhoef, 1998). 
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A number of different elements or, rather, instruments of language activism can be 
identified. The first of these may be termed research. This refers to academics and 
other educators working in the field of language policy and planning whose role it 
supposedly is to develop a scientifically rigorous understanding of linguistic trends 
and processes in society. This is not to say that researchers are often not also 
politically engaged or motivated. Indeed, the findings of their research may support 
the advocacy of a particular political position. Obviously, though, it is desirable that 
political positions are adopted on the basis of honest research findings rather than 
dishonest research being pursued to fit with pre-determined political values. An 
important function of academic research, as far as language activism is concerned, can 
be to provide a theoretically and factually rigorous, coherent supporting structure 
which can enable the other elements of language activism to function more 
successfully .. Another important facet of academics' work can also be to undertake 
research which combats popular and politically influential myths or false 
preconceptions about language which contribute towards the perpetuation of 
undesirable sociolinguistic conditions. In the South African case, for example, such 
research has shown the fallacy of the widespread belief that first-language (or 
'mother-tongue' as it often problematically referred to) education for black students is 
unsuitable and that academic and socio-economic advancement can only be made by 
studying through the medium of English (Heugh, 2003; Webb, 2oo4a). This research 
also implicitly lends support to the argument for maintaining Afrikaans as a medium 
of instruction at all levels of education. Very little academic sociolinguistic research 
undertaken recently in South Africa would seem to support or advocate an ANC-style, 
top-down, reductionist, English-mainly model of language-in-nation-building (for an 
exception see Harnischfeger, 2003). 
A second instrument of language activism may take the form of lobby or pressure 
groups. These bodies can provide a forum and an outlet for the articulation of 
opinions, complaints or demands surrounding linguistic matters through which 
political pressure can then, theoretically at least, be applied to the relevant 
governmental organisations. These pressure groups may take the form of opposition 
political parties or they may be just so-called 'cultural organisations', such as the 
FAK in South Africa (see section 5.3), which do not necessarily seek active 
participation in the representative political system but nevertheless implicitly promote 
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a particular cultural group and, therefore, also an often unavoidably political vision of 
society. As for lobby groups, these can play an important role in raising public 
awareness of linguistic matters. Also significant in this regard is a closely-related 
third instrument of language activism, namely the media, particularly the broadcast, 
electronic and printed varieties. These media have an unrivalled capacity to reach 
vast, nationwide or even global audiences. The great potential for such media to 
highlight and inform about linguistic matters and, in doing so, influence opinion, is 
obvious. 
These first three instruments of language activism briefly discussed here - research, 
lobby/pressure groups and the media - can be viewed as elements aimed at opinion-
forming and imparting knowledge around questions of language. The fourth and 
probably most powerful form of language activism involves recourse to legal action, 
namely litigation. The bringing of lawsuits against public or private organisations 
which flout constitutional and other legal stipulations on language use can be an 
effective way of challenging and hopefully changing undesirable linguistic practices. 
The fifth and most extreme form of language activism is violence. In cases where 
individuals or groups do not have recourse to legal means in order to effectively 
challenge the legality of certain linguistic practices and where other forms of language 
activism prove unsuccessful, desperation may lead them to resort to violence as a 
means of inducing political change. Many countries, including South Africa, have a 
history of violence over linguistic matters. Other examples include Sri Lanka, 
Belgium and Spain. However, as far as national integration and the fostering of a 
sense of solidarity and community are concerned, it is to be hoped that this final form 
of language activism be avoided. 
The first comment to make about the state of language activism in South Africa is that 
it is at a relatively undeveloped stage. T.Du Plessis (2004: 170), for example, notes 
that language activism in South Africa is still in its 'children's shoes'. This is 
certainly a valid observation when one compares South Africa as a whole with a 
country such as Canada which has a long tradition of language rights activism. For 
example, in the period 1994-2001, only eight lawsuits were brought in South Africa 
concerning language rights. In Canada, fifteen such litigations were made in the single 
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year 1999-2000 (T. Du Plessis, 2004: 171). However, the most important observation 
to make about language activism in South Africa is that it is unevenly pursued and 
generally ethnocentrically orientated. It was discussed earlier (see section 5.3) how 
language activism in South Africa is disproportionately prevalent amongst white 
Afrikaans speakers and how their language activism has a strongly ethnocentric or 
Afrikaner-centric flavour to it. Although there have been commendable attempts by 
Afrikaans speakers, but mainly in academic works with limited readership, to link the 
Afrikaans issue to the wider issue of the 'national language question' (Giliomee and 
Schlemmer, 200 1), coverage of language issues from within the Afrikaans press, for 
example, is often characterised by a parochial Afrikaner-centrism. 
Currently in South Africa, litigations, complaints and petitions regarding language are 
usually made on behalf of a particular ethnolinguistic community and are aimed at 
ensuring rights solely for that group. These tendencies towards ethnocentric language 
activism are also strongly apparent in much of the non-Afrikaans activism in South 
Africa. A good example is that of the Northern Ndebele or SiNdebele language. 
Under the new South African constitution SiNdebele was not accorded official status, 
unlike Southern Ndebele or isiNdebele as it is officially known, which was included 
as one of the eleven official languages. A consequence of this has been that the 
Northern AmaNdebele National Organisation has persistently lobbied (so far 
unsuccessfully) parliament and PANSALB with the aim of achieving official status 
for the SiNdebele language (Stroud and Heugh, 2003:5). Other examples include the 
Northern Sotho National Language Body which has been agitating to have the name 
of the official language known as Sepedi changed to Northern Sotho in the English 
version of the South African constitution on the grounds that the term Sepedi includes 
only speakers of a particular variety of Northern Soth03o. To a large extent, the 
ethnocentric nature of such language activism can be seen as a consequence of the 
nature of the South African constitution which has largely maintained the 
ethnolinguistic classifications of the apartheid era. In naming, somewhat arbitrarily, 
nine African languages as official languages alongside English and Afrikaans, the 
constitution has the effect of implicitly ascribing and valorising nine concomitant 
African ethnolinguistic identities that do not necessarily resonate with African 
~ http://www.sabcnews.comlsouth_8fricalgeneraVO.2112.123485.00.html 
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language speakers' subjective experience and perception of their own identities. 
However, in order to claim and lobby on behalf of their linguistic rights, individuals 
and groups are forced to adopt one of these ascribed identities. Speakers of varieties 
excluded by the constitution are therefore left to feel excluded and the main effort of 
their language activism becomes focused upon agitating for the official recognition of 
their particular variety. Herein lies the potential for divisive identities to be generated 
and become polarised around different named linguistic varieties, as was previously 
not the case for much of the black African population. Pillay's (2005:72) observation 
that 'liberalism, despite claims to the contrary, cannot entertain claims to difference 
which are outside the differences authorised' is particularly relevant in connection 
with this issue. The linguistic human rights paradigm (Skutnabb-Kangas and 
Phillipson, 1994; Skutnabb-Kangas 20(0), which may be viewed as part of a broader 
human rights paradigm and whose influence can be clearly seen in the language 
provisions of the post-apartheid South African constitution, enshrines a one-to-one 
relationship between identities and named standardised linguistic varieties. This is 
fundamentally at odds with inclusive national integration since i.t again places the 
emphasis on difference rather than commonality and, in doing so, heightens the 
potential for language conflict. 
Arbitrary and limiting conceptions of language are [ ... J leading to an enforcement 
of cultural identities that do not reflect the perceptions of local speakers, and a 
delimitation of linguistic identities that jar with constructs of language entertained 
by the community. [ ... J One consequence of this is the production of division and 
conflict both within and between the designated linguistic groups. This situation 
brings to mind Alexandra Jaffe's claim that "fonns of language activism that 
reproduce a dominant language ideology also reproduce the structures of 
domination" (1999:28). [ ... J The notion of language rights endorses an ethno-
linguistic stereotyping in the fonn of monolingual and unifonn identities. It forces 
groups of speakers to work actively to differentiate themselves from others, by 
claiming unique linkages of language and identity so as to gain political leverage 
in the competition for scarce resources. (Stroud and Heugh, 2003:7) 
As long as language activism remains ethnocentric in its motivation it is almost 
inevitable that language questions will continue to be experienced as issues of inter-
ethnic competition and conflict. The fracturing of language activism activities along 
ethnic lines actually has the effect of strengthening the prevailing linguistic ideology 
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of the ruling elite. Instead of concentrating their resources into a harmonious, 
ideologically unified, mutually beneficial endeavour, language activists are forced 
into competition with each other in an effort to claim a slice of the political cake for 
their respective, constitutionally-ascribed ethnolinguistic groups. Consequently, their 
potential collective strength to challenge the undesirable linguistic status quo remains 
unrealised. The current political system also has the effect of trapping language 
activism into an invidious state of ineffectiveness. It encourages or, rather, forces 
language activism to become fractured along ethnic lines but as soon as any demands 
are actually made on behalf of a particular group they are frequently dismissed by 
mainstream (i.e. ANC) discourse as being particularistic, divisive and against the 
'national interest' or, to be more precise, against the ANC's own hegemonic 
interpretation of what constitutes the national interest. 
In a society as diverse and unequal as South Africa, it is difficult to conceive of how 
ethnocentric language activism might contribute towards a reduction in 
ethnolinguistic conflict, which is a condition sine qua non for inclusive national 
integration. For language activism to even hope to challenge the dominance of the 
elitist, exclusive model of nation-building presently being pursued by the ANC 
government, it must seek to serve an alternatively conceptualised, viable 'national 
interest'. At the ideological level, this would seem to require that the interests of the 
wider South African nation 'to be' are made the focus of concern and are placed 
above those of individual ethnolinguistic groups. However, this highly idealistic 
approach would seem to be undermined by significant practical constraints. One is 
forced to ask the question of just how realistic a proposition this reconceptualisation 
of, for example, Afrikaans, Xhosa or Zulu language activism as 'South African' 
language activism is at the level of popular acceptance. It would seem entirely 
fanciful to expect the average person (or social groups in general) to show equal 
concern for the status and use of all linguistic varieties as shelhe would for herlhis 
native language(s). To the extent that this is true, a certain degree of ethnocentric 
motivation in language activism is probably unavoidable. 
A model of national integration which seeks to counter the hegemonic dominance of 
the English language in South Africa obviously ideally requires that speakers of all 
marginalised languages work together, mutually reinforcing, collective self-interest. 
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It has been argued that an alliance of marginalised language speakers is imperative in 
this regard and that Afrikaans speakers, with their historical experience of fighting 
(largely successfully) against English language hegemony, have the opportunity to 
play a leading role in a collective movement which seeks to redress the linguistic 
inequity which characterises present-day South African society. As Alexander notes: 
Afrikaans can play a key role in establishing democracy in South Africa if it 
shares its assets and privileges with the other native languages [ ... J Afrikaans 
speakers must step into partnership with other African language speakers. Not 
because the speakers of Afrikaans, or the language itself, are too weak, but 
because this is the only way to avoid a new ethnic-based language struggle. The 
new South Africa cannot afford to consciously promote division. Language policy 
can divide or it can reconcile and integrate. Paradoxically, history offers 
Afrikaans speakers the opportunity [ ... J to strengthen and support unity in the 
diversity of South African society. (Alexander, 200la:9-11) 
One writer sees In the history of the Afrikaners the great motivating reason for 
speakers of African languages to drop their infatuation with English and make their 
own native tongues the main medium of their public, as well as private, life. 
If the Afrikaners [ ... J needed a new language that could make the Western 
influence on the one hand and their African experience, on the other, intelligible, 
why would Africans think that they could contain the same experience in the 
languages of Europe alone, without domesticating that thought in African 
languages? (Omotoso, 1994:114) 
It has also been suggested that the development of Afrikaans from a highly 
stigmatised, lowly 'kitchen vernacular' to that of a standardised language of science, 
technology and government may serve as an exemplar for the development of, and 
acquisition of higher domains by, the currently marginalised African languages 
(Schlemmer and Giliomee, 2001 :5). To be sure, there is some value in this assertion. 
The development of Afrikaans shows clearly that any stigmatised language can, in 
theory, potentially serve as the basis for a fully developed, literate standard language 
and be equipped with an appropriate terminology for use in all linguistic domains. 
However, as far as nation-building is concerned, the question that remains to be 
answered is whether any such development of the African languages could be 
203 
achieved without a vigorous accompanying ethnonationalist movement similar to that 
which drove the development of Afrikaans. Some degree of caution and historical 
situatedness would therefore seem to be advisable when seeking to draw inspiration 
for the post-apartheid national integration project from the social processes which 
facilitated the development of Afrikaans. One would do well to consider whether a 
highly emotional, virulently xenophobic movement such as that which accompanied 
the rise of Afrikaans does not fall some way short of serving as the ideal model of 
linguistic development for the marginalised languages of South Africa. 
The overriding concern of liberal theory, which has had such influence on much 
contemporary thinking on language policy issues, with, yet simultaneous failure to 
satisfactorily resolve, situations of inter-ethnic conflict and competition has the effect 
of deflecting attention from the deep problems of class-based social inequalities. As 
seen in section 3.7, theories advanced by liberal culturalist authors justify the 
distribution of rights to minority ethnic and national groups on the basis that they can 
counter the cultural deprivation experienced by those who do not have full access to 
the range of cultural options enjoyed by members of majority groups (earens, 2000; 
Kymlicka, 1995; May, 2001). Access to a full societal culture is held to provide a 
meaningful context of choice from which to pursue the 'good life' (see section 3.7). 
However, the existence of inter-ethnic equality, typically expressed in the language of 
rights, does not remove all sources of social inequality since questions of socio-
economic deprivation and marginalisation remain unaddressed. By prioritising ethnic 
groups ahead of socio-economic groups, liberal culturalist theory is disinclined and, in 
fact, unable to theorise adequately upon questions concerning the promotion of socio-
economic justice and equality. While the issue of cultural deprivation is rightly taken 
seriously, to focus on ethnocultural life as the sole context of such deprivation is to 
utterly overlook the cultural deprivations suffered by the poorest members of society, 
irrespective of their ethnic loyalties. 
[T]he groups that are most systematically vulnerable to problems of cultural 
deprivation are not those characterized by their position in an interethnic struggle, 
but rather those who are set apart by the terms of the relation to an advanced 
capitalist economy. Those who are most vulnerable to the ills of cultural 
deprivation are the persistently poor. [ ... ] The poor of every nationality lead lives 
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of great social estrangement. The poor are cut off from the main social institutions 
of their cultures - not just political parties and trade unions, but even such 
everyday institutions as banks, hospitals, department stores and museums. Class 
subordination brings with it a sense of low self-worth and diminished self-esteem 
that hampers the life-chances of the poor, even in situations where their material 
situation improves. (Walker, 1999: 157) 
It should not be forgotten that some of the most vocal advocates of ethnically-based 
minority rights tend to be drawn from the middle-class elites of ethnic groups. These 
elites are often well integrated into mainstream society and do not tend to suffer 
greatly from a lack of access to resources and cultural goods, often having far greater 
access than the poorer members of the majority ethnic group (Blommaert, 2001: 137) 
In South Africa, for example, the current ability of middle-class Afrikaners to gain 
access to cultural goods does not differ hugely from that of middle-class English 
speakers, despite the de facto government policy which greatly favours English. Are 
the middle classes of ethnolinguistic minorities really to be deemed more deserving of 
governmental concern and supportive legislation than the poor and marginalised 
members of majority ethnolinguistic groups? The liberal concern with ensuring ethnic 
harmony over genuine social equality would seem to suggest so. However, such a 
position is incompatible with a model of national integration which has the 
emancipation, on equal terms, of the whole of South African society as its motivating 
value-assumption. After all, it is the poor of all language communities who suffer 
cultural deprivation most severely. None of this is to deny that patterns of socio-
economic inequality may well coincide, to a greater or lesser degree, with 
ethnolinguistic boundaries. Of course, certain ethnic groups inevitably fair better than 
others. However, in a society as unequal as South Africa an excessive concentration 
on ethnic politics cannot hope to resolve the national question to the benefit of the 
majority of the country's citizens. A system that encourages the prioritisation of the 
ethnic group as the unit of greatest socio-political concern will necessarily lend a 
bourgeois quality to language activism since it will be mainly conducted by middle-
class ethnolinguistic elites who, being already comparatively well-integrated into the 
wider political system at an instrumental level, fight a mainly symbolic battle for 
recognition which does not address the cultural deprivation experienced by the poor 
of any ethnolinguistic group. It is increasingly evident that a rights-orientated (in a 
liberal understanding of the tenn) language activism is not especially useful or 
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productive in underdeveloped and highly unequal societies such as South Africa. 
Empirical observation would suggest that the existence of a vibrant language rights 
culture presupposes a reasonably high level of socio-economic development. It is no 
coincidence that countries such as Canada, Belgium, Spain and certain other member 
states of the EU, all of which have a relatively high level of socio-economic 
development and large middle classes, are amongst the countries with the most highly 
developed and institutionalised language rights cultures. Language rights are only of 
any use when citizens have the resources at their disposal to claim them and insist 
upon their implementation. When citizens do not have such resources available to 
them, any rights that they may possess become merely decorative and so remain 
essentially meaningless. For a country like South Africa, then, the contemporary 
concentration on what are essentially immaterial language rights is really a case of 
getting ahead of oneself. Before an effective language rights culture can even hope to 
become institutionalised the requisite socio-economic conditions for its existence 
must be realised and guaranteed. 
6.6 Language planning as a tool of societal development? 
It should be clear by now that linguistic democratisation -is a necessary condition for 
wider societal democratisation. In the South African case, the African languages 
spoken in the country continue to remain a largely untapped resource as far as 
contributing to societal development is concerned. How, though, is the increasing use 
of the African languages in public life linked to the creation of greater instrumental 
attachments (from which can develop additional symbolic attachments) to the South 
African state amongst the oppressed and marginalised majority of its citizens? Quite 
simply, an individual is far more likely to be able to integrate into a system which 
operates in a language she or he understands well. This is most obvious with regards 
to the issue of education. The educational advantages of mother-tongue or first-
language instruction are well documented and do not need to be re-stated here 
(Cummins, 2002; Heugh, 2002b; J. Lewis, 2004; see section 4.5.1). First-language 
education has been described as South Africa's 'missing link' (Beeld, 23/0512(01) 
and, indeed, its importance for the reduction of inequality through the economic and 
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social development of the majority of South African citizens cannot be 
underestimated. 
It is clearly important from the point of view of redistributing wealth and 
facilitating access to occupational opportunities that the use of African languages 
in all areas of work and life (training and skills development, work 
communication, contracts, public notification, and work related documentation 
such as conditions of employment) should be seriously considered. [ ... ] Unless 
African languages are used far more comprehensively in the economic life of 
South Africa, and Africa in general, the majority of citizens will remain outside of 
the mainstream of economic life. (Webb and Kembo-Sure, 2002:8) 
The assertion that language planning has a central, transformative role to play in the 
revitalisation of the African languages, including Afrikaans, would seem to be more 
of an aspiration rather than a judgement formed on the basis of historical precedent. 
While socio-economic equality cannot hope to be achieved as long as economic life is 
left to the mercy of capitalist market forces, the same is true of linguistic equality, so 
the argument goes, the implication being that countering the elitist tendencies of the 
'free-market' language regime must be a vital component of a wider initiative aimed 
at bringing about social transfonnation to the benefit of the majority. And certainly, if 
the hegemony of the English language regime is to be challenged effectively in South 
Africa, it is essential that the African languages acquire market value which will 
empower their speakers and allow them to gain 'cultural capital' (Bourdieu, 1991). 
The Afrikaner poet and essayist, N.P. Van Wyk Louw, writing in the 1950s, famously 
remarked that the successful development of Afrikaans into a fully-fledged state 
language represented the 'socialism of the poor Afrikaner' (Van Wyk Louw, 
1986:350). In a similar way, the African languages need to become a vehicle of the 
'socialism of the poor South African' and Afrikaans must also be harnessed to 
empower the very many non-white speakers of the language. African languages need 
to provide access to jobs, educational opportunities and other avenues facilitative of 
social advancement. The need to endow the African languages with market value also 
emphatically does not mean that English be rejected and its national and global 
importance somehow artificially underplayed. It would be futile and counter-
productive to attempt to do so. It ought to be emphasised that English is a resource 
which can be more efficiently and effectively exploited in the context of a 
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complementary, not competitive, relationship with the other languages of South 
Africa. Again though, theoretical considerations place a considerable restraint on the 
credible advocacy of this line of thought as the basis for a genuinely effective 
language policy for national integration. For those committed to the cause of societal 
transformation and the reduction of socio-economic equality, the belief in the power 
of human agency to effect change in the social order is both attractive and potent. 
However, when applied to the matter of sociolinguistic change, attributions of agency 
must be made with great care (see section 3.2). An approach which says that the 
African languages must be endowed with market value through language planning 
activities must also answer the much more pressing question of how this might 
happen. 
In matters as complex as the South African national question, seeing the problems is 
far easier than seeing the solutions. The basic principles behind an alternative 
language policy for emancipatory national integration which have been set out so far 
in this chapter have assisted in identifying the problems and many of the causes of the 
problems which face those engaged in the field of language policy and planning. 
However, serious attention must also be given to the practical implementation of 
concrete measures in line with these principles. It is not evident a priori precisely 
what form such measures will take as they will necessarily be dependent on the 
particularity of the local South African context. Numerous measures have been, and 
doubtless will continue to be proposed as solutions, or part-solutions, to the national 
question. Perhaps the most notable and certainly one of the most controversial 
suggested solutions to have originated from within South Africa with regard to the 
difficult issue of how many languages should be used in public life has been the 
proposal to harmonise the Nguni and Sotho language clusters. 
6.7 Harmonisation of the Nguni and Sotho language clusters: a viable 
alternative approach to nation-building? 
The Nguni and Sotho language clusters are both sub-groups belonging to the Bantu 
language family. Of the official languages of South Africa, isiZulu, isiXhosa, 
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isiNdebele and SiSwati are Nguni varieties and Sepedi, Setswana and Sesotho belong 
to the Sotho cluster. The idea of creating overarching Nguni and Sotho written 
standard varieties was first proposed as far back as the 1940s by Jacob Nhlapo 
(Nhlapo, 1944). More recently, the most notable advocate of this idea has been the 
prominent South African sociolinguist and language activist, Neville Alexander 
(Alexander, 1989; 1992; 2000). The idea has been advocated as an additive measure 
and not one designed to supplant the numerous standard African languages. 
The development of a written Standard Nguni and a Standard Sotho, as an initial 
phase of a very long-term process of 'uniformation', need not and will not lead to 
the disappearance of Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, SiSwati, Sepedi, Tswana and their 
dialects [ ... ] Indeed, subject to the availability of resources, they will be 
encouraged in print in literature of all kinds. The main difference will be that in 
all formal situations, including the crucial area of education, the Standard Nguni 
or Standard Sotho forms will be promoted. It is to be expected that, over time, the 
spoken standard - used in formal or relatively formal situations - will begin to 
approximate the written standard. (Alexander, 1989:64) 
The technical plausibility of this harmonisation proposal supposedly rests upon the 
fact that the different linguistic varieties spoken within each cluster are generally 
highly mutually intelligible. For example, with a little will and effort, speakers of 
isiXhosa and isiZulu are generally able to understand each other effectively, as are 
speakers of Sesotho and Setswana etc (Heugh, 2000:25). There are consequently no 
obvious insurmountable linguistic barriers to the realisation of the proposal to create 
individual standard Nguni and Sotho languages. However, mainly for political 
reasons, reaction to this proposal has tended to range from the unenthusiastic to the 
downright hostile (Brown, 1992; Brand, 2006:72). Much of the negative reaction to 
the proposal has come from those who have falsely interpreted it as a subtractive 
measure. The fervent, but poorly conceptualised, preoccupation with linguistic 
diversity so evident in the 'human rights' and ecolinguistic approaches to language 
policy issues (see section 3.6.4) reveal themselves as inherently hostile to any 
suggestion of planned future linguistic convergence. The irony here, of course, is that 
such advocates of diversity do not generally question the historical contingency and 
constructedness of the numerous standard languages already in existence whose 
maintenance they passionately defend, despite the fact that these languages were (and 
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still are) themselves also sites of linguistic convergence. In South Africa, the 
desirability of harmonising the Nguni and Sotho language clusters has been 
questioned and rejected most vigorously by those with a vested interest in promoting 
or defending individual Nguni or Sotho languages and their associated identity 
communities. The fact that the Ausbau character of most of the present standardised 
Bantu languages in South Africa stems from the pernicious policies of the apartheid 
regime which were deliberately designed to prevent the emergence of a single, united 
identity-community is often curiously forgotten (see section 4.4). 
The passion with which many scholars and some politicians defend the inherited 
standard written forms of the Bantu languages that were very deliberately not 
provided with the armies and the navies which, according to Weinreich's famous 
definition, mark the difference between a language and a dialect, remains one of 
the great paradoxes of the post-apartheid dispensation. (Alexander, 2004: I 18) 
A lack of appreciation for the historical constructedness and contingency of social 
identities often pervades discussions of the South African situation. A good example 
of this comes from Kymlicka (1989:248), when he asks '[w]hy should the blacks be 
viewed as a single people, when they in fact are members of different "nations", each 
with its own language and political traditions?' In opposition to this view, Pillay 
(2005:60) notes that the 'characterisation of Black South Africans as being made up 
of many 'nations' will prompt queries from those who have shown that cultural, 
ethnic and linguistic communities were consciously fashioned by colonial powers into 
political identities'. Kymlicka' s remark is symptomatic of the difficulty faced by 
proponents of liberal theories of group rights in trying to accommodate conceptions of 
social identities which depart from those which are formally legitimised in official 
state discourse. Capturing the subjective, dynamic nature of inhabited social identities 
is not possible within a liberal theory of group rights. However, by rejecting the 
identity-stereotyping inherent in the liberal approach, one can appreciate that social 
identities may become subject to contestation and negotiation. The harmonisation 
proposal recognises that there is nothing natural or immutable about the inherited, 
ascribed identities from the apartheid and colonial eras. 
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Harmonisation of the Nguni and Sotho clusters is clearly at odds with the interests of 
those ethnic entrepreneurs (see section 5.3.2) seeking to profit from the ethnocentric. 
'competition for inclusion' type of language (and other forms of culture) activism that 
is generated by the liberal nature of the current political dispensation in South Africa. 
What, though, can explain the widespread scholarly tendency to cling to the inherited 
standard languages of the apartheid era? A cynical interpretation might point to a 
defence of vested interests on the part of some academics. After all, many university 
departments and academic positions have been established to facilitate the study of, 
and the research into, individual Nguni and Sotho standard languages. On the other 
hand, one might also possibly interpret it as a deeply pragmatic position, as simply a 
decision to do one's best with the constitutional and other political cards one is dealt. 
To an extent, this position is understandable given the genuinely passionate desire of 
many to see some clear short-term progress with regards to the resolution of the 
profound language-related social problems that blight South African society. 
However, the increasingly frustrating experiences of so many working in the field of 
language policy and planning with regard to the lack of progress made since 1994 
suggests that such as strategy has been, at best, minimally effective. To attempt to 
solve the national question in favour of the majority of citizens while uncritically 
obeying the prescriptions of the liberal, capitalist political order is a largely futile 
endeavour. There is a reluctance on the part of many to be seen to be overly critical of 
the ANC and the political system which nourishes its rule. Such criticism is frequently 
depicted as unpatriotic and bordering on the heretical given the central role the ANC 
played in the anti-apartheid liberation movement (Neocosmos, 2oo4:226). 
At a purely theoretical level and assuming widespread acceptance of its desirability, 
the harmonisation proposal would, after all, seem to have some potentially attractive 
features in so far as advancing national integration is concerned. The role of 
standardised languages and the media that promote them (newspapers, books, 
television etc.) in creating impersonal identity communities has been well 
documented, most notably by Anderson (1983) with his notion of 'imagined 
communities' (see section 2.5.1). Indeed, Alexander (1999:25) has explicitly 
acknowledged the influence of Anderson's work on the development of his ideas 
concerning the harmonisation of the Nguni and Sotho language clusters. The 
development and use of two overarching standard African languages which together 
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would be understood by the majority of South African citizens would clearly provide 
scope for greatly increased communicative effectiveness and efficiency throughout 
society. This, in turn, would be a significant step towards facilitating increased 
participation in the national economic and political system. One should bear in mind 
Kloss's (1967:42) remark that 'complete equality of status seems possible only in 
countries that have two or at most three languages. No country could conduct its 
affairs in four or more languages without becoming hopelessly muddled'. If 
standardised forms of Nguni and Sotho were to be adopted by the state and its related 
institutions alongside English and Afrikaans, a four-language regime could be 
founded. The other official languages, Xitsonga and Tshivenda, both Bantu languages 
but not mutually intelligible with each other or any of the Nguni or Sotho varieties, 
could be handled at the regional level since they are comparatively smaller and 
spoken mainly in quite localised areas in the north of South Africa. Now, for someone 
such as Kloss, even four languages is too high a number for effective government. 
However, compared to the present situation in which there are eleven official 
languages, having just four would be a considerable improvement in the prospects for 
effective and representative government. A reduction from eleven to four languages 
would also make economic sense as translation costs would be reduced and fewer 
versions of documents would need to be produced. This need not be read as an 
endorsement of the notion 'the fewer languages the better'. As the current trend 
towards English monolingualism at the state level demonstrates, a single-language 
regime in South Africa would also be ineffective and inefficient as far as the 
promotion of equal incorporation into the national system is concerned. The apartheid 
regime also demonstrated the undesirability and inequity of a two-language regime. 
Instead, one should preferably think in terms of what constitutes the optimal number 
of languages that a state should use in order to establish effective and accessible 
government. The necessity of establishing an optimal-language regime from a 
conflict-avoidance, integrative perspective stems from the fact that, as Pool 
( 1996: 160) notes: 
Apparently incompatible purposes are invoked as criteria for the choice of official 
languages. such as efficiency. fairness. diversity and liberty. Efficiency seems to 
require a single widely known official language. but this treats the native speakers 
of other languages unfairly. It also induces minorities to transmit (perhaps only) 
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the official language to their children, eroding diversity. Protecting diversity 
apparently requires coercion ~e.g. obligatory minority-language schooling), 
impeding liberty. New solutions, such as automatic translation, artificial 
languages or linguistic decentralization, involve costs, complications, and 
divergent interests, rendering them difficult to adopt or of doubtful efficacy. 
Governments tend to choose languages for their own and constituents' use 
incrementally and to consider these choices seriously, if ever, only after the 
problem of official languages has become a 'crisis'. (Pool, 1996:160) 
Democratic aspirations are clearly at odds with any suggestion of standardised forms 
of Nguni and Sotho being foisted upon an unsuspecting and unweIcoming population 
by state decree. Alexander (2000) has argued that harmonisation should ideally be 
seen as a slow, organic process which leads to the gradual emergence of separate 
Nguni and Sotho standardised varieties. A credible counter argument to this point is 
that the creation of additional standard languages will either simply relocate existing 
linguistically mediated inequalities or become a source of new ones. After all, some 
citizens will undoubtedly come to have a better, more empowering knowledge of 
these languages than others and it is inevitable that these differences will broadly 
correlate with socio-economic inequalities. Certainly, this accusation is difficult to 
refute since access to resources of linguistic empowerment is dependent on a wide 
range of other non-linguistic social factors. There would seem to be some irreducible 
degree of tension between the very clear need to have standardised languages and the 
desire to eradicate linguistically mediated social inequality. This fact is highlighted by 
Brand who notes that 
a unified standard - a single language - is the only way in which language forms 
within the same family can be treated as a unit for certain purposes. This 'received 
view' runs into problems in the educational domain. In initiatives to promote 
'mother tongue education', it is often discovered that, say, 'isiXhosa speakers' 
have difficulty understanding 'standard isiXhosa'. Clearly, there is a need for 
practices of standardization that are pursued in fu]] consciousness of the fact that 
standardization is. at least partly. a political business. and that it can be done in 
ways that either empower or disempower certain sections of the population. 
(Brand. 2006:73) 
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Linguistic inequality cannot, therefore, be addressed effectively in isolation from 
other sources of social inequality. Alexander (2000) is again at pains to stress that the 
advocacy of the harmonisation of the Nguni and Sotho clusters should not be 
confused with the delegitimisation and stigmatisation of any of the smaller 
standardised varieties (e.g. standard isiXhosa or standard Setswana etc.) or the spoken 
non-standard varieties which belong to each cluster. Indeed, as Stroud and Heugh 
(2003: 11) note in the formulation of their 'post-liberal' model of 'linguistic 
citizenship', there need be no inherent contradiction between the teaching of standard 
languages and the use of informal, vernacular varieties for positive educational 
purposes. Instead, one is able to emphasise the possibility of a complementary 
relationship between standard and non-standard varieties. Use of non-standard 
varieties may have an important role to play in generating intimacy and solidarity 
between learners, in combating inherited feelings of linguistic insecurity and 
inadequacy and in providing an avenue of expression for marginalised identities. One 
mistake of the linguistic human rights (LHR) discourse is to believe that the route to 
linguistic equality is to insist that it can only be achieved through access to, and use 
of, standard languages. This is because the LHR discourse is, fundamentally, still 
ideologically sympathetic to the liberal state with its restricting conceptions of 
language and ethnolinguistic identity and, hence, it only deals in the currency of 
officialised, publicly authorised language practices. While the integrative importance 
of standard languages is not to be denied, one must not dismiss the potential of non-
standard languages to contribute to the creation of a positive learning environment. 
The importance of informal and at times stigmatized local varieties in intimate 
contexts [ ... J challenges the emphasis of LHR discourse on formally sanctioned 
and publically recognized linguistic practices. Language or educational policy 
based within LHR paradigms, with their narrow conception of ethnolinguistic 
identity do not fit complex and ever shifting identities, and there is no sense in 
which facts such as these can be productively employed in educational contexts 
within the LHR paradigm. In other words, languages like Tsotsitaae l are not 
legitimised in the rights paradigm. their speakers are thus marginalized. (Stroud 
and Heugh. 2003: ) ) - ) 2) 
31 Tsotsitaal (or Flaaitaal as it also known) is a hybridised urban vernacular, containing elements of 
languages such as Zulu and Afrikaans, mainly spoken in and around Johannesburg (Makhuda, 2(02). 
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Having considered some of the theoretical issues associated with the harmonisation 
proposal, attention must also be given to practical issues and requirements associated 
with the implementation of the proposal. Alexander (2000: 174) suggests that the 
harmonisation process could be facilitated by the decision to label texts which. for 
instance, are mainly in Sesotho or Setswana but contain elements of other Sotho 
varieties as Sotho texts and to label texts which are in Zulu or Xhosa as Nguni texts. 
This seemingly highly simple measure would, however, seem to suffer from a major 
problem at the level of acceptance and this brings us to perhaps the most commonly 
heard criticism of the harmonisation proposal, namely that it is not consistent with the 
language attitudes of the South African people. Alexander has been the object of 
considerable criticism in this regard. For example, Sonntag (2003:90) has criticised 
Alexander's harmonisation proposal for being 'too idealistic and distant from the 
everyday experience of those whose cause he [Alexander] so fervently espouses'. 
Elsewhere, Barkhuizen writes that: 
[Language] planners have to take into account the attitudes of the people of South 
Africa. Unfortunately, what they think is not what Alexander wants them to think. 
He therefore feels that 'they have got to understand' both the history of the 
country's language situation and its plans for the future. Besides being patronising 
and potentially undemocratic, this task will be a very difficult one indeed. 
(Barkhuizen, 1997:94) 
To an extent, Barkhuizen's is a curious criticism to level. Academics and activists, 
such as Alexander, are not servants of public opinion in the way that elected 
representatives (supposedly) are. Instead, their role is to contribute to opinion-forming 
through presentation of fact and argument. There has been no suggestion from 
Alexander that harmonisation be imposed undemocratically and unwillingly on the 
South African people. The challenge for advocates of the proposal is to change 
popular opinion by emphasising the possible benefits that would be derived from 
harmonisation. One can respect the right of others to hold a contrary opinion without 
revering the content of that opinion. The view that to seek to change popular opinion 
is patronising and undemocratic works effectively as an endorsement of the political 
status quo. Without changes in public opinion, legitimate political changes cannot 
readily occur. A vibrant civil society is one in which numerous and, indeed, 
potentially conflicting interests and viewpoints compete to gain favour with public 
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opinion. To stigmatise any proposal which dares to challenge popular opinion as 
'patronising' and 'undemocratic' is to provide fertile ground for the establishment of a 
depoliticised civil society which conforms ideologically to the state-determined 
'consensus' and which continues to be a major factor in the maintenance of the state's 
authoritarian governing practices. 
However, Sonntag's criticism of the proposal is less easily deflected. Under current 
conditions, the harmonisation proposal does strike one as extremely idealistic and 
rigidly unyielding to any synchronic practical considerations. Admittedly, it would be 
fair to say that the language attitudes of much of the South African population are not 
consistent with genuinely inclusive democratic practices. To use Marxist terms, no 
doubt familiar to Alexander, one might well argue that very many South Africans are 
victims of 'false consciousness' (Holden, 1993: 143) in that public opinion is 
undoubtedly moulded to a great extent by the ideological discourse emanating from 
the capitalist state and those sympathetic to it. The notion of 'false consciousness' is 
strongly reminiscent of the conception of hegemony most famously advanced by 
Gramsci (1971). May (2001: 18) neatly summarises this understanding of hegemony: 
[S]o effective and widespread is the promotion and promulgation of a particular 
(dominant) point of view, that even those who may not initially share such a view 
come to accept it and internalise it as normative, as simply the commonsensical 
'way of seeing things' . (May, 200 1: 18) 
Such is the gumption which invariably accompanies dominant ideological discourse, 
any ideas which contain the imagination to challenge these received norms are 
frequently dismissed for being hopelessly idealistic and unrealistic and hence being of 
no synchronic practical application. This type of situation very much pertains in South 
Africa with regard to attitudes concerning the relative values of English and the 
African languages, at least certainly outside the field of specialists concerned with 
matters of language policy and planning, The general feeling seems to be that the 
situation of the African languages is so hopeless with regard to their gaining 
economic value and social prestige that one should simply submit to the unassailable 
dominance of an English-only/mainly dispensation and attempt to make the best of it. 
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In this sense, language planners and policy designers are in something of an 
intractable position. Given the grave difficulty of implementing language planning 
measures which successfully challenge prevailing linguistic nonns, any proposals 
which attempt to do so can often justifiably be dismissed as unworkable or irrelevant. 
Advocates of the hannonisation proposal must be aware that they are faced with an 
extremely onerous task with regards to realising first its acceptance and then its 
implementation is concerned. Respect for democratic practices requires that popular 
opinion be in accord with the harmonisation proposal before government resources 
can be allocated to its attempted implementation. Current indications would seem to 
provide advocates of harmonisation with little optimism in this regard and so 
consequently, the proposal continues to remain a non-starter. A more viable solution 
to the linguistic dimension of national integration policy may lie in a long-term 
strategy to promote a more balanced, symmetrical individual multilingualism. 
6.8 Individual multilingualism and nation-building 
While the example of Switzerland shows that citizens need not necessarily share a 
common language(s) in order for them to share a common national identity (see 
section 4.5), it is obviously far more favourable to the development of such an identity 
if citizens are able to communicate effectively with each other on an inter-personal 
and an inter-community basis (S.Wright, 2oooa). It was discussed in section 5.3.1 
how most South Africans are in fact bi- or multilingual but despite this, there 
nevertheless remain significant barriers to communication between certain 
communities, most notably between African language speakers and speakers of 
Afrikaans and English. With reference to national integration, there are two main 
points of concern here. The first concerns the necessity to transfer the multilingual 
repertoires that high numbers of (particularly urban) African language speakers 
display on a daily basis in private and informal contexts into the public domain and 
civil society. For this to happen, the African languages 'must become what may be 
termed social and economic mobilisers, that is, they be vested with at least some of 
the material privileges and perquisites that are currently shared by only English and 
Afrikaans' (Kamwangamalu, 2004b: 132). The second point concerns the strategy for 
overcoming the communicative barriers between African language speakers and 
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speakers of English and Afrikaans. The most instinctive, 'common sense' reaction to 
this problem, mostly styled in the guise of economic pragmatism, is to advocate an 
asymmetrical solution whereby African language speakers learn English and, to a 
lesser extent, Afrikaans. The notion that members of the English- and Afrikaans-
speaking communities might undertake systematic efforts to learn any of the African 
languages will, quite rightly given the prevailing socio-economic climate, likely be 
dismissed as a flight of idealistic fancy. However, let us consider the potential 
attractions of a situation of symmetrical multilingualism in South African society, that 
is, an ideal-type situation whereby every South African citizen had a useful 
knowledge of English, Afrikaans and one or more African language. A genuinely 
multilingual citizenry which had a multilingual repertoire broadly representative of 
the composite linguistic communities of the South African population at its disposal 
would signify considerable progress towards the achievement of the linguistic 
equality putatively aspired to in the country's constitution. It would also be a great 
facilitator of communication between citizens of diverse linguistic backgrounds. 
Communication between such citizens would not necessarily need to take place on the 
terms of the majority language speaker, as it invariably does at present. A reciprocal 
learning of languages would potentially allow for greater innovation and flexibility in 
inter-personal and inter-group linguistic practices. One could also hope expectantly 
that by learning the languages of other groups, and particularly languages of groups 
long styled as the 'Other', citizens may come to acquire some deeper sense of cultural 
understanding, appreciation and tolerance. Such a scenario would clearly provide 
more fertile ground for the emergence of sentiments of social unity and for the 
development of community relations, without which, democratic national integration 
will remain a faint prospect. 
Now, the great obstacle that one faces in attempting to work towards the realisation of 
a situation even remotely approaching this highly idealistic scenario concerns the 
matter of motivation, Under present conditions there are very few factors motivating 
English and Afrikaans speakers to learn an African language. While intellectual and 
cultural curiosity may lead some individuals to learn particular foreign languages, 
these are generally not motivating factors at the societal level where instrumental and 
economic concerns have the greatest influence on patterns of foreign language 
learning (Ager, 2001:116-117; Dornyei, 1990; Gardner, 1985). In this regard, it would 
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seem unrealistic to hope or plan for the type of individual multilingualism, described 
above, to become the social norm through some kind of 'civic virtue' taking hold 
amongst citizens. If English and Afrikaans speakers are, in significant numbers, ever 
going to learn African languages then knowledge of these languages must hold some 
form of instrumental attraction for them. Until the African languages are imbued with 
economic value, it is inevitable that knowledge of them within the English- and 
Afrikaans-speaking communities will remain very low. At this point, it is worth 
considering a point regarding the harmonisation proposal discussed in the previous 
section. It seems reasonable to imagine that native English and Afrikaans speakers in 
South Africa would potentially have greater instrumental motivation to learn a 
harmonised Nguni or Sotho standard variety than learning one of the sub-Nguni or 
sub-Sotho standard languages such as isiZulu or Sesotho. By learning a single 
harmonised Nguni or Sotho language one would, theoretically at least, be able to 
communicate effectively with speakers of all Nguni or Sotho varieties respectively, 
certainly more effectively than if one just learnt a single sub-variety. If this were to 
happen, one would still only need to learn one language but one's communicative 
potential would be considerably expanded. This, however, is not a realistic scenario 
in the short term, for several reasons. Firstly, as previously discussed, it would require 
widespread popular acceptance of the desirability of the harmonisation proposal itself, 
which currently is not the case. To a certain degree, the predominant attitudes towards 
the harmonisation proposal may be compared with the lack of enthusiasm shown by 
many speakers of non-standard European minority languages towards any proposed 
overarching standard varieties. Examples include the Occitan-speaking community in 
France which has long history of dispute and conflict regarding the claims of various 
varieties to act as the single Occitan standard variety (Ager, 1990:37-41; Bee, 1967). 
The second reason for the present non-feasability of the harmonisaton proposal is that, 
under present socio-economic conditions, even if an individual were able to 
communicate with all African language speakers through the medium of an African 
language, this would still not constitute a significant economic advantage due to the 
extreme marginalisation of all African language varieties from the public and 
economic life. 
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Admittedly, the thoughts outlined here regarding the appeal of reciprocal patterns of 
individual multilingualism are speculative and may be difficult to give firm substance 
to at the present time. A more pragmatic, or one might say pessimistic, approach 
might resign itself, and, to a degree, understandably so, to the interminable dominance 
of English in South Africa's political and economic life. A preoccupation with status 
planning for the African languages has been described as 'unhelpful' (Harnischfeger, 
2003:30) for supposedly deflecting attention and resources away from the synchronic 
necessity of facilitating the acquisition of English amongst the most marginalised 
sections of society. However, the weight of scholarly research simply does not 
support a scenario in which full societal acquisition of English will occur without 
most citizens receiving a fair amount of their primary and secondary education 
through the medium of their mother-tongue. Even if one were committed to English 
becoming the sole national lingua franca of South Africa, experience shows that 
mother-tongue education is sti1l necessary for the cognitive development of individual 
learners, something without which the acquisition of a foreign language such as 
English cannot occur effectively (see section 4.5.1). It has been observed that a 
concentration on English-medium education to the detriment of mother-tongue 
education leads to the existence of widespread 'semilingualism' (Lewis, 2004: 187), 
that is, a situation where people have an insufficient competence in any language. 
English monolingualism is neither a realistic nor an attractive option for a country 
such as South Africa if one has aspirations for the realisation of societal development 
and socio-economic equality. It is also explicitly at odds with the Language in 
Education policy of the Department of Education which states that 'being multilingual 
should be a defining characteristic of being South African' (Department of Education, 
1997). A monolingual approach must therefore be rejected on both ideological and 
practical grounds. A form of reciprocal, individual multilingualism, while 
undoubtedly a difficult task to accomplish, remains a far more attractive and more 
socially beneficial ideal to strive for than one which cements the dominance of elitist, 
authoritarian forms of political governance. If the political will were in place, efforts 
aimed at the promotion of a public individual multilingualism broadly representative 
of the entire South African population could potentially be undertaken. For example, 
government organisations and other public institutions could demonstrate their 
commitment to multilingualism by making knowledge of several languages, including 
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an African language, a prerequisite for entry into certain jobs and educational courses. 
Such a policy would need to be administered with caution, however, in order to avoid 
accusations of reverse discrimination from speakers of English and Afrikaans who do 
not speak any African languages. Even a quota system whereby a minimum number 
of people in whatever organisation are required to have a knowledge of an African 
language would likely be controversial. A similar policy in sporting circles whereby 
provincial and national cricket teams have been forced to include a fixed quota of 
'players of colour' has proved highly controversial and has aroused considerable 
resentment amongst certain people who believe white players are now being unfairly 
discriminated against (Cricket South Africa, 2(01). Despite this caveat, some degree 
of positive discrimination in favour of African language speakers would appear to be 
an unavoidable practical requirement if the African languages are to acquire greater 
presence in public life. However, if this positive discrimination is undertaken within 
the framework of a wider policy commitment aimed at the promotion of individual 
multilingualism, then it may offer some hope in advancing the cause of emancipatory 
national integration. 
6.9 Limitations and potential criticisms of this approach to language 
policy and national integration 
The most immediate limitation of the approach outlined in this chapter concerns the 
scope of its focus. Obviously, an effective pplicy of popular national integration 
through societal development must be about more than just language-related matters. 
It is of great importance not to isolate the language factor as this may lead to both 
skewed diagnosis and ineffective prescription. Matters such as the provision of 
healthcare, welfare, transport infrastructure and certain other public amenities, all of 
which are of great importance for societal development, are beyond the scope of 
language policy theory and, indeed, may be more foundational in their urgency. For 
example, as Blommaert (200 1: 138) notes in relation to language-in-education policy 
in Africa, 'underlying the issue of the language of instruction is a deeper problem: 
who goes to school?' Discussions of the language-in-education issue and educational 
policy in general are rendered of marginal significance if large numbers of children, 
as a consequence of social and economic deprivation, do not actually attend or barely 
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attend school. For example, figures from the 2001 census (Statistics South Africa, 
2(03) show that 17.9% of-the total South African population and 22.3% of the black 
African population aged 20 or above had received no formal schooling whatsoever. In 
the poorer rural provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga, this figure rises to 33.4% 
and 27.5% respectively. According to the census, 16% of the total South African 
population aged 20 and above started but did not complete their primary education 
and only 20.4% of all South Africans (and 16.8% of black Africans) had completed 
their secondary education. From these statistics it is apparent that discussions centring 
on medium of instruction issues in higher secondary education, and even more so in 
university education, are of no direct relevance to more than one half of the entire 
South African popUlation. 
An adequately functioning educational system is obviously one of the most urgent 
prerequisites for the creation of a mobile and prosperous population. This requires, 
amongst other things, properly trained (and paid) teachers, adequate school facilities, 
sufficient classroom materials, textbooks, manageable class sizes, pastoral support 
structures, schools that are within a reasonable walking distance from the homes of 
most students and so on. Linguistic concerns, while certainly of great importance, can 
only ever be one part of a successful educational policy approach. Language policy 
and planning measures can only hope to be effective if they enter into a symbiotic 
relationship with wider, foundational social conditions. The language question is not, 
therefore, the be-all and end-all of successful, emancipatory national integration. For 
the most oppressed and marginalised members of South African society, there are 
undoubtedly more pressing concerns than matters relating to language policy or even 
education. There is the day-to-day struggle to survive in the face of severe poverty, 
the catastrophic HIV / AIDS epidemic and high levels of inter-personal violent crime. 
Consequently, it is important that those scholars and activists working in the field of 
language policy and language pedagogy remain aware of, and advocate, the urgent 
requirement for social development in other domains. The cause of societal 
development will be advanced if a unity of purpose amongst those active in all fields 
of social policy is formed. 
Another potential criticism that may possibly be levelled at the ideas developed in this 
chapter is that it lacks detail with regards to the minutiae of policy implementation. In 
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defence, it should be pointed out that this was never the principal aIm of the 
discussion. The principal aim was to identify some of the main areas of ideological 
and practical concern and seek to outline the key emphases of a policy response to the 
problems raised. The minutiae of policy implementation is naturally best left to 
experts working on the ground rather than detached academic theorists (in the case of 
the present author, regularly detached by over 5000 miles from the South African 
situation), although this does not preclude the possibility and, indeed, desirability of 
frequent reciprocal consultation and exchange of information. Input from a full range 
of committed, capable language specialists is desirable for the formulation and 
implementation of a thorough, wide-ranging language policy. The ideas expressed in 
this chapter can only ever hope to form a small fraction of that input. Given that the 
establishment and development of a national community is an on-going, trans-
generational process, there can be no definitive solution or final word on the matter. 
Models of national development will need to be continuously re-assessed and nuanced 
to meet changing conditions and requirements. 
It might be the case that the approach to national integration outlined here will receive 
criticism for being overly pessimistic and negative with regards to the potential of 
language planning to contribute to the transformation of South African society .. In 
response, it should be pointed out that the rigorously developed theoretical insights 
into language policy and planning explicated in the early chapters of this study, 
coupled with the overt lack of historical precedents from which to take genuine hope, 
permit no other conclusion. It should be understood that, given the logic of the 
prevailing political and economic conditions which sustain its rule, one cannot 
reasonably expect the current South African government to adopt policies in line with 
the motivating values behind these suggestions through mere force of argument, 
particularly when such arguments do not enjoy widespread popular support. The 
social change needed to bring about popular integration into the national system 
cannot take place without significant political change. The nature and extent of the 
political change required is, however, something far beyond the control of any 
language planning measures. 
What role, then, is left for language planners? For some readers, the foregoing 
discussion might seem to point towards a somewhat defeatist stance with regards to 
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the language planning situation both in South Africa and more generally. However. 
this need not necessarily be the case. As long as one constantly has in mind the very 
real limitations of language planning, language planners need not become despondent 
about the situation in which they find themselves. It might sound trite but humans can 
only control the controllables. It has never been the argument in this study that 
language planning alone can ever credibly hope to bring about the requisite 
transformation in social conditions that would lead to the democratic linguistic 
transformation of South African society. What one can say is that should such social 
conditions ever broadly pertain, then language planners will have an important role to 
perform in harnessing linguistic resources so that they best complement and support 
those conditions. Even under such ideal-type conditions, most linguistic matters will 
not simply just take care of themselves to the most desired effect. 
The one area in which language planning can perhaps strive to be more than just 
complementary to existing societal trends is with regards to language attitude 
planning (Verhoef, 1998). Trying to influence opinions, rather than attempting to 
directly influence behaviour, is probably the most realistic short-term goal for 
language planners. Once powerful opinions are influenced and persuaded of the 
desirability of a particular vision or course of action, the possibility of initiating 
meaningful societal change becomes greater. It is above all in this sense, then, that 
one can emphasise the contemporary and future importance of language planning in 
advancing the cause of inclusive, emancipatory national integration. The trouble with 
much language planning is that it attempts to influence behaviour before dedicating 
itself to influencing opinions and attitudes. It is therefore unsurprising that such 
planning is either experienced as coercive and prescriptive or as an abstract, detached 
irrelevance. A great challenge for future language planning is to engage its target 
populations so that they may participate in, and help to shape the processes of, the 
sociolinguistic development of their societies. The more this is able to happen, the 
more progress might be made towards the goal of founding cultures of bottom-up 
language planning, something which is a necessary antidote to the deletrious effects 
of coercive, top-down language policies which continue to abound around the world 
and especially in highly unequal, post-colonial contexts such as South Africa. 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 General summary of findings 
The first objective of this study was to define and explain the main concepts of 
analysis before applying them to the specific South African context. Chapter 2 
examined the concepts of 'nation' and 'ethnic group' and many of their attendant 
cognate terms. The two concepts were held to be kindred on account of their joint 
possession of a core ethnic character. This joint presence of ethnicity which, it was 
shown, is a subjectively determined sense of group self-differentiation, lends both the 
ethnic group and the nation a similar psychological character and function. Some 
authors, though, have unsuccessfully sought to differentiate nations and ethnic groups 
on psychological grounds when, in fact, the most useful and verifiable basis for 
making a valid distinction between the two concepts is a sociological one. It is the 
possession of modem sociological characteristics such as a common civic/public 
culture and a uniform, standardised education system which distinguishes nations 
from mere ethnic groups. From this, though, it does not logically follow that nations 
themselves are distinctly modem entities. Nations cannot be defined purely in terms 
of their modem elements. To do so is to overlook or ignore ethnicity as a defining 
feature but without any ethnic core, there can be no nation. Without the ethnic core, 
one is just left with a set of civic or political elements which, by themselves, are 
incapable of generating the types of psychological solidarities and attachments and 
ultimately therefore, the types of identities that may be described as national. As for 
the relationship between language and ethnic identity is concerned, the perhaps 
somewhat underwhelming insight that there is often a very central, but by no means 
essential, relationship between the two was affirmed. Nevertheless, mere empirical 
observation shows that it is quite rare for ethnic identities to not, in some way, find 
expression through some form of linguistic distinctiveness. If a group cannot claim a 
unique language or language name for itself, then it is still generally able to express 
its ethnic distinctiveness through elements such as accent and other salient linguistic 
particularities. Where national identity is concerned, not only is language frequently a 
highly important marker of the nation's core ethnic identity, it also has a crucial role 
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to play in the construction and maintenance of the standardised civic culture which 
sets the nation apart from the ethnic group. The South African case is a potent 
illustration of the fact that a linguistically fractured public space is a serious 
impediment to the creation of a common, inclusive civic culture. 
Chapter 3 offered an in-depth conceptual analysis of language policy and planning 
and the way in which these are frequently linked to matters of ethnic and national 
identity. Firstly, though, a definition of language policy as a combination of language 
practices, language beliefs or ideologies and language planning or management 
measures was proposed. It was noted that language policies may exist in covert or 
overt form and vary in salience depending on the context in question. Furthermore, 
contradictory official and de facto language policies may be in operation 
simultaneously within a polity, giving rise to the existence of an unharmonised 
language policy situation. Given the strong linkage established between language and 
ethnic/national identities in chapter 2, one was then in a position to style language 
policy and planning as a species of identity policy and planning. And, indeed, it was 
shown how all types of language planning, whether corpus, status or acquisition 
planning, frequently reflect a concern for, and sometimes have an impact upon, issues 
of ethnic or national identity. As a result, it was possible to construct a typology of 
language-in-national identity policies which can be broadly correlated to the 
ethnolinguistic composition and complexity of the state in which they operate. 
Chapter 3 ends with an extensive description and analysis of some prominent 
contemporary thought in language policy theory. The single greatest issue that has 
preoccupied much contemporary language policy theory essentially involves the 
determination of how much normative value should be placed upon the antagonistic, 
contradictory processes of linguistic convergence and divergence. In language policy 
terms, this has become conceived as a conflict between the desire to promote national 
unity or nation-building on the one hand and to protect linguistic diversity on the 
other. Although these discussions were not engaged with on a normative level for the 
reasons set out in section 1.1, it was shown that even if one willingly suspends one's 
normative disbelief, much of the most prominent work in current language policy 
theory deals in inadequate conceptualisation and therefore fails on an internal level to 
effectively tackle the issues it engages with. Despite some game attempts, liberal 
culturalist theory cannot get around the unavoidable tensions that arise from the 
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simultaneous advocacy of minority ethnic rights and the promotion of a nation-state 
style identity discourse. Elsewhere, spokespersons for linguistic diversity who 
continue to conceive of the object of their passion in terms of the number of language 
names currently in use, rather than by a true measure of objective linguistic variation, 
provide themselves with a highly dubious conceptual basis upon which to espouse 
their cause. 
In chapter 4, an overview of language policy and planning trends and their impact 
upon processes of group identity formation throughout the colonial and post-colonial 
history of South Africa was presented and interpreted in the light of the theoretical 
insights developed in earlier chapters. It was noted that the history of identity 
planning through language planning in South Africa has largely been one of failure 
and resistance due to the fact that most language planning has been coercive and top-
down in character and not in harmony with prevailing sociological and political 
conditions. The sociolinguistic history of South Africa is a salutary reminder of the 
limited potential of language planning to effect fundamental changes in the social 
environment which do not accord with wider, agentless, macro-social trends. 
Developments in the post-apartheid era have demonstrated the powerlessness of 
official language policies when they are flagrantly contradicted, underimplemented or 
even ignored by hegemonic governing regimes. Constitutional aspirations in the 
direction of public multilingualism, linguistic equality and respect for diversity have 
been severely compromised by the consolidation of 'elite closure' which has seen the 
institutionalisation of highly exclusionary, English-mainly linguistic practices in the 
public arena. This has led to the emergence and political pre-eminence of an elitist-
bourgeois, monolingual-anglophone South African national identity in the post-
apartheid era, something which has sown the seeds of conflict around the issue of 
language. 
One such conflict was discussed in chapter 5, namely the issue around Afrikaans 
which demonstrates the extremely detrimental effects that ethnocentric language 
conflict can have on efforts to promote a common, inclusive national identity. The 
great political dominance or, indeed, hegemony of the ANC in the post-apartheid 
years has allowed its own particular vision of South Africa nationhood to acquire 
strong normative force. As a result, the ANC has become increasingly prescriptive 
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and less consensus-seeking with regards to what may form the content of South 
African national identity. Unfortunately for Afrikaans speakers, the ideological thrust 
of ANC national identity policy has meant that their language is being increasingly 
marginalised in public life. The presence of Afrikaans has declined in many areas of 
national importance, most notably with regard to its use in universities and other 
higher educational establishments. This issue in particular has been the source of great 
discontent and has very much become the locus of the Afrikaner community's 
21 Slcentury taalstryd. The extremely emotional and essentially irrational nature of this 
identity conflict, for all parties involved, has leant it an intractable quality that 
temperate, rational language planning measures cannot effectively address. If, 
somehow, the focus of the conflict is able to shift to the material, instrumental 
interests of the many socially marginalised Afrikaans speakers that are being damaged 
by the increasing anglicisation of educational establishments and other public 
institutions, then language planning may be able to offer some tailored assistance in 
resolving this unsatisfactory state of affairs. If Afrikaans speakers are to be able to 
make a positive contribution towards the development of an inclusive South African 
national identity through the medium of Afrikaans, it is imperative that conflict 
tendencies around the language are nullified so that Afrikaans can become an 
effective vehicle for the empowerment of its speakers in all domains of public life. 
Chapter 6 outlined some of the key potential principles and practices behind a 
language policy that would form part of a wider policy initiative aimed at the equal 
incorporation of South African citizens into the national system. It was shown how 
the hegemonic pre-eminence of a liberal capitalist ideology embraced by the ruling 
ANC has entrenched authoritarian governing practices in the post-apartheid era. As 
far as language is concerned, such authoritarianism is mediated through continuing 
marginalisation of the African languages from public life and, by consequence, also 
the speakers of these languages. The nature of the country's constitution and the 
mandates of organisations such as P ANSALB has provided highly inadequate scope 
for the effective promotion and institutionalisation of a genuinely emancipatory public 
linguistic environment. Instead of focusing on issues of socio-economic equality and 
improvement, the current political environment has ensured that language activism is 
generally ethnocentrically orientated and concerned with the acquisition of rights 
which, for the majority of South African citizens, remain basically meaningless since 
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their socio-economic marginalisation means that they are unable to claim them or 
insist on their implementation. Some intitiatives which have been proposed as a 
means of founding a truly representative linguistic public culture include the proposal 
to harmonise the Sotho and Nguni language clusters and the stimulation of nationwide 
(in the social, ethnic and geographical sense) reciprocal individual multilingualism. 
However, a number of obstacles are preventing any effective moves towards the 
realisation of these scenarios. The most significant of these obstacles with regards to 
the harmonisation proposal is that its essential desirability is not widely accepted or 
viewed favourably in popular public opinion which is largely compliant with, or 
acquiescent to, the ideology of the dominant ANC which itself is inherently hostile to 
any meaningful changes in the current status quo of elitist political power relations in 
South Africa. This status quo also renders aspirations towards the successful 
promotion of reciprocal individual multilingualism most unrealistic because current 
conditions remove nearly all sources of motivation for English and Afrikaans 
speakers to learn African languages. As a result, asymmetrical, uneven patterns of 
individual multilingualism, which reflect the wider power relations in South African 
society, persist. One of the great challenges for language planners in the South 
African context is to influence and change both powerful and popular opinions so that 
they come to favour, and advocate, linguistic practices which are consistent with other 
non-linguistic initiatives which have the equal incorporation of all South Africans into 
the national system as their guiding motivation. Whether such a momentous task will 
be possible ultimately remains to be seen but theoretical insights into language policy 
and planning unfortunately would not seem to offer much cause for optimism. 
7.2 Some suggestions for further research 
Many of the findings and ideas presented in the preceding chapters are not limited, in 
their relevance or application, to the contextual scope and content of this study. The 
necessarily limited nature of any research of this sort clearly begs the need for further, 
related research. One can identify a number of areas in which additional, beneficial 
research relevant to the findings and ideas discussed in this study might be conducted. 
There is clearly still a great need for continued research within a specifically South 
African context. No single piece of work can credibly aspire to be the final word on 
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such dynamic, diachronic processes as national identity formation and language 
policy fonnulation and implementation. Consequently, the interplay of linguistic and 
identity factors with processes of national integration is something which requires on-
going documentation. The usefulness and desirability of context-specific models of 
language policy and national integration, such as the one outlined in chapter 6 of this 
study, is subject to change across time and can only be properly ascertained through 
continued testing in, and engagement with, prevailing synchronic conditions. 
Changing social and political conditions will have implications for the acceptance, 
rejection, improvement and refinement of such models and ideas. Therefore, it is the 
task of future research to determine or, at least, contribute towards the determination 
of the relevance and value of past research. 
Naturally, the character and content of any further research carried out and presented 
within the specific South African context will reflect the ideological tendencies and 
concerns of those researchers undertaking it. For example, any research by adherents 
to the Linguistic Human Rights and/or ecolinguistic paradigms, which, on past 
evidence, tends to be gratuitously normative, will clearly have a different tone and 
emphasis to the model of language policy and national integration developed in 
chapter 6. Given that this study rejects imposing normative prescriptions, it would 
seem a redundant exercise to suggest further avenues of research for those whose 
ideological convictions and preferences differ significantly from those of the present 
author. For those that do broadly share the preferences for a model of language and 
society outlined in chapter 6 of this study, a number of suggestions for further 
research undertakings may be made. Firstly, it is clearly beneficial that any such 
linguistic research consciously situates itself within a paradigm of a wider, practical 
policy commitment to social development and the reduction of social inequality 
(Ager, 2001: 105). However, this is not to say that such research need necessarily be 
insensitive to, or ignorant of, the issue of ethnically-based claims and any conflicts 
that result from such claims, merely that, unlike with a lot of language policy 
research, this will not be its primary emphasis or priority. Secondly, given that the 
causes of societal underdevelopment and socio-economic inequality are more than 
just linguistic in origin and persistence, it is vital that future research overcomes the 
tendency of much sociolinguistic or sociology of language research to restrict itself to 
a unidisciplinary approach. There is obviously great benefit to be gained from 
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combining a sociolinguistic approach to the relevant issues with insights from other 
fields of social research (see section 6.9). Such a multidisciplinary approach might 
conceivably, and hopefully, lead eventually to the emergence of a unified field of 
societal development research, of which a linguistic element would naturally form an 
important part, certainly in the South African context at least and doubtless in many 
other post-colonial contexts throughout the world. However, some caveats are worth 
stating in connection with this. If one chooses to undertake research within a 
paradigm of 'language policy for societal development', one must be careful not to 
blindly import findings from one context to another. If language policies and planning 
measures taken on their behalf are to maximise their potential to succeed, it is 
important that they be 'tailor-made' to their specific contexts, although this obviously 
does not disqualify them from possessing a less context-specific ideological emphasis. 
The successful development of coherent, context-specific models of language policy 
therefore requires the sensitive harnessing of the particular and the universal. 
None of the foregoing, though, is to deny the desirability and usefulness of 
comparative case-study research. The benefits of a comparative approach to the study 
of the relationship between language and national identity have been demonstrated by 
several previous studies (e.g. Chriost, 2003; Oakes, 2001). As far as the South African 
case is concerned, one highly interesting avenue of potential research would involve a 
comparison with language policy and planning trends in the European Union. At one 
level, there would seem to be a number of significant similarities between the two 
polities. The official language policy of the EU is, like that of South Africa, liberal-
democratic in character, as revealed by its extreme preoccupation with matters 
pertammg to 'rights' and its putative promotion of linguistic diversity and 
multilingualism through the institutionalisation of a set of named, official languages, 
whilst simultaneously promoting the unified ideal of a common European identity. 
Consider the following statements from some EU-related documents. 
The Union shall respect cultural, reJigious and Jinguistic diversity. (Article 22 of 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights, Nice Treaty, 2(00) 
European identity and European citizenship as defined by the Treaty on European 
Union incorporate the notion of cultural and linguistic diversity. For speakers of 
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regional or minority languages, the notion of European citizenship has an 
important dimension only if ~e European Union effectively respects its lesser-
used languages as an important part of - and an added value to - the European 
heritage and culture. (European Bureau For Lesser Used Languages, Ljouwert 
Declaration, 2002) 
The parallels with the language-related clauses from the post-apartheid South African 
constitution are unmissable (see sections 4.5 and 6.3). Neither policy makes any overt 
commitment to social development and improving the material life of citizens through 
the implementation of language policy but, instead, only goes so far, in 
characteristically liberal fashion, as to promise to 'respect' or 'tolerate' linguistic 
or. 
diversity. The returns from this supposed commitment to linguistic diversity have 
been predictably meagre in both cases. For example, Phillipson (2003: 142) describes 
the European Union's commitment to promoting linguistic and cultural diversity as 'a 
general EU goal that is seldom converted into specific implementation or monitoring' . 
It is also apparent that both the South African and EU policies are working with a 
highly inadequate conception of linguistic diversity, measuring it in terms of the 
number of named languages rather than by an objective measure of linguistic 
variation (see section 3.6.1). A further similarity between the EU and South Africa is 
that while neither has had much success in implementing and consolidating genuinely 
multilingual practices in line with their respective constitutional aspirations, both 
seeming to conform to the rule 'the more languages, the more English' (De Swaan, 
2001: 144), the two polities have enthusiastically embarked upon a strong symbolic 
promotion of the linguistic and cultural diversity that they purport to represent as part 
of a programme of top-down identity construction (see section 6.4). It has not been 
common for the term 'nation-building' to be used in connection with language and 
identity policy at the supra-state, EU level, but as S. Wright has noted: 
[I]n some respects nation building and the construction of the European Union 
bear certain resemblances. Of course for the idealists who instigated the steps 
towards European integration the main idea was to overcome the pathological 
nationalisms of Europe. not to recreate them at a higher level. Nonetheless. where 
overt strategy has been employed to foster European identity. there are certain 
parallels and. where situations and circumstances have evolved fonuitously. there 
are patterns to be observed. (S. Wright, 1997:465) 
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Attempts by European integrationists to overcome these divisive, 'pathological' 
nationalisms are highly reminiscent of the ANC's strong resistance to political 
expressions of sub-state ethnolinguistic identities or 'tribalism' as it has historically 
been referred to. The following is taken from a 2005 ANC 'discussion document' on 
the 'national question': 
What is the national question in South Africa? In the first place, it is about the 
liberation of blacks in general and africans [sic] in particular. Secondly, it is the 
struggle to create a non-racial, non-sexist democratic and united South Africa. 
Thirdly, it is the quest for a single united South African nation with a common 
overriding identity. Fourthly, it is about combating tribalism, racialism or any 
other form of ethnic chauvinism. (ANC, 2(05) 
Pillay (2005:57) observes of the ANC's conception of South African nationhood that 
it 'claims a conceptual globality as its terrain' while styling sub-state ethnic demands 
as 'pragmatic localities'. Competing conceptions of the universal and the specific are 
clearly at work in both South Africa and the European Union. The irony is that the 
universality claimed by the ANC government for its model of South African 
nationhood would logically be considered a particularistic claim by the EU if South 
Africa were a member state of the organisation. Equally, a hypothetical, future world 
governing organisation would likely style expressions of European identity as 
particularistic. Identity-based claims to universality must therefore be treated with 
deep scepticism and be seen for what they are, namely an attempt at the normalisation 
of the specific identity in question. 
The similarities between the language-in-identity policies of South Africa and the 
European Union outlined above provide substantial scope for some potentially 
interesting theoretical discussions. However, such discussions can only hope to make 
sense against the background of a full appreciation of the differences that exist 
between the two polities. One difference has already been suggested at, namely that of 
scale. South Africa is a state with a population of around 45 million (2001 Census) 
while the European Union is an expanding supra-state organisation of 27 member 
states (following the admission of Romania and Bulgaria into the union in January 
2007) with a population of over 400 million. Even more important than the issue of 
scale, though, at least as far as an analysis of language policy and identity trends is 
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concerned, is that of the major sociological, demographic and structural political 
differences between South Africa and the European Union. De Swaan points to three 
significant differences between the EU and 'formerly colonised countries' such as 
South Africa: 
European societies are much wealthier than their overseas counterparts, their 
populations are far more educated, and the languages of the European states are 
without exception 'robust'. They have been under the protection of the central 
state for two centuries or more; they are imposed in the schools, the courts, and 
the bureaucracies, in courts [sic], in politics and government. That is why the 
supercentral languages will not easily dislodge them from the domestic functions 
in their 'home' societies. Thus, it is the European state system, even in the era of 
its transformation into a supranational political entity, which continues to shape 
the dynamics of the European language constellation through the peculiar 
resilience each state has conveyed to 'its' language in the past. (De Swaan, 
2001 :146) 
South Africa has nothing really comparable with the European state system. Its 
provincial governing structures are fairly weak and do not represent or speak for any 
particular ethnolinguistic groups in a way comparable to how European states 
represent their corresponding national groups. Unlike the EU, the South African 
'language constellation', to use De Swaan's term, is emphatically shaped at the 
highest level of the polity. Whilst the EU seeks to wrestle ever more power from its 
member states from 'above', political power in South Africa is already highly 
concentrated at the top level (i.e.state) and so, therefore, the struggle for the 
redistribution of power becomes one from 'below'. An interesting issue for further 
research, bearing in mind the differences between South Africa and the EU just 
mentioned, would be to investigate the respective success of the two polities' identity 
building policies. A possible hypothesis that would need testing is that given the main 
focus of most European citizens' ethnopolitical loyalty is, despite the challenging 
effects of globalisation trends (Malesevic and Haugaard, 2002; S. Wright, 2004:157-
178), still the state, the EU might face considerably more difficulty in engendering a 
sense of common European identity than the South African state would in creating a 
common South African national identity. 
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The South African and EU settings thus provide an excellent opportunity for studying 
the differing effects of ideologically highly sirrular language policies (i.e. liberal 
democratic, rights-based policies with a putative commitment to pluralism) in two 
extremely different societal settings. Whether the emphasis of such research is placeJ 
on issues of identity or on issues of societal development, or, on both since the two 
are often inextricably linked, depends on the preferences and choices of the 
researchers in question. However, it is to be hoped that the introduction of a suitable 
comparative element into any future research might aid the development and 
implementation of ever more appropriate language policies and planning measures for 
each of the societies in question. South Africa, in particular, is in urgent need of an 
effective language policy approach if it is to go any way towards meaningfully 
addressing the many linguistically mediated problems that beset the country and face 
the challenges of the 21 ,( century with renewed optimism. 
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